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Foreword 
In 2007, when I was granted the opportunity to participate in the EU-FP6 
project European Programme of Soft-Tissue Engineering for Children 
(EuroSTEC Contract: LSHB-CT-2006-037409), I was far from knowing what 
the final product of my research, my PhD thesis, would look like. 
The life of  law and philosophy departments are surely much different from that 
of a medical faculty, and even more different from  the proceedings in a 
department of obstetrics and gynecology, where I ended up conducting my 
research.  
I thought I was going to sit safely behind a desk with a computer and a pile of 
books with yellowed and underlined pages, and think. After a while, I would 
stop the reading and the thinking and would start writing a book, my first. That 
book would have a clearly defined topic, with a continuous line of thought; it 
would be divided into chapters with a sequence and a conclusion that would 
correspond to the steps and stages of the argument that by then would have 
taken me at least three years to come up with.  
Little did I know… 
Although I sat behind a desk most of the time, I did not work on a clearly 
defined topic, but on many topics. My chapters are not written according to the 
sequence of one argument, but of many, and, as the reader will notice, 
sometimes, different types of arguments and strategies are used to justify 
different claims about different topics. Sometimes, even, my previous argument 
will contradict the next because, in the meantime, I have changed my mind 
about a topic.There is, however, a central idea that is woven across the chapters 
of my thesis and that is that in ethics, pregnancy and the pregnant women as 
objects of study are surrounded by uncertainty and complexity. We do not 
know what they really are so not only do we not know how to treat them, we 
also often ignore them as addresses of our moral theories and practical 
judgments. This cannot be right. 
With that in mind, I have focused on various ethical issues that arise with the 
advent of maternal-fetal surgery.  
Since the chapters of my thesis were written according to the medical faculty 
tradition, to be submitted to peer-reviewed journals for publication, the reader 
will find that there is some repetition in the arguments presented. Also, the 
sequence of chapters follows no hierarchical structure, although personally, I 
find chapter two the most urgent and important. 
I hope you take as much pleasure in reading them as I did in writing. 
‘Dr
a. Conceição Ferreira († 19??- 2004), at long last, a philosophical view I can 
call my own.’ 
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Introduction 
For the last five decades, the development of prenatal diagnosis and of 
assisted reproductive technologies has achieved remarkable public 
interest. Despite being used in and by only a small percentage of the 
world population, they have had a great impact on how pregnancy and 
birth are understood. The previously inaccessible and invisible sequence 
of events that occurs inside a woman’s body is now visible and 
‘manageable’; embryos and fetuses are out there for ‘anyone’ to see and 
ten-eleven weeks gestation ultrasound pictures have become the first 
“baby picture” of many west born family photo albums. In other words, 
pregnancy is now publicized and thus politicized. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, at the same time that prenatal care was 
becoming more common in Europe and in North America, laws 
regulating legal rights to abortion were also being implemented in that 
territory. What followed was a never-ending dispute about the moral 
and legal status of embryos, fetuses, and pregnant women. A debate 
which was promptly exacerbated during the 1990s by the fast 
development and refinement of prenatal diagnosis and by the 
concomitant development of maternal-fetal surgery to improve the 
outcome of severely debilitating, and sometimes even deadly, congenital 
birth defects.  
Monica Casper’s seminal work, The Making of the unborn Patient: a 
Social Anatomy of Fetal Surgery contains a very detailed description of 
the modern history of MFS.
1 
It is generally accepted that it began in 1963, in New Zealand, where Sir 
William Liley performed the first successful prenatal blood transfusion 
on a 32 weeks male fetus affected by RH disease
2.  
                                                           
1 Casper MJ. The Making of the Unborn Patient. A Social Anatomy of Fetal 
Surgery. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London, 
1998. 
2  Rh incompatibility is a condition, which develops when a pregnant woman 
has an Rh-negative blood type, and the fetus she carries has Rh-positive blood 
type. During pregnancy, red blood cells from the fetus can get into the woman's 
bloodstream through the placenta. If she is Rh-negative, her system cannot 
tolerate the presence of Rh-positive red blood cells. In such cases, the woman’s 
immune system treats the Rh-positive fetal cells as if they were a foreign 
substance and makes antibodies against the fetal blood cells. These anti-Rh Introduction     
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About that, David Zimmerman wrote: 
“Liley’s needle had penetrated barriers beyond 
flesh and death on its way to the heart of the 
womb: breached, too, was the metaphysical barrier 
between the world of life that is and the universe of 
life that is yet to be. A fetus had been treated, 
medically, as one of us. 
Shattered, too, had been the barrier of medical 
custom. Prudence and caution insisted until then 
that the womb and its contents were beyond the 
boundary of direct medical intervention.”
3 
 
A considerable number of fetuses survived because of Liley’s efforts. 
However, because no reliable fetal imaging techniques were available to 
ascertain fetal position, intrauterine transfusions also resulted in a 
significant amount of fetal death.
4 
At the same time, on the other side of the world, researchers from U.S. 
and Puerto Rico universities were investigating the potential of open 
MFS for treating RH disease as a countermeasure to the “bad” results of 
Liley’s “blind procedure”. In 1965, Stanley H. Asensio, from the 
University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine successfully performed a 
hysterotomy on a woman and treated her fetus with a blood transfusion. 
The fetus, a girl appropriately named Miracle, survived the procedure, 
but the latter proved to be an isolated case and in all other subsequent 
attempts, the fetuses died.
 5 
After almost twenty years, in 1983, the International Fetal Medicine and 
Surgery Society (IFMSS) was founded in the United States, in the 
sequence of the first reported success of “true” MFS, performed at the 
Fetal Treatment Center from the University of California, San Francisco 
                                                                                                                                 
antibodies may cross the placenta into the fetus, where they destroy the fetus's 
circulating red blood cells. Rh incompatibility can cause symptoms ranging 
from very mild to fatal.  
3Zimmerman, David R. RH: the Intimate History of a Disease and Its 
Conquest. New York: Macmillan, 1973. p233 
4 Casper MJ, 1998 
5 Casper. MJ, 1998 Introduction     
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(UCSF) on a woman carrying a fetus with a severe kind of urinary tract 
obstruction.
6  
Rosa Skinner, seven months pregnant at the time, was put under 
anesthesia, a hysterotomy was performed, and the operable part of the 
fetus was exposed and worked upon by the surgeons. When the 
surgeons were done, the fetus was placed back in her mother’s uterus 
where it was expected to stay until term. It did not, but it survived, and 
so did Rosa Skinner.  Baby Michael, named by the surgeon who saved 
his life, was born on Mother’s Day 1981
7   
At that time, the IFMSS put forward a number of criteria for MFS 
referral. With some adaptations, they are still followed today. 
 
Criteria for Maternal-Fetal Surgery 
1  Accurate diagnosis and staging possible, with exclusion of 
associated anomalies. 
2  Natural history of the disease is documented, and prognosis 
established. 
3  Currently no postnatal therapy. 
4  In utero surgery proven feasible in animal models, reversing 
deleterious effects of the condition. 
5  Intervention performed at specialized multidisciplinary fetal 
treatment centers with strict protocols and approval by local ethics 
committee with informed consent of mother or parents. 
                                                           
6 Harrison, M.R., et al. "Fetal treatment 1982", The New England journal of 
medicine, vol. 307, no. 0028-4793; 0028-4793; 26, pp. 1651-1652.  
7 The San Francisco’s Chronicle published in May 2005 a newspaper article 
entitled “First fetal surgery survivor finally meets his doctor: 24 years ago, 
UCSF surgeon saved his life in mom's womb” where Journalist Sabin Russell 
describes the meeting between the first survivor of MFS and the surgeon who 
saved his life 24 years before. See: 
http://fetus.ucsfmedicalcenter.org/our_team/news.asp and http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/05/05/BAGG9CK9F41.DTL Introduction     
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Deprest et al. 2006 
8 
Since the creation of the IFMSS, more or less invasive surgical 
procedures have been developed and several kinds of “fetal 
abnormalities” have been diagnosed and targeted as potentially 
correctable via MFS as well. The latter include, among others, 
congenital diaphragmatic hernia, myelomeningocele  or  Spina Bifida, 
gastroschisis, fetal tumors, heart block, tracheal atresia / stenosis, and 
less severe conditions such as cleft lip and palate.
  
Notwithstanding the accomplishment of MFS in saving some fetuses 
from certain death or disability, surgeons soon verified that the 
manipulation of women’s uteruses causes contractions, which often 
result in rupture of the membranes and pre-term labor. Those fetuses 
that survive surgery, but are born too soon, have then to endure 
intensive care, risking further disability because of prematurity and not 
necessarily because of the defect that made them suitable for MFS in the 
first place.  
In order to minimize these effects and, perhaps more importantly, the 
significant maternal morbidity associated with open MFS
9, less invasive 
surgical techniques such as endoscopic MFS and fetoscopy were 
developed during the last two decades. Without a hysterotomy and with 
only one or two openings in the pregnant woman’s abdomen, surgeons 
are now able to intervene surgically upon the woman, fetus, cord, 
placenta and membranes.  
Most indications for operative fetoscopy are still experimental, but at 
least one has already become standard of care. That is the case of 
                                                           
8 Deprest J, Jani J, Lewi L, Ochsenbein-Kolble N, Cannie M, Done E et al. 
Fetoscopic surgery: encouraged by clinical experience and boosted by 
instrument innovation. Semin.Fetal Neonatal Med. 2006;11:398-412. 
9 Maternal morbidity associated with MFS includes complications related to 
major abdominal surgery; complications that result from tocolytic management 
for prevention of preterm labor, namely pulmonary edema; complications 
resulting from premature membrane rupture, like infection  and sepsis; uterine 
rupture, placental abruption, severe blood loss that requires blood transfusion, 
etc.  Introduction     
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umbilical cord occlusion in monochorionic twins.
10 Congenital 
diaphragmatic hernia and bladder obstructions are also examples of fetal 
indications for operative fetoscopy.
11  Modern open MFS has been 
rarely attempted in Europe but it has been performed in (women 
carrying) fetuses with big tumors and hydrops and myelomeningocele. 
12 
Jennings and Kunisaki describe in detail the proceedings of such 
interventions - from preoperative preparation to anesthesia, 
intraoperative monitoring and postoperative care. 
13 
 
Applied Ethics 
In a report entitled ‘care for the unborn child – ethical and juridical 
aspects of fetal therapy’ (in the original “Zorg voor het ongeboren kind - 
Ethische en juridische aspecten van foetale therapie” (2009)), the Health 
Council of the Netherlands has identified several areas of concern when 
evaluating fetal therapy from an ethical point of view. 
14 
Without being exhaustive and in no particular order, those areas of 
concern were: 
 
                                                           
10 Senat, M. V., Deprest, J., Boulvain, M., Paupe, A., Winer, N., & Ville, Y. 
2004, "Endoscopic laser surgery versus serial amnioreduction for severe twin-
to-twin transfusion syndrome", N.Engl.J.Med., vol. 351, no. 2, pp. 136-144 
11 Deprest J, Jani J, Gratacos E, Vandecruys H, Naulaers G, Delgado J et al. 
Fetal intervention for congenital diaphragmatic hernia: the European 
experience. Semin.Perinatol. 2005; 29:94-103. 
12 Deprest, J. A., Devlieger, R., Srisupundit, K., Beck, V., Sandaite, I., Rusconi, 
S., Claus, F., Naulaers, G., Van de Velde, M., Brady, P., Devriendt, K., 
Vermeesch, J., Toelen, J., Carlon, M., Debyser, Z., De Catte, L., & Lewi, L. 
2010, "Fetal surgery is a clinical reality", Semin.Fetal Neonatal Med., vol. 15, 
no. 1, pp. 58-67. 
13 Kunisaki SM, Jennings RW. Fetal surgery. J.Intensive Care Med. 
2008;23:33-51. 
14 Gezondheidsraad. Foetale therapie. Update van de stand van de wetenschap. 
(publicatienr. 2008/10.). 2009. Den Haag, Gezondheidsraad. Introduction     
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1. The definition and significance of the concept of fetus as a patient, 
including its moral, cultural, political and legal implications. 
2. The issue of the “maternal” obligations towards the fetus. 
3. The issue of the obligations of physicians and researchers towards the 
pregnant woman and the fetus qua patients and/or research subjects. 
4. The issue of the protection of research subjects’ rights and of the 
design of ethically acceptable clinical studies. 
6. The question of the moral and legal acceptability of late term 
abortion. 
 
The partners of the European Programme on Soft Tissue Engineering 
for Children (EuroSTEC) have used the report from the Dutch Health 
Council as a guideline to determine the research priorities of its research 
area 5 (RA5): “ethical and legal aspects of soft tissue engineering for 
children and fetal interventions” .
 15 My PhD project, being one of the 
                                                           
15 EuroSTEC is divided into 5 areas of research and 10 work packages.  Our 
task falls under research area 5, work package 9: “ethical and legal aspects of 
soft tissue engineering for congenital birth defects in children and fetal 
interventions” 
In short, the project aims at developing body tissues with the capacity to 
regenerate, correct, or substitute other impaired tissues that are responsible for a 
number of congenital birth defects (such as spina bifida, urogenital defects, 
gastroschisis, diaphragmatic hernia, and esophageal atresia).  
A variety of cells, including stem cells, fibroblasts, muscle cells and 
urothelial/epithelial cells will be cultured in vitro and seeded into biomatrices.  
These will be implanted using specially designed animal models for major 
congenital birth defects, and will be evaluated for their capacity to regenerate 
the appropriate tissues.  The biomatrices will degrade in time and will hopefully 
be replaced by the body’s own tissue thus assuring compliance with growth 
which is especially important in babies and young children. Prenatal and 
postnatal reconstructive procedures will improve the final outcome of 
reconstructive surgery.  
A randomized clinical trial (RCT) for diaphragmatic hernia will form the start 
of the patient registry and protocol development for future clinical application: 
fetoscopic endoluminal tracheal occlusion (FETO) trial:  the EuroCDH trial and Introduction     
 
13 
 
work packages of that research area, reflects some of the aspects 
identified by the Health Council report and deemed important by the 
consortium that has financed my research.  
 
Scope of the Thesis 
Among the topics identified as areas of ‘ethical concern’ by the 
EuroSTEC consortium (chapter 1), three have deserved special attention 
in this thesis: [1] the issue of the possibility and consequences of fetal 
patienthood (as ethical concept) for the moral judgements and options 
taken both in clinical practice and in MFS research (chapter 2); [2] the 
research ethics topic of clinical equipoise, seen by many as a sine qua 
non condition for the conduct of ethically acceptable clinical trials 
(chapter 3 and 4); and [3] the issue of counselling and informed consent 
of pregnant women in the context of MFS (chapter 5).  
Because common sense holds that any specialist has his or her own 
target patients, there is apparently nothing problematic with the 
definition of the fetus as a patient. Women are gynecologists’-
obstetricians’ patients, children are pediatrician’s patients, elderly 
people are geriatrician’s patients, cats and dogs are veterinarian’s 
patients, fetuses are fetal surgeons’ patients. 
However, the concept of the fetus as a patient is not as innocuous as it 
might seem because of the terms in which its meaning has been defined. 
The qualification “patient” has been used to ascribe moral status to the 
fetus and to justify the existence of moral obligations towards them, in a 
way that has both ignored the philosophical debate about moral status in 
general, and the limits of our knowledge about fetal development in 
particular. It is unclear in which way one can really speak of the fetus as 
a patient. If it were a patient, it would have the same status as the 
pregnant woman and it would have to be seen in a position that is 
independent from hers. It is, however, not obvious how that can be 
conceptually and coherently argued.  
My goal is to provide those involved in the care of pregnant women 
who consider MFS with a critical evaluation of the ‘concept of the fetus 
                                                                                                                                 
“Tracheal Occlusion To Accelerate Lung growth-trial (TOTAL trial): 
http://www.eurocdh.eu/ 
15 
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as a patient’ (FaP) and with an alternative to that concept that is, in my 
view, more coherent with the knowledge we have about the ontological 
status of the fetus and of pregnant women. The latter, I hope, will also 
prove more adequate as guidance to medical professionals in solving the 
conflict of (moral and professional) duties that will inevitably arise in 
the practice of MFS.  
In addition, I aimed at elaborating a series of recommendations 
regarding the “ethics’ of clinical trials involving pregnant women and 
MFS. The dominant view in research ethics has been that equipoise is a 
prerequisite for conducting any ethically acceptable RCT. 
Etymologically,  equipoise comes from the Latin word equi and the 
French word pois, literally meaning “equal weight”. As an ethical 
principle, it aims at protecting the value of the principle of “primum non 
nuocere”
 16 that is in the heart of the Hippocratic Oath and all 
therapeutically driven medical practice. Equipoise is thus based upon 
the idea that physicians who are also researchers have special (fiduciary) 
obligations to provide the best available treatment to their patients. 
According to this view, randomization can only be ethical if the relevant 
medical community is genuinely uncertain about which of the arms of 
the proposed trial is superior in terms of the balance of risks weighed 
against the anticipated therapeutic benefits of each trial arm for the 
participating patient-research subjects. In this thesis, the criticisms made 
to this principle and the several ways in which it has been interpreted 
and even adapted to accommodate RCT involving MFS have been 
described and critically analyzed. The latter culminated in the analysis 
of the concept of the Therapeutic Misconception in the context of MFS 
research, and in the elaboration of an ethical framework that I hope will 
prove more adequate to guide researchers considering the conduct of a 
MFS clinical trial, than the ones we currently have.   
Finally, the previously described work resulted in the elaboration of a 
series of general recommendations regarding the counseling and 
informed consent of Dutch patients who are eligible for MFS for 
Myelomeningocele outside the Netherlands. 
Outline of the Thesis  
In chapter 1, a survey of experts’ views on the ethical issues raised by 
the development of a clinical application of tissue engineering is 
presented. The central objective was to identify, with the use of a 
                                                           
16 “First do no harm.” Introduction     
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modified Delphi study, the morally problematic issues the experts 
involved in research on soft tissue engineering for closure defects deem 
more important during the different phases of the EuroSTEC project. 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. In part one, the concept of “the 
fetus as a patient” (FaP) as developed by Professors Chervenak and 
McCullough (C&M) is investigated.  
C&M’s work is inescapable to anyone involved in MFS, as they 
maintain, with very few exceptions, a quasi-monopoly of what has been 
written about the ethics of MFS. In this first contribution, C&M’s 
proposal is criticized from the point of view of the internal consistency 
of their argument for the moral status of the fetus. We have checked the 
coherence and consistency of C&M’s proposal with their own 
foundational assumptions, including their justification of the concept of 
FaP and of the nature of physicians’ obligations towards pregnant and 
fetal patients.   
In part two of Chapter 2, we provide an alternative to C&M’s concept of 
FaP as the foundation of physicians’ moral obligations in the context of 
MFS. That alternative aims at justifying moral obligations within a 
moral framework that is based on human rights. We have chosen the 
theory of human rights developed by Alan Gewirth. His Principle of 
Generic Consistency (PGC) requires that all prospective purposive 
agents (PPAs) act in accordance with their own and their recipients’ 
generic rights to freedom and well-being. Firstly, we give arguments for 
the ascription of independent/ intrinsic moral status to both the fetus and 
the woman in whom it gestates. Secondly, we put forward a criterion for 
the solution of the conflicts of duty that will inevitably arise in the 
context of MFS.  
Chapter 3 is dedicated to an analysis of the concept of equipoise and its 
relevance for the ethical review of MFS research protocols.  Equipoise 
is a widely accepted ethical requirement for conducting randomized 
controlled trials (RCT). In both part one and two of this chapter, a series 
of arguments against its use in the ethical review of clinical research is 
presented. Section 3.1 exposes the shortcomings of clinical equipoise to 
evaluate the appropriateness of MFS research and presents an 
alternative to that concept: in our account, RCT involving MFS can be 
ethically initiated when a multidisciplinary ethics review board (ERB), 
based on an evidence based assessment of the risks involved, is 
convinced that the value of answering the research hypothesis for the 
sake of the health interests of future pregnant women carrying fetuses Introduction     
 
16 
 
with certain congenital birth defects, justifies the actual risks present 
research participants might suffer within a set roof limit of 
low/manageable. 
Having as case study the first European RCT of MFS for congenital 
diaphragmatic hernia (CDH), the TOTAL trial (Tracheal Occlusion To 
Accelerate Lung-growth trial), our aim in section 3.2 was to determine 
whether RCTs are adequate for the clinical evaluation of maternal-fetal 
surgery for CDH. In order to do that we have described the conception 
and setting up of the TOTAL trial and analyzed the ethical dilemmas 
faced by the research team during that time.  
Section 3.3 presents an argument against the use of equipoise in general. 
This section has been published in Dutch. Some of the points made in 
the original English version of this paper were ‘lost in the translation” 
and for that reason, the original in English is added. 
Chapter 4 is the result of a joint effort of representatives of the 
multidisciplinary teams involved in the care of children with 
myelomeningocele, aka Spina Bifida, in the Netherlands.  In the 
sequence of the release of the MOMS trial results ( February 2011) the 
first RCT on prenatal repair of myelomeningocele, the Fetal Treatment 
Center of the University Hospital of the Catholic University of Leuven 
in Belgium began training its staff to offer MFS for Spina Bifida (as 
described in the MOMS trial protocol) to patients. In order to make the 
process of referral of Dutch patients to Leuven as transparent as 
possible, a position paper about the admissibility and conditions for 
referral was written by the PROSPER consortium (Prospective Spina 
Bifida registry of outcome after intrauterine surgery consortium). In this 
chapter, I describe the ethical issues that were discussed during the 
setting up of the consortium, the source of those concerns, the way they 
were dealt with by the work group, and well as the foundation of the 
choices made.  
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the main arguments and conclusions 
of this thesis and a section dedicated to the discussion of several topics 
that need further investigation. 
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Ethical aspects of soft-tissue engineering for congenital birth 
defects in children- what do experts in the field say.  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is part of the EuroSTEC project, which aims at developing 
tissue engineering-based treatments for structural disorders present at 
birth. EuroSTEC is positioned at the intersection of three areas with 
their own ethical issues: (1) regenerative medicine, (2) research with 
pregnant women and fetuses, and (3) research with neonates. Because of 
the overlap of these three areas in this project, we can expect to be 
confronted with new ethical challenges. To be able to respond 
adequately and timely to current and possible future ethical issues, a 
prospective and anticipatory ethical analysis is essential. 
To obtain a first survey of ethical issues that might arise during the 
different phases of the project, the Delphi method was used. The 
professionals directly involved in the EuroSTEC project were 
questioned about their views on possible ethical issues. The first round 
yielded 27 ethical issues that the respondents were asked to prioritize in 
the second round.  
For the fundamental research phase, issues deemed most important were 
privacy and informed consent of the tissue donor. For the animal 
experimentation phase, three issues were mentioned (in order of 
decreasing priority): the suffering of animals, the use of animals as 
means to an end, and the limited adequacy of the animal models. Issues 
that were deemed most important during the clinical (trial) phase 
pertained to the problem of weighing risks and benefits for the 
fetus/child and the pregnant woman. 
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INTRODUCTION 
EuroSTEC is an Integrated Project on ‘Soft tissue engineering for 
congenital birth defects in children’. Funded by the European 
Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6), it 
commenced on January 1
st, 2007. The project unites fifteen partner 
organizations (ten research institutes and five companies) from nine 
European countries.
1 
Modern tissue engineering approaches will be used to treat children with 
congenital structural disorders, such as spina bifida, urogenital defects, 
gastroschisis, diaphragmatic hernia and esophageal atresia. Usually, 
these closure defects are first diagnosed during routine prenatal 
ultrasound screening. In case of, for example, spina bifida and 
diaphragmatic hernia, many pregnant women (parents) may decide to 
terminate the pregnancy. In other cases, the child will be operated on 
some time after birth and – depending on the kind and severity of the 
defect  – will require surgery and/or other treatments throughout 
childhood and even into adulthood. Closure defects are associated with 
a varying range of morbidity and decreased quality of life. [1] In the last 
two decades, in utero fetal therapy has been performed to reduce long-
term morbidity of the child. At present, a multicenter RCT is being 
performed in the United States to study maternal-fetal surgery for spina 
bifida.
2 In short, modest advances have been made in the field of 
maternal-fetal surgery for certain structural defects, although these 
interventions are still experimental. [2-4]  
The EuroSTEC project focuses on both maternal-fetal (or in utero) as 
well as neonatal interventions using tissue engineered products. Part of 
the EuroSTEC project design is an extensive ethical analysis, which will 
focus on all three phases of the project – fundamental or in vitro 
research (which, for the purposes of this article, will be referred to as 
‘fundamental research’), animal experiments and clinical trials – and 
will also look ahead to the application of soft tissue engineering in 
clinical practice.  
The ethics of the clinical applicability of tissue engineering has so far 
received little attention. Issues that receive a relatively large amount of 
attention within the broader context of tissue engineering are the use of 
                                                           
1 The EuroSTEC project, www.eurostec.eu (last accessed October 2, 2009). 
2 Management of Myelomeningocele Study (MOMS), 
www.spinabifidamoms.com (last accessed October 2, 2009). Chapter 1 
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human embryonic stem cells and therapeutic cloning. [5] The 
EuroSTEC project is positioned at the intersection of three fields: (1) 
regenerative medicine, (2) research with pregnant women and fetuses 
and (3) research with neonates. All three areas have their own ethical 
issues, but because of their overlap in this project, the combination of 
these issues may lead us to be confronted with new ethical challenges. 
To be able to respond adequately and timely to possible future moral 
issues, a prospective and anticipatory ethical analysis is paramount. [6] 
In this paper we survey experts’ views on ethical issues raised by the 
development of a clinical application of tissue engineering. From the 
perspective of an empirically based ethics, the views of these 
professionals – all involved in the EuroSTEC project – are expressly 
relevant because they have practical experience of the day to day 
(research on the) clinical application of tissue engineering. This unique 
feature may lead them to identify ethical issues that are difficult to 
recognize for those who are not directly involved in the process. The 
central objective of this empirical study was to identify what ethical 
issues experts involved in research on soft tissue engineering for closure 
defects expect to occur during the different phases of the EuroSTEC 
project. 
 
METHODS 
Data collection and analysis 
A modified Delphi study
34 was deemed the most suitable method to 
survey the ethical issues that EuroSTEC professionals expect to occur 
during the course of the project. The Delphi method is a systematic, 
iterative forecasting method used to collect and distil knowledge from a 
group of experts. [10] Characteristic of this qualitative research method 
is that it takes place over several rounds, with the answers of one round 
being used to formulate questions for the next rounds. 
In this case, the first round consisted of a questionnaire with two 
sections: (1) six short questions asked for certain personal information, 
such as gender, nationality and role in the project (respondents were not 
                                                           
 
4 The Delphi method is a standardized research method. However, it is common 
to modify a Delphi study and restrict the number of rounds to ensure a high 
response rate throughout the multiple rounds. [7-9] Chapter 1 
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asked to include their name), and (2) four open-ended questions. Each 
of these questions invited the respondents to list ethical issues they 
expect to occur during a specific phase of the project (fundamental 
research, animal experimentation, clinical trials, clinical practice). For 
the latter two phases, respondents were asked to answer for maternal-
fetal and neonatal interventions separately.  
The research population consisted of all persons involved in one or 
more research areas of the EuroSTEC project (which includes, among 
others, paediatric urologists, fetal and neonatal surgery specialists, 
obstetricians/gynaecologists, animal research experts, researchers in the 
fields of biochemistry, biopolymer synthesis, molecular biology and 
bioengineering). All professionals involved in the project were invited 
to participate in the first round. The questionnaire was sent to the 
research population by email several days before a central research 
meeting in November 2007. Respondents had the opportunity to return 
it by email or in hard copy at the meeting itself. 
The results of the first round were initially analysed by the primary 
analyst (AO) and subsequently reviewed by the second analyst (WD). 
Respondents’ answers referring to the same issue were given the same 
code label. Subsequently, similar ethical issues were grouped in a 
category. In June 2008, the results were presented to the participants. As 
is customary in a Delphi study, the results of the first round were used to 
develop the questionnaire for the second round.  
This second questionnaire consisted of: (1) the same six short questions 
as in the first questionnaire; (2) a list of ethical issues distilled from the 
first round, grouped by research phase. For each ethical issue in the list, 
respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how 
important they thought this issue would be during the project (1 labelled 
“not important”, 5 labelled “very important”). Again, the entire group of 
professionals was invited to participate, regardless of whether they had 
responded to the first round questionnaire. The second Delphi round 
was conducted during a central research meeting in November 2008; the 
questionnaire was sent to the research population several days in 
advance, and respondents had the opportunity to return it by email or in 
hard copy at the meeting itself. The results were described and analysed 
in the final months of 2008 by calculating the average score per item (on 
a scale of 1 to 5) using SPSS 16.0 software. Product of round two was a 
list of ethical issues, ranked in order of importance. 
 Chapter 1 
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RESULTS 
Response 
The first round saw a response of 29 out of a total of 48 (60.4%). The 
response rate of the second round was 67.9% (or 38 out of 56). There is 
a discrepancy in the total number of addressees between these rounds, 
since eight people were added to the EuroSTEC project between round 
1 and round 2. For respondent characteristics, see table 1. 
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The first round yielded a total of 27 ethical issues. During this first 
round, the questions were divided into the four phases: the fundamental 
research phase, the animal experimentation phase, the clinical trial phase 
and the clinical practice phase. However, answers pertaining to the last 
two phases appeared to be very similar. With exception of certain issues 
in the field of research ethics, all pertain to both clinical trials as well as 
eventual implementation of tissue engineering in clinical practice. 
Therefore these phases were combined in the second round 
questionnaire (and renamed the ‘clinical (trial) phase’). The scores given 
to the 27 issues in round two (on a scale of 1 to 5) ranged from 2.54 to 
4.59 (see also table 5). 
 
Results by research phase 
Fundamental research 
For the fundamental research phase, the first round yielded two main 
categories, named ‘source’ and ‘donation’, with a total of ten issues 
mentioned (see table 2).  
Source 
Six different issues all refer to the source of cells used in the 
fundamental research phase. The origin of these cells appears to be 
morally problematic or at least morally relevant to the respondents.  
Donation 
The second category within this research phase (entitled ‘donation’) 
contains four issues that all refer to some part of the donating process; 
material received from a person and used for research or development of 
a tissue engineered product. Often mentioned in this respect were the 
protection of the privacy and the need for informed consent of the tissue 
donor. Also mentioned, although much less often, was the possible 
invasiveness of the procedure through which tissue is obtained. An 
example of this, mentioned by a respondent, is the possible risks 
involved in collecting amniotic fluid from a pregnant woman for the 
purposes of research. 
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In terms of ranking by importance, issues directly related to the tissue 
donor (privacy and informed consent of the donor and the invasiveness 
of the procedure) ranked highly, taking the 4
th, 5
th and 11th place in the 
overall ranking (of 27 issues in total). The use of excess tissue obtained 
through abortion and the use of embryonic and umbilical cord stem cells 
were among the lowest ranked (at places 24, 25 and 26, respectively). 
The other five issues ranked between places 14 and 20. (see also table 5) 
 
Animal experimentation 
For the animal experimentation phase the answers given could be 
brought back to three issues, grouped under the category of ‘use of 
animals’ (see table 3). Firstly, as mentioned by almost all respondents, 
the suffering of the animals during experiments, which ranked highest 
among the three (and ranked 7
th overall). Secondly, the instrumental use 
of animals – as means to an end – to improve the health of human 
beings was mentioned. Lastly, the limited adequacy of the animal 
models was pointed out, although this was mentioned far less frequently 
than the first two. The latter two ranked at numbers 18 and 21, 
respectively. 
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Clinical (trial) phase 
The clinical (trial) phase yielded the largest amount of issues (14), more 
than the fundamental and animal experimentation phase combined. The 
list of issues could be clustered into five different categories, namely: 
risk-benefit ratio, parents, material, intervention and miscellaneous. (See 
table 4) 
 
Risk-benefit ratio 
A category of issues mentioned by virtually all respondents was 
difficulties surrounding the risk-benefit ratio. In the EuroSTEC project, 
‘risk’ can be divided into different types of risk. In the case of a 
maternal-fetal (or in utero) intervention, there are risks for both the 
pregnant woman and the fetus. As explained by respondents, for the 
pregnant woman this means the negative consequences of a surgical 
intervention, without her actually experiencing any physical benefits 
herself. These risks include miscarriage and preterm delivery after the 
procedure, and the risk of bodily injury associated with any surgical 
intervention. The risks for the fetus include, again, spontaneous abortion 
or preterm delivery, with associated consequences of severe morbidity 
or death of the fetus, and the risk of bodily injury.  
In addition to risks associated with the surgical intervention, 
respondents indicated that the materials used carry certain risks with 
them. The collagen used, derived from bovine tendon, may lead to 
infection with certain viruses. In addition, there appear to be some 
questions as to whether the use of certain cells could give rise to the 
development of tumors later in life. Chapter 1 
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However, the maternal-fetal intervention has numerous possible 
benefits, both for the future child and the pregnant woman. As pointed 
out by several respondents, the future child may need fewer or no more 
surgical procedures later in life, or may even survive where it would 
have died with conventional treatment. Benefits for the pregnant woman 
include for example an improved psychological well-being due to 
having a healthier child. As pointed out by the respondents, the ethical 
question is how we balance the risks against the benefits, especially 
because so little is known about some of the risks. 
 
Parents 
The category we called ‘parents’ comprises three different issues all 
somewhat related to the parents’ involvement in decision-making 
regarding participation of their fetus or child in clinical research or 
consenting to treatment of this child. Respondents indicated that parents 
may experience discomfort or feel pressured by the researcher and/or 
physician (ranked 9
th). Also mentioned was the impossibility of fully 
informing the parents of the risks involved in procedures using tissue 
engineered products (number 13 on the ranking list), since the 
technology is complex and difficult to understand, especially for lay 
people, and particularly at a time of intense pressure. Mentioned only 
once was the matter of respecting parents’ religious beliefs when 
dealing with their views about the use of certain materials (from animal 
sources) in their (unborn) child (ranked 23
rd). 
 
Material 
Two issues were grouped under ‘material’, both initially mentioned by 
only a few respondents. Firstly, the use of animal material inside the 
human body or, as one respondent put it, the ‘mixing of humans and 
animals’ was identified as an ethical issue. Secondly, one respondent 
mentioned possible objections against the use of animal material (or 
rather, material from certain specific types of animals) for religious 
reasons. Incidentally, these two issues were ranked low compared to the 
other issues, placing at spots 22 and 27 of the ranking list, respectively. 
Intervention 
A fourth category of ethical issues refers to difficulties surrounding the 
determination of the right time of intervention. Though it may seem like Chapter 1 
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a medical-technical question, it does have a moral layer, as discussions 
about the right timing of an intervention are related to the moral status 
of the fetus and the idea that it is gradual and dependent on viability. In 
the discussion, we will return to the respondents’ phrasing of the ethical 
issues.  
An issue that came up repeatedly – and was deemed the most important 
issue during the second round – was the dilemma of choosing between 
termination of pregnancy and surgical intervention with poor long-term 
quality of life prospects for the child. 
Several professionals involved in clinical research and/or clinical 
practice mentioned the issue of determining the right timing of a 
maternal-fetal intervention. This in effect is related to weighing risks 
and benefits of the two options – respondents named the example of 
spina bifida, in which early intervention (i.e. covering of the defect) 
diminishes secondary damage to the spinal cord due to prolonged 
exposure of the neuronal tissue to amniotic fluid, but which in turn 
might lead to delivery before the fetus is viable. If one were to intervene 
later in the pregnancy, when the fetus has a chance of survival if born 
prematurely, secondary damage to the spinal cord has already occurred. 
Another issue mentioned is the difficulty of determining how severe a 
defect should be for a surgical intervention to be required. In some 
cases, the defect is non-lethal but comes with considerable morbidity. 
Respondents questioned whether we should then take the risk of 
intervening  in utero, with a possibly better long-term quality-of-life 
prospect, but also with the risks of infection and premature delivery 
associated with a maternal-fetal intervention. In other words, if a 
neonatal intervention is an option, should we still want to perform a 
maternal-fetal intervention? 
All three issues ranked relatively highly: at number 1, 8 and 10, 
respectively. 
 
Miscellaneous 
Several uncategorized issues were grouped under ‘miscellaneous’. An 
issue mentioned once was distributive justice, or as the respondent put 
it: “will this only be available to the richest, or is it for everyone?” 
(ranked 17
th). Mentioned more frequently were the so-called ‘rights of 
the fetus’ (ranking at number 16). Chapter 1 
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An issue that pertains specifically to clinical trials is deciding on the 
right moment to cease clinical research and implement the intervention 
in clinical practice. As several respondents indicated, this should not be 
done too early, since enough evidence of the risks and benefits 
associated with the treatment should be available. On the other hand, it 
would be a shame to wait too long, because that would delay the 
potential good that can be done. 
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DISCUSSION 
Our Delphi study yielded a total of 27 ethical issues. Some issues were 
rather non-specific, such as ‘informed consent of tissue donor’ for the 
fundamental research phase or ‘the suffering of animals’ for the animal 
experimentation phase. Others – like many of the fourteen mentioned 
for the clinical phase – more specifically related to the EuroSTEC 
project, either because they pertained to tissue engineering research or to 
research with fetuses or neonates (or a combination of both). As 
mentioned previously, the project is positioned at the intersection of 
different fields with their own ethical issues. It is interesting to note that 
the issues deemed most important are not specific to tissue engineering 
research, but to research with pregnant women and fetuses and neonates. 
Some of the issues mentioned were more in the realm of morally 
relevant facts and problems than true ethical issues. An example is ‘the 
possible invasiveness of the procedure through which tissue is 
obtained’: although the implications of risks associated with a procedure 
do inform the moral judgments about the acceptability of the procedure, 
the invasiveness itself is not an ethical issue in the strict sense of the 
word. Our participants were not ethicists and may have had some 
trouble identifying ethical issues in their practice and phrasing them in 
the questionnaire. In addition, the fact that we used a questionnaire as 
method of data collection most likely had some influence: written 
questionnaire answers are usually somewhat concise (more concise 
than, for example, during a face-to-face interview). This may have 
caused participants to phrase their answers as morally relevant facts and 
problems, whereas if they were to elaborate further, the underlying 
ethical issue would become more explicit. Therefore, we did include 
these morally relevant items in our analysis.  
In a previous literature study focusing on ethical aspects of tissue 
engineering [5], an overwhelming majority of papers was found to focus 
solely on the use of human embryonic stem cells or therapeutic cloning, 
while other ethical issues received little attention. It was argued that the 
most pressing matter at this time were ethical questions related to 
clinical trials, because of the current stage of development of the field of 
tissue engineering. Trommelmans et al. [11,12] too argued that these 
issues have so far received relatively little attention.  
A recent publication by Trommelmans et al. reported on a survey 
conducted among participants of a consortium of universities and 
enterprises focusing on tissue engineering of skin, cartilage, bone, and Chapter 1 
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viscera. [13] Participants were asked for their opinion on the need for 
development of ethical guidance and were presented with statements 
concerning clinical trials. Our study took a more bottom-up approach: 
we started by asking the participants to name ethical issues, instead of 
presenting them with a fixed list. Based on their study, Trommelmans et 
al. argued that clinical trial issues are in need of more profound 
reflection, a conclusion we endorse based on our own research.  
As evidenced by our priority list – issues more or less related to clinical 
trials were in the top half of this list – tissue engineering professionals 
too consider these issues to be of great importance. Both previously 
cited articles and our participants note that the complexity of tissue 
engineered products poses challenges to meeting the requirements of 
informed consent (for donors as well as recipients of tissue/tissue 
engineered products) and making an accurate risk-benefit analysis. We 
believe ethical challenges in clinical trials are in most immediate need 
of attention, both from tissue engineers and ethicists. 
It might be objected that knowledge gained from the two Delphi rounds 
was – by nature of those rounds – more broad than deep. However, this 
was our explicit objective; to give an initial survey of the full range of 
ethical issues expected by people with experience in tissue engineering 
research. The mere wording of some of the respondents’ answers 
request further explanation in face-to-face conversations. An example of 
this would be the issue ‘the rights of the fetus’. Although it may seem a 
rather straightforward concept, by using the term ‘right’ in combination 
with ‘fetus’, a certain interpretation of the entity ‘fetus’ as a subject with 
rights is implied. Future research – in the form of focus groups – will 
aim to deepen this knowledge and explore the issue further. 
Our research population consisted of a diverse group of tissue 
engineering professionals: participants were involved in fundamental 
research, animal experiments and/or clinical research, and many 
different countries, nationalities, occupations and institutions were 
represented. In future empirical research, we wish to extend the target 
population to include other groups, such as tissue engineering experts 
outside of the EuroSTEC project. Additionally, the views of ethicists 
and of prospective patients and/or their parents are lacking in this study. 
It is our explicit intention to include them in future research. 
Ethics of tissue engineering and regenerative medicine is still a 
relatively small field. This study was one of the first to feature a survey 
of tissue engineering professionals’ views on ethical aspects of a clinical Chapter 1 
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application of tissue engineering. Although the participants of this 
Delphi study were recruited from one specific project, we feel the 
relevance of our results is not limited to this project. Numerous parallels 
can be drawn between the project at hand and any other (pre)clinical 
study in the field of tissue engineering. The full list of ethical issues is 
unique to the research of EuroSTEC, but, for example, issues pertaining 
to animals experiments with tissue-engineered products will be of 
interest to those conducting these types of experiments. Those involved 
in clinical trials in this field will find the ethical issues that refer to this 
phase relevant to their own research. Therefore, we feel our study will 
be of relevance to research on applications of tissue engineering in 
general. 
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2.1 “Dotting the I’s and crossing the T’s. Autonomy and/or 
beneficence? The “fetus as a patient” in maternal-fetal 
surgery.”   
 
ABSTRACT 
Chervenak and McCullough, authors of the most acknowledged ethical 
framework for maternal-fetal surgery, rely on the ‘ethical-obstetrical’ 
concept of the fetus as a patient in order to determine what is morally 
owed to fetuses by both physicians and the women who gestate them, in 
the context of prenatal surgery. In this article, we reconstruct the 
argumentative structure of their framework and present an internal 
criticism. Firstly, we analyze the justificatory arguments put forward by 
the authors regarding the moral status of the fetus qua patient. Secondly, 
we discuss the internal coherence and consistency of the moral 
obligations those authors derive from that concept. We claim that some 
of the dilemmas their approach is purported to avoid, such as the debate 
about the independent moral status of the fetus, and the foundation of 
the moral obligations of pregnant women (towards the fetuses they 
gestate) are not, all things considered, avoided. Chervenak and 
McCullough construct the obligations of physicians as obligations 
towards entities with equal moral status. But at the same time they 
assume that the woman has an independent moral status while the moral 
status of the fetus is dependent on the decision of the woman to present 
it to a physician for care. According to the logic of their own 
argumentation, Chervenak and McCullough implicitly admit a different 
moral status of the woman and the fetus, which will lead to different 
ascription of duties of the physician than those they ascribed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Maternal-fetal surgery (MFS) can be defined as a series of prenatal 
surgical interventions, which aim at correcting or improving the 
outcome of life-threatening or severely debilitating fetal congenital birth 
defects. 
The century old idea that pregnancy is an instance of conflict, and that 
women and fetuses are potential antagonists is present throughout the 
literature on “fetal surgery”. That discourse eventually led to the 
widespread idea that the fetus is a patient in its own right, separate or 
separable from the woman in whom it gestates.[1,2] The ‘fetal patient’ 
gained its way into the vocabulary of ‘fetal surgeons’ who use it to 
justify the clinical and social value of their discipline and their own 
personal moral obligations towards the fetuses they operate on, almost 
as if it were an undisputable or self-evident truth.[1,3,4,5]  
In order to determine what is morally due to both fetuses and women in 
the context of MFS, Chervenak and McCullough, authors of the most 
acknowledged ethical framework for MFS also rely on what they call 
the ethical-obstetrical concept of “the fetus as a patient” (FaP).[6-8]  
But that the fetus is or can become a patient in its own right is not self-
evident at all. And, if it is going to be the foundation of the “maternal” 
and of the clinicians’ moral obligations towards the fetus, justificatory 
argument must be given. In this paper we analyze the arguments put 
forward by Chervenak and McCullough (C&M) for the moral status of 
the fetus qua patient and we discuss whether the moral obligations those 
authors derive from that concept are internally consistent and coherent. 
 
MORAL STATUS OF THE FETUS QUA PATIENT 
To have moral status is roughly to be worth of moral concern and 
respect. There are many theories about how one comes to acquire it, but 
most justifications depend on the possession of a certain property or 
quality (being alive, sentient, a member of a certain species, being a 
person, a rational agent, having the potential to acquire or develop the 
relevant property, etc.). It is just not possible within the scope of this 
paper to discuss the justification for the ascription of moral status in 
detail. Instead, we focus on the issues that arise when we try to apply a 
theory, like the one proposed by C&M, which grounds moral obligation 
towards the fetus on their special social standing of being patients. Chapter 2    2.1 
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Dependent vs. Independent Moral Status 
C&M have construed a beneficence-based concept of being a patient 
and have extended it to the debate of the moral status of the fetus.[8-10] 
They distinguish between two kinds of moral status: that which is based 
on an entity’s constitutive property/ies (independent moral status) and 
that which is the result of special social interactions, independently of 
one’s constitutive properties (dependent moral status). Dependent moral 
status is acquired in virtue of an entity’s position in relation to others 
and in the context of a particular relationship, namely the one that is 
established between a patient and a physician.  
Being a patient is thus to have a moral status of sorts. An entity becomes 
a patient, and, for this reason, worth of moral consideration as such, 
when it is presented to a physician for care and there are interventions 
that are reliably expected, from an evidence-based clinical point of 
view, to benefit it.[8]  
On their account, it is the physician’s commitment to fiduciary 
responsibility towards those presented to his/her care that is the basis for 
the ascription of the moral status of ‘patient’. From this perspective, 
from the point of view of a physician, all patients are patients in the 
same degree, independently of any other qualifying properties. One does 
not need e.g., to be a person in any morally relevant sense of the word to 
be a patient. One needs only to be or be placed in a relationship that 
generates moral status and the correlative moral “relation-generated” 
fiduciary obligations. Since there are no degrees of being a patient, the 
fiduciary benefice-based obligations of physicians towards their patients 
do not also vary in degree.[8]  
 
The moral status of the “pregnant and fetal patients”. 
C&M consider that there are at least two, albeit inseparable, patient-
research subjects in MFS: a woman and at least one fetus. The moral 
status of such different but inseparable entities would differ in that 
average adult women have full, independent moral status, and fetuses 
may have dependent moral status. Pregnant women have independent 
moral status because they generally possess the characteristics or 
properties (e.g., humanity, reason, personhood, etc.) that, according to 
most ethical theories, give them a claim to have their legitimate interests 
protected and eventually promoted and a right to have one’s legitimate 
interests respected by others. In contrast, according to C&M, fetuses Chapter 2    2.1 
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may have dependent moral status because even though they might lack 
the features necessary for independent moral status, their social position 
in relation to others is such, that it generates moral status and correlative 
moral ‘relation-generated’ obligations to protect that entity’s interests, 
in this case, its clinical interests.[8]  
C&M’s argument for the moral status of the fetus qua patient can be 
summarized in the following captions:  
1. When the entity presented for care is a fetus, its being a patient is the 
function of [a] its position in the relationship with a physician, [b] the 
existence of interventions that, from a medical point of view, are 
reliably expected to benefit it and [c] the existence of a reliable link 
between the fetus and its later achieving the moral status of a child, and 
then a person. 
2. There are two links between the fetus and its later achieving the moral 
status of a child, and then a person: [a] the pregnant woman’s choice to 
continue a previable (i) pregnancy to term; and [b] her choice to present 
her viable or previable fetus to care by a physician.  
3. When all the previous conditions are present, from the perspective of 
a physician, the previable and viable fetus becomes worth of moral 
consideration qua patient. For a physician that entails a prima facie 
beneficence-based obligation to protect its clinical interests. For the 
woman in whose body the fetal patient is gestating, fetal patienthood 
involves a similar ought. The difference between the moral obligations 
of physicians and pregnant women towards the fetal patient is 
determined only by viability, and only in relation to the pregnant 
women. That is, according to C&M, pregnant women are under no 
moral obligation to present their previable or viable fetuses to care by a 
physician, even when there are clinical interventions that might benefit 
them, or the children that they will become. When, however, a woman 
chooses to present a viable (ii) fetus to care, that too originates a prima 
facie beneficence-based obligation to protect that fetus’ clinical interests 
that cannot be waved. I.e. according to C&M, both physicians and 
pregnant women have prima facie beneficence-based obligations 
towards the viable fetal patient. 
4. In addition, because fetal and pregnant patients are different but 
inseparable patients, and because the moral status of pregnant women as 
patients is an independent one, physicians must in all cases balance 
prima facie beneficence based obligations towards the fetus against Chapter 2    2.1 
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prima facie beneficence based and autonomy based obligations towards 
the woman in whose body the fetus gestates. Because fetuses are 
patients only through the autonomous choice of pregnant women, and 
since the latter have independent moral status, physicians must at all 
times, but not unconditionally, respect their autonomous choices. 
 
C&M’S REFERRAL TO BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS’ FOUR PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS. AUTONOMY AND BENEFICENCE. 
It is important to point out that C&M’s proposal is build up from the 
perspective of physicians who take care of pregnant patients and 
specialize in interventions that aim at benefiting the fetus. In order to 
determine what is morally due to the fetal patient by those in charge of 
its care in the context of MFS, they refer to both John Gregory‘s work 
and the well-known “four principle” approach to biomedical ethics 
developed by Beauchamp and Childress.[8,9,11] As guidance for 
practical moral decision making, this approach puts forward the 
principles of respect for autonomy, of beneficence, of non-maleficence 
and of justice. 
Beauchamp and Childress do not offer a comprehensive ethical theory 
but a kind of approach that should guide decision-making in a process of 
weighing and specifying the four principles. The status they ascribe to 
the four principles has changed over the last decades in the various 
versions of their book since its first publication in 1979. According to 
their current view, Beauchamp and Childress see the four principles as 
an expression of a so-called shared or universal common morality which 
contains all principles and only those principles that all morally serious 
persons accept as authoritative.[12] The principles are grounded in 
common morality in the sense that they are grounded in a sort of pre-
theoretical moral point of view to which everyone has access, that is not 
equivalent to any particular ethical theory and that transcends local 
costumes and attitudes. For that reason, the four principles are not in a 
hierarchical position in relation to a higher ethical principle, like the 
greatest happiness principle in Utilitarianism or the categorical 
imperative for Kantians, and they are also not in a hierarchical position 
in relation to each other as action guiding norms. As Beauchamp and 
Childress, C&M also sustain the prima facie character of moral 
principles. That means that each principle is binding unless it conflicts 
with another, which, according to the circumstances of the case at hand, 
is also pertinent. When the latter leads to an irreconcilable conflict of Chapter 2    2.1 
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obligation, a solution that is compatible with the clashing principles 
must be found.(iii) 
If this is the background against which C&M’s ethical framework for 
MFS research should be understood, then there are several points that 
deserve further consideration.  
 
Beneficence vs. autonomy in MFS  
Firstly, there is the question of whether moral status, understood as 
being worth of moral consideration is something that can be derived 
from an entity’s position in a social relationship, like the one that is 
established between physicians and patients. In a reply to Carson Strong 
[13] C&M sustained that their theory about dependent moral status 
applies exclusively to a special group of entities, that is, human fetuses. 
[14] By the same token, the moral obligations that derive from the moral 
status of fetuses as patients would be binding only to those who are 
morally engaged with them within a fiduciary relationship of medical 
care, and not extensive to all others who are worth of moral 
consideration on different grounds. One may also wonder why only 
human fetuses should have this dependent moral status, and not other 
entities.  C & M do not offer a strong argument for that.  
In addition, even if we assume that C&M provide a sufficient 
justification for the moral obligations of fetal surgeons towards the fetal 
patient, they do not provide sufficient justification of the moral 
obligations of pregnant women towards their fetuses in the context of 
MFS.  
“A pregnant woman is obligated to take only reasonable risks of 
obstetric interventions that are reliably expected to benefit the viable 
fetus or child later” [15] (iv)  
However, because the connection between a woman and her fetus can 
hardly be described as a physician-patient relationship, the prima-facie 
beneficence obligations, C&M claim pregnant women have towards 
their fetuses must rely somewhere else. An account of the foundations 
of the moral obligations of pregnant women towards their fetuses is 
therefore missing.  
Secondly, according to C&M, contrary to claims of independent moral 
status, “the physician’s commitment to fiduciary responsibility for the 
fetal and pregnant patient is a certain and therefore a highly reliable Chapter 2    2.1 
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basis for the moral status of both patients.”[14] (v) In practice, what this 
means is that in the context of MFS there are two patients (albeit 
inseparable) to whom physicians owe role-specific beneficence-based 
obligations. Since, according to C&M, from a fetal surgeon’s 
perspective, there are also no degrees of being a patient, their duty to 
provide assistance and care to women and fetuses is not dependent on 
any other consideration, apart from their being patients. 
In this sense, C&M defend an ‘egalitarian’ position in relation to the 
moral status of patients that produces beneficence role-specific 
obligations.  In other words, as equals (in their role as patients) pregnant 
women and fetuses have an equal claim to receive available medical 
care that is reliably expected to medically benefit them. As a result, 
when a physician’s duty of care to the pregnant women conflict with the 
duty of care he/or she owes to fetuses, a solution must be found that 
does not compromise the care of either those patients; a compromise 
that would consist on a violation of the role-specific moral obligations 
of physicians. 
Thirdly, that pregnant women carrying fetal patients are also fetal 
surgeon’s patients in the same degree as fetuses is not self-evident 
however. As previously mentioned MFS is typically defined of a series 
of interventions that aim at benefiting the fetus and eventually the child 
and person it will become, by correcting or improving the outcome of 
congenital birth defects. If this is correct, one could indeed ask, who 
exactly the patient in MFS is. If an entity acquires the moral status of 
patient when it is presented to a physician for care and there exists 
interventions that are reliably expected to benefit it, then fetal surgery is 
not an intervention that can benefit directly the pregnant woman. Only if 
we take the effects of the fetal surgery on the psychosocial benefits for 
the pregnant woman into account, this would make some sense, but that 
seems not to be the primary aim of the surgeons’ interventions.  
One of us has argued elsewhere (vi) that in the context of clinical 
research involving MFS, namely in the context of clinical trials 
comparing experimental fetal intervention with expectant management 
during pregnancy, pregnant women can be seen as volunteers of sorts, 
precisely because, for them personally, prenatal surgery has no prospect 
of direct benefit. These considerations were made in a different context 
but an analogy can be made here. 
Credit must be given to C&M in this respect. They have actually 
claimed that because fetal patients are different but not separable from Chapter 2    2.1 
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pregnant women, physicians must in all cases balance prima facie 
beneficence based obligations towards the fetus against prima facie 
beneficence based and autonomy based obligations towards the woman 
in whose body the fetus is gestating. Respect for the autonomy of a 
pregnant woman, translated into her choice of presenting a previable or 
viable fetus for care, is justified by appeal to the latter’s possession of 
independent moral status qua person and rights bearer.  
What this means is that, in her relationship with fetal surgeons, the 
pregnant woman is a “different” kind of patient than the fetus. Even 
though she has no prospect of direct clinical benefit from the fetal 
intervention, she has, apart from beneficence role-related claims, a claim 
(if not even a right) to have her autonomy respected by fetal surgeons. 
In other words, contrary to the fetus which has only beneficence based 
interests that must be protected and fostered, pregnant women have 
additional morally justified claims in relation to fetal surgeons. The 
latter might entail that pregnant women and fetuses do not possess 
moral status as patients in the same degree, not even from a physician’s 
perspective. If a pregnant woman is free, in virtue of her autonomy, to 
give and withdraw her moral status as patient, as well as the moral status 
of her previable fetus, then, in relation to that fetus and in the context of 
the interaction with health care professionals, she assumes a privileged 
and superior status. In fact, her position is so privileged, that the whole 
issue of fetal patienthood is dependent on her presenting her fetus to a 
physician for care and on her consenting, on a second moment to 
surgery for fetal benefit. 
 
CONFLICT OF OBLIGATION 
A conflict of obligation for fetal surgeons will arise when on a first 
moment a pregnant woman confers the moral status as patient to her 
viable fetus by presenting herself and her fetus for medical care, and 
then, on a second moment, withdraws that status by refusing to submit 
herself (with her fetus) to surgery.  
In these cases, according to C&M, the physician is not excused from his 
beneficence-role related moral obligations towards the viable fetal 
patient, which are now in open conflict with the role related autonomy 
obligations towards the woman. How could these conflicts be solved? 
C&M tell us that these obligations must be balanced, but they do not 
provide a criterion according to which obedience to one moral Chapter 2    2.1 
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obligation can override and justifiably take precedence over another in a 
conflict.  
 
We can foresee two options:  
1.  either the autonomy of the pregnant patient is respected, 
overriding the beneficence-based  and role specific moral 
obligations of fetal surgeons towards the fetus, or 
2.  the beneficence, role specific moral obligations of fetal 
surgeons towards the viable fetus override the respect for 
autonomy due to the pregnant patient. 
In view of the fact that there is no hierarchical relationship between the 
principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of beneficence as 
proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, and on which C&M apparently 
rely, a morally justified choice must be made in favor of one of those 
principles.  How can such a choice be made in a morally justified 
fashion, i.e., in a way that does not compromise fetal surgeons’ role-
related moral obligations, is something C&M do not say.  
In the context of MFS, if a choice is made in favor of the respect for the 
autonomy of pregnant patients, as we suspect it would be the case, we 
cannot foresee a justificatory argument that ignores the independent 
moral status of that type of patient as a person and eventually a bearer of 
human rights.  After all, that status is conferred to ‘normal’ average 
adult pregnant women by all comprehensive moral theories, not to 
mention also the law. If that is the case, there is no conflict between 
obligations towards two patients that would have an egalitarian moral 
status without degrees. C & M are constructing a conflict that they 
cannot even develop consistently within their own framework. Although 
they claim that their approach to the ‘ethics’ of MFS differs 
significantly from those that rely on claims for or against the 
independent moral status of the fetus, in that it does not introduce the 
“paralyzing and intractable”(vii) debates about sentience, personhood, 
and human rights, we believe their approach cannot avoid making some 
tacit assumptions from those debates. A patient which is also a person 
and a rights bearer cannot be addressed by a physician in the same way 
a fetal patient is, especially when, in order to comply with one’s moral 
obligation towards the fetus, one must intervene, physically, on another 
patient to whom we owe respect, not only as patient but also as person 
and rights bearer outside the context of a hospital.  Chapter 2    2.1 
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When a conflict of duty arises in the context of MFS, fetal surgeons 
cannot thus appeal exclusively to their role related moral obligations. 
The dilemmas C&M’s approach is purported to avoid, such as the 
debate about the independent moral status of fetuses, are not avoided at 
all, since that issue will come back to the table whenever there is a 
conflict of duty involving the respect for the autonomy of pregnant 
women and the beneficence based obligations physicians have towards 
viable fetuses in MFS.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our aim was to uncover some of the limitations of C&M’s approach to 
the ethics of MFS. Although the topic deserves further thought, it was 
not our aim to discuss whether moral status is something we can derive 
from the position one assumes in the context of special social 
relationships, like the one that is established between a patient and his or 
her physician. 
What we did was to check the coherence and consistency of C&M’s 
proposal  with their own foundational assumptions, including their 
justification of the concept of the fetus as a patient and of the nature of 
fetal surgeons’ (viii) obligations towards pregnant and fetal patients. We 
recognize that we have been very criti9cal on C&M’s position, but 
offered no alternative in return. We are working on such an alternative. 
The later will not avoid the debate about the moral status of the fetus; a 
debate that will always be, inevitably, in the background of any attempt 
to morally justify what is owned to pregnant women and fetuses by 
those who are in charge of their medical care. The justification of the 
moral obligations pregnant women have towards their fetuses in the 
context of care is also inescapable and cannot be made on the same 
terms of the justification of physician’s moral obligations, since the 
relationship that is established between woman and fetus cannot be 
defined in terms of medical care. 
One can even imagine that there is no relationship at all between 
pregnant women and fetuses, for it can be sustained that the latter are 
entities that cannot engage in moral interactions. For now, it is however 
enough to say that the debate about the moral obligations of physicians 
towards the fetus cannot be transposed to the debate about the moral 
status of pregnant women and fetuses.  
 Chapter 2    2.1 
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NOTES 
i.  The biological, medical and legal concept of fetal viability consists 
on the expected capacity of the fetus to survive birth, even if for that 
substantial technological support is needed. In most developed 
countries, a fetus is said to acquire this ability at 24 weeks of 
gestation.[16]  
ii.  Pregnant women can confer and withdraw the moral status of 
patient to her fetuses at any time during previability, because there 
are no medical interventions that are reliably expected to benefit her 
fetus were it to be born before the gestational age of viability. 
iii.  In order to determine which principle/s should guide our actions in a 
particular context, the content of the four principles must be 
specified and justified in accordance with the circumstances of the 
case at hand. When the case in hand falls under the “jurisdiction” of 
two or more principles, and when the application of both leads to a 
irreconcilable conflict of obligation, Beauchamp and Childress 
propose the use of the “Rawlsian”(17) inspired method of wide 
reflective equilibrium.
1 Roughly, according to this method, the 
strengths and weaknesses of all plausible moral beliefs, moral 
judgments, principles, and moral theories are evaluated with the aim 
of finding a plausible and coherent solution to that conflict. A 
coherent solution to a conflict is the one that is most compatible 
with our most basic ‘considered judgments’, i.e., with those beliefs 
and norms that all morally serious persons accept as authoritative 
and that translate into the four principles of biomedical ethics.  
iv.  The risk for the pregnant woman is reasonable when: 1) her 
mortality risk is reliably expected to be low and 2) her risk of 
disease, injury or disability, including in future pregnancies is 
reliably expected to be low or manageable.[8] 
v.  We are aware of the controversial nature of this claim [14] 
However, as mentioned previously in this article, we will proceed 
without questioning it. 
vi.  The article where we argue this has been accepted for publication 
elsewhere, but it is not yet available. 
vii. “The principle advantage of for research ethics of the ethical 
concept of the fetus as a patient (…) is that the ethics of research on 
pregnant women is conceptually independent of the discourses of Chapter 2    2.1 
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personhood, fetal rights, and the unborn child. The unnecessary and 
unwarranted introduction of such discourses will only polarize and 
therefore paralyze research ethics and therefore paralyze clinical 
research on pregnant women because the application of these 
discourses will result in philosophically irresolvable competition 
among sharply differing candidates for an acceptable risk-benefit 
ratio. The abortion debate will simply replicate itself in the ethics of 
research on pregnant women with the same paralyzing 
consequences that it has had for the ethics of abortion.” [8] 
viii.  Note that we have repeatedly referred to fetal surgeons’ moral 
obligations.  We do not mean that only fetal surgeons have moral 
obligations towards fetal and pregnant patients in MFS. When we 
say “fetal surgeons”, we also mean all those who are involved in the 
care of pregnant patients for fetal benefit. 
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2.2 A morally and procedurally justified argument for the 
moral obligations of physicians towards pregnant women (and 
fetuses) in the context of maternal-fetal surgery. A Gewirthian 
Precautionary Approach. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Maternal-fetal surgery (MFS) is a relatively new medical specialty that 
aims at correcting or improving the outcome of severely debilitating or 
life threatening congenital birth defects, such as congenital 
diaphragmatic hernia and myelomeningocele. When a pregnant woman 
presents to a physician for MFS, the relationship that is established by 
this encounter generates certain professional and moral obligations. The 
latter involves, almost invariably a conflict between the moral and 
clinical interests of women and the eventual moral and clinical interests 
of their fetuses.  In this paper, we put forward what we believe is a 
morally and procedurally justified argument for the obligations of 
physicians towards pregnant women (and fetuses) in the context of 
MFS.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the literature, an attempt to justify pregnant women and physicians’ 
moral obligations towards the fetus has been made based on the concept 
of ‘the fetus as patient’. This ethical concept states that, once fetuses are 
presented for care by a pregnant woman to a physician, they acquire the 
moral status of patient (not person and/or agent) from which relation-
specific (autonomy and beneficence based) moral obligations arise
21-22 
When a conflict of duty arises, for example, when a beneficence or 
autonomy based obligation to the woman conflicts with a beneficence-
based obligation towards the fetus qua patient, the physician must make 
a decision based on a weighing judgement that balances both types of 
professional and moral obligation according to the circumstances of the 
case. 
Somewhere else, we have considered the limitations of such a theory. 
Here, we propose an alternative to the concept of ‘the fetus as a patient’ 
as the foundation of physicians’ moral obligations in the context of 
MFS. That alternative is written against the background of the 
precautionary principle (PP), Alan Gewirth’s theory of human rights and 
also from the perspective of the Principle of Generic Consistency 
(PGC), which requires that all prospective purposive agents (PPAs) act 
in accordance with their own, and their recipients’ generic rights to 
freedom and well-being.
23  For the sake of clarity, it is important to state 
here what we will not do in this paper. Our intention is not to provide a 
definitive justificatory argument for the moral status of fetuses. Nor is it 
to determine which specific moral obligations physicians have towards 
the fetus. And, contrary to the ‘doctrine of fetal patienthood’
24 , our 
argument does not purport to justify the moral obligations women may 
or may not have towards the fetuses they carry. 
                                                           
21 We will call this position ‘the doctrine of fetal patienthood’. 
22 F.A.Chervenak, L.B. McCullough, ‘An ethically justified framework for 
clinical investigation to benefit pregnant and fetal patients.’ Am J Bioeth 11(5) 
(2011), pp.39-49.  
23 A. Gewirth,  Reason and Morality. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1978); 
A. Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications. (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1982); A. Gewirth, The Community of Rights. 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).  
24 Above at note 3.  Chapter 2    2.2 
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Our general aim can be stated as follows: In light of Deryck Beyleveld’s 
interpretation of the precautionary principle (PP),
25 and in light of its 
place in a Gewirthian inspired community of rights
26, we propose what 
we think is a morally and procedurally justified argument for the 
existence of physicians’ moral obligations towards the women and 
fetuses they care for in the context of MFS. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Despite the lack of agreement on the moral status of the fetus and the 
rigidity of most European legal systems, which attribute no legal rights 
to the fetus
27, the emergence of MFS
28 (together with ever more refined 
fetal imaging technologies and the recognition of ‘fetal pain’
29) tends to 
promote the notion of two patients: a woman and at least one fetus.
30 
Physicians who are engaged in MFS are confronted with a unique 
professional and moral issue.  As agents and healthcare professionals, 
they must determine what duties they owe, morally and professionally 
to those in their care. When the latter includes fetuses, that task is 
                                                           
25 D. Beyleveld, S. Pattinson,  ‘Precautionary Reasoning as a Link to Moral 
Action’, in M. Boylan, Medical Ethics. (New Jersey,  Prentice Hall, 2000); D. 
Beyleveld, R. Brownsword, ‘Principle, Proceduralism, and Precaution in a 
Community of Rights.’  Ratio Iuris 19(2) (2006), p.141.  
26 Gewirth, as above at n.4.  
27 J. Dorscheidt, ‘Developments in legal and medical practice regarding the 
unborn child and the need to expand prenatal legal protection.’ Eur J Health 
Law 17(5) (2010), pp.433-454. 
28 M. Harrison, R. Filly, M. Golbus , et al. ‘Fetal treatment’ N Engl J Med 
12/23;307(0028-4793; 0028-4793; 26) (1982) pp.1651-1652;  J. Deprest, R. 
Devlieger,  K. Srisupundit  et al, ‘Fetal surgery is a clinical reality’. Semin 
Fetal Neonatal Med  02;15(1878-0946; 1744-165; 1) (2010) pp. 58-67.  
29 M. Van de Velde,  J. Jani, F. De Buck et.al. ‘Fetal pain perception and pain 
management.’ Semin Fetal Neonatal Med  Aug;11(4) (2006), pp. 232-236; K. 
Tran, ‘Anesthesia for fetal surgery.’ Semin Fetal Neonatal Med  Feb;15(1) 
(2010), pp. 40-45.  
30 F. Chervenak, L. McCullough, ‘The fetus as a patient: an essential concept 
for the ethics of perinatal medicine.’ Am J Perinatol 11;20(0735-1631; 0735-
1631; 8) (2003), pp.399-404;  
C. Williams, ‘Framing the fetus in medical work: rituals and practices.’ Soc Sci 
Med  60(9) (2005), pp. 2085-2095.  Chapter 2    2.2 
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complicated by their not only unusual geographical location and 
dependence, but also by the lack of consensus about their ontological 
and moral status. Who is/are the patient(s) in MFS? Despite not 
knowing (yet) how to answer that question, in order to operate on the 
fetus, physicians must cut through the body of the woman in whom it is 
gestating, causing harm to her health, including the risk of death, for no 
direct personal clinical benefit. That unavoidable fact puts them in a 
position that is often described as ‘having to balance or weigh’ different 
kinds of moral obligation, or ‘solving a conflict of duty’. Nowhere, we 
believe, is this “balancing” more intricate, since it involves the 
elaboration of a moral and professional judgment that refers to entities 
whose moral status is unknown, uncertain or, at best, controversial.   
The assertion that ‘normal’ adult pregnant woman are worthy of moral 
consideration and respect according to all major ethical theories is not 
something that can be challenged.  Support for the proposition that 
fetuses (of any gestational age) are, or must be, worthy of moral 
consideration varies considerably, not only amongst ethical theories, but 
also amongst different political, cultural, and religious perspectives.     
Because we cannot have perfect knowledge about the ontological and/or 
moral status of the fetus, and because we suspect that, despite that fact, 
most physicians who care for pregnant women feel that they owe 
‘something’ to the fetus, bioethics must provide them with some kind of 
authoritative action-guiding norm.
31 That authoritative action guiding 
norm must  help us determine whether, in addition to women, fetuses 
are the kind of entity that deserve moral consideration 
32, and it will 
                                                           
31  Chervenak and McCullough have proposed a ‘professional responsibility 
model of obstetric ethics’ which is based on the ‘ethical concept of human 
being becoming a patient’ and which assumes beneficence and fiduciary 
responsibility as the defining feature of all patient-physician relationships.  F. 
Chervenak & L. McCullough, above at n.3 and  F. Chervenak , L. McCullough 
and R. Brent, ‘The professional responsibility model of obstetrical ethics: 
avoiding the perils of clashing rights.’ Am J Obstet Gynecol  205(4) (2010) 
315.e1-315.e5. 
We have challenged  this position in a manuscript that is currently under review 
elsewhere.  
32 According to Alan Gewirth, Moral Philosophy should be able to answer three 
central questions. The authoritative question, which aims at determining why 
one should accept morality  as obligatory; the distributive question, which aims 
at determining whose interests, other than my own are worthy of moral Chapter 2    2.2 
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have to put forward some criterion according to which the rightness of 
the actions of physicians can be judged. In addition, in order to be 
operational, that criterion must set out norms for the resolution of the 
conflicts of duty that will almost inevitably arise in the context of MFS. 
We are convinced that a Gewirthian interpretation of the PP fulfils these 
requirements. 
 
ANSWERING THE DISTRIBUTIVE QUESTION WITH PRECAUTIONARY 
REASONING AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ALAN GEWIRTH’S THEORY OF 
AGENCY. 
In order to make sense of our proposal, it is important to understand the 
background and premises against which it has been constructed.  
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY (PGC)  
“Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of 
yourself”.
33 
Any Morality aims to, amongst other things, establish requirements for 
the rightness of human action. Those requirements differ from others 
because they have a special kind of authority: compliance with them is 
mandatory (not optional)
34 for all actions and institutions, independently 
of other considerations, such as personal world views, religious 
affiliations, or even the Law of the State one inhabits. The obligatory 
character of Morality rests also on different foundations, depending on 
which Moral theory one adheres to. For Gewirth, it rests on the 
‘normative structure ‘of action. 
35 On his view, all action has two 
interrelated generic features: ‘voluntariness’ and ‘purposiveness’. As a 
result, an action can only be called an action if what an agent did (or did 
not do) was [1] unforcedly chosen [2] for a purpose it values, which 
                                                                                                                                 
consideration;  and the substantive question, which aims at identifying which 
interests are worth protecting (A.Gewirth, Reason and Morality, above at n.4). 
Given the limited scope of this paper, we are especially interested in the 
distributive question. 
33 A. Gewirth,  Reason and Morality, above at n.4, p.135. 
34 As above at p.1. 
35 As above at pp.25 – 41. Chapter 2    2.2 
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consists in its reason for acting (or omitting to act)
36.  In order to be able 
to act in a voluntary and purposive way, agents  must be ascribed a right 
to the necessary goods for action, that is, a right to what any agent needs 
to be able to act for the goals he or she values as good.
37 The PGC 
demands thus that all prospective purposive agents be granted rights to 
the generic features of action. 
 
How is the PGC justified?  
Gewirth’s argument for the PGC proceeds from the internal point of 
view of (any) agent that acts or intends for a purpose he/she values, 
through a ‘dialectically necessary method’.  The method is dialectical 
because “… [it] begins from assumptions, opinions, statements or 
claims made by protagonists or interlocutors and then proceeds to 
examine what these logically imply.”
38 It is dialectically necessary, 
because it begins not from any type of statement, but from a statement 
or judgment that, on pain of contradiction, is necessarily attributable to 
everyone who engages in voluntary and purposive action. 
39 In other 
words, those statements are such that were a PPA to deny them, that 
negation would signify a concomitant logical negation of his/her own 
status as a PPA. 
40  
                                                           
36 There is a broad debate about what counts as voluntary and purposive action 
and omission.  See, e.g., D.Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: 
an Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of 
Generic Consistency. (University of Chicago Press; 1991). 
37 The necessary goods for action are set in a hierarchical position according to 
a ‘criterion of degree of needfulness for action’ comprising the most basic 
rights to life, physical integrity, mental equilibrium, and shelter, and a series of 
increasingly less ‘urgent’ goods (in terms of their degree of needfulness for 
action) such as the rights to education, to labor, not to be lied to or stolen from, 
etc. This means that in cases of conflict, the most basic rights to the most basic 
goods for voluntary and purposive action override the less needed: A. Gewirth, 
Reason and Morality, above at n.4, p. 63 and A. Gewirth, The Community of 
Rights above at n.4, p.14. 
38 The Community of Rights, above at n.4, p.44. 
39 The Community of Rights, above at n.4.  
40 The argument for the PGC proceeds in three stages. See: A. Gewirth, Reason 
and Morality,  above at n.4, pp.129-150 and D.Beyleveld, The Dialectical 
Necessity of Morality: an Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth's Argument to Chapter 2    2.2 
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The PGC thus commits every agent to accept, on pain of contradicting 
that he or she is an agent (and therefore rights bearer), that he or she has 
rights to the generic features of action (and agency), and that others who 
are also PPAs are entitled to those rights. For that reason, PPAs must 
also maintain that they ought to act with respect for their own and other 
PPA’s rights to the necessary features of action. This means that others 
must not interfere with the requisites of my ability to act in pursuit of 
the purposes I value. It also means that, under certain conditions, others 
must protect and secure the necessary conditions of my ability to act. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SUFFICIENCY OF AGENCY (ASA) AND THE FETUS 
For “Gewirthians”, being an agent is the necessary and sufficient 
justification for any agent’s claim to the generic conditions of action.
41   
This means that only those who possess the necessary features of 
agency are the addressees of the PGC and of all other principles and 
rules that might derive from it. That agents are the addressees of 
morality does not however mean that other entities who are not agents 
should be left outside the protecting hand of Morality. Entities such as 
children and fetuses, to which most of us (or some of us, in the case of 
fetuses) think we owe some moral obligations, do have a certain moral 
standing within Gewirth’s theory. In fact, he claimed that fetuses and 
children could be considered partial agents, as they are gradually 
developing the necessary abilities for agency. Accordingly, they should 
be granted those generic rights that are proportional to the degree to 
which they approach fully-fledged agency; that is, in proportion to the 
degree that they have noticeable capacity for agency.
42  
  The major problem with this proposal is that we cannot know, in 
relation to fetuses, or very young children for that matter, whether they 
possess even the most rudimentary abilities for agency: the ability to 
enforcedly choose to act for a purpose we value.  Adults express those 
abilities by showing an array of behaviors, attitudes and intelligence; 
and, although it is probably true that we cannot know exactly if others 
are agents (since we can only have access to our own internal mental 
                                                                                                                                 
the Principle of Generic Consistency. (University of Chicago Press; 1991), 
pp.13-46 and also D. Beyleveld, ‘Law, ethics and research ethics committees.’ 
Med Law 21(1) (2002), pp.57-75 for a summary.  
41 A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality, above at n.4, p.122. 
42 Above, p.122-125, 141-142. Chapter 2    2.2 
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state),
43 most ‘normal’ human adults behave as though they are agents.  
If the mental state of fetuses cannot be empirically proven it is even 
more difficult to make judgements about the degree to which they 
approximate agency. What we end up with is an absolute uncertainty 
about whether fetuses are worthy of moral consideration by other 
agents, and, if yes, on which terms. 
Deryck Beyleveld and several co-authors have made a proposal that we 
find convincing and which, while maintaining adherence to Gewirth’s 
theory of human rights, avoids its shortcomings regarding the moral 
status of the fetus.
44  
 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE  (PP) AND THE MORAL STATUS OF THE 
FETUS 
Beyleveld’s proposal proceeds from the following fundamental starting 
points:  
[1] There are no degrees of being an agent – one is or is not an agent.  
Rather, there are  
(a) ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ agents (e.g. ‘normal’ human adults) and  
(b) ‘non-ostensible’ agents (e.g., fetuses, children, adults with severe 
mental impairments, some non-human animals…).
45  
[2] Certain beliefs, which cannot be known or justified rationally, 
should be accepted as a positive premise in practical thinking.  
[3] That those beliefs (e.g. about the ontological/moral status of the 
fetus) must be taken, as a positive premise in theoretical thinking, is the 
function of precautionary reasoning.  
                                                           
43 Beyleveld, Deryck. 2008. Human Cognitive Vulnerability and the Moral 
Status of the Human Embryo and Foetus. In The Contingent Nature of Life. 
Duwell, Marcus., Rehmann-Sutter,Christoph.&Mieth,Dietmar.Springer.83-88 
 and  Beyleveld, Deryck. 2000. The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and 
Fetus. In The Ethics of Genetics in Human Procreation. Haker, Hille. & 
Beyleveld, Deryck. Aldershot, Ashgate.: 59-85 
44 Above at n.6 and 23 
45 D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword,  Human dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw. 
(Oxford University Press; 2001). Chapter 2    2.2 
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[4] Precautionary reasoning is justified because of the lack of certainty 
about the knowledge we possess, the idea of possible agency, and the 
PGC that categorically demands that all agents respect the rights to the 
generic conditions of agency of all agents. 
According to Beyleveld and his co-authors, since we can only be sure 
about our agency (because other things that behave and look like as 
agents, may turn out not to be agents) we should refer to those entities 
we are fairly convinced are agents as ostensible or apparent agents. 
Those entities about which we are less sure that they are agents (since 
they do not show the abilities and behavior we normally associate with 
agents) should be referred to as non-ostensible agents.
46 
Applied to the fetus, the argument proceeds by saying that, since we 
cannot know whether fetuses are agents, despite their not exhibiting any 
of the behaviors normally attributable to agents, precaution demands 
that we treat them as if they were agents when it is possible for us to do 
so.
 The reasons for this precautionary step are: [1]our commitment to the 
PGC, that  categorically commands us to respect the rights to the 
generic features of action of all agents; and [2]the limits of our 
rationality, which precludes us from knowing what the fetus really is 
(ontologically, I mean).
47 
Were fetuses to be agents, failing to treat them accordingly would be 
absolutely forbidden by the PGC. Therefore: “If doing X (not treating 
the fetus as an agent) risks something that is categorically prohibited 
(not granting the generic rights to an agent), whereas not doing X 
(treating the fetus  as an agent) risks something not categorically 
prohibited, then doing X must be prohibited even if it cannot be known 
                                                           
46 What level of evidence is necessary for us to treat other entities as apparent 
agents or non-ostensible agents is another question.  We will not deal with it at 
this moment, since it is not necessary to establish Beyleveld’s point about the 
moral status of the fetus. The question of the level of evidence is however, no 
minor issue. 
47 It is important to note that the precautionary argument put forward by 
Beyleveld and others is obligatory only for those who are convinced by the 
PGC and feel compelled to act accordingly. However, we believe such an 
argument will also be of use to those who adhere to other ethical theories, since 
they too face a radical uncertainty about how to treat (morally) fetuses. Chapter 2    2.2 
66 
 
whether or not the risk is real, provided only that not doing X is 
possible.” 
48   
 In other words, even though the fetus is apparently not an agent, there 
remains a risk that it is indeed an agent. If I act as if the fetus was not an 
agent and it turns out that I was wrong, I would have deprived the fetus 
of the protection of the PGC, something it is, qua agent, entitled to. 
Consequently, I must recognize that I have a duty not to harm the fetus 
and eventually to protect it.  If, on the other hand, I treat the fetus as an 
agent and it turns out that it really is not an agent, I would have done 
something that is not prohibited by the PGC. That is, I would not have 
deprived any agent of its necessary features of action and therefore I 
would not have hurt any agent.
49   Although the latter provides a reason 
to believe that we owe something morally relevant to the fetus, we 
should not conclude that the fetus should, for precautionary reasons, be 
treated as ‘one of us’.  Indeed, independently of its real status, in order 
to treat the fetus as an addressee of my actions, I must invariably 
involve the woman in whom it gestates. Since fetuses do not exist 
separately from women, we cannot interact with them in a way that does 
not also involve interfering (as minimally as possible) with an ostensible 
agent. In view of that, we must confer to fetuses (and all beings that 
could be agents) the moral status that is proportionate to the degree of 
probability that it has the necessary ability for action, providing that 
doing so does not hurt or preclude another agent’s rights to the 
necessary abilities for action.
50 
What we have just described provides a reason for physicians to believe 
that they owe something to the fetus in the context of MFS (the first aim 
of our paper). It does not, however, explain how we should deal with 
conflicts between ostensible and non-ostensible agents, which are the 
                                                           
48  D. Beyleveld, & R. Brownsword, ‘Complex Technology, Complex 
Calculations: Uses and Abuses of Precautionary Reasoning in Law’  in M. 
Duewell & P Sollie (Eds), Evaluating New Technologies. Methodological 
Problems for the Ethical Assessment of Technological Developments (Springer, 
2009) pp. 175-190, at 183 (Text in brackets not in the original). 
49 Above at n.26. 
50 It is worth noticing that the notion of probability involved in this argument 
has a normative content that is provided by the PGC, which requires us to 
employ precaution in the face of metaphysical uncertainty. See: D. Beyleveld & 
S. Pattison at n.6 above. Chapter 2    2.2 
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kind of conflict a physician might face in the context of MFS (second 
aim).  
In order to determine whether the PGC can also guide us in these cases, 
we use a real-life example that was presented to us during the 2011 
International Fetal Medicine and Surgery Society (IFMSS) in Sedona, 
Arizona, in the USA. 
 
CONFLICTS OF DUTY IN MFS AS A TEST TO THE PGC – A CASE STUDY  
The case we take into consideration concerns a 30-year-old nullipara 
pregnant woman who was referred by her obstetrician to a Fetal 
Medicine Center for MFS to address severe fetal congenital 
diaphragmatic hernia. After preliminary evaluation, woman and fetus 
were considered adequate candidates for MFS. Informed consent was 
obtained after the disclosure of the experimental nature of the procedure 
and the risks and potential benefits of the intervention. The necessary 
arrangements were taken for her admission at the center; however, on 
the day of the surgery, the woman withdrew her consent and asked for 
termination of the pregnancy even though the legally established limit 
for abortion - 24 gestational weeks- had already passed.  We were told 
that her reasons for the withdrawal were that she was no longer prepared 
to accept the risks of surgery for herself since she no longer had any 
affective connection with her fetus. 
The woman was refused a termination based on the illegality of that act 
according to State law. The real reason for that refusal, we were also 
told, was that the team felt that they owed something to the pregnant 
woman’s fetus. In their view, prenatal surgery could have improved its 
chances of survival 
51 and thus, they owed it to the fetus, to try:  “a 
                                                           
51 It is important to know the following:  
 [1] MFS is still investigational and thus not the standard of care for severe 
CDH. For those so diagnosed, there are currently two medically accepted 
options: termination of pregnancy within the limits of the Law and expectant 
management during pregnancy and postnatal care.  
[2]The prognosis for severe CDH is almost always perinatal death (> 70 - 85%) 
due to respiratory insufficiency and pulmonary hypertension: J. Deprest, J. 
Hyett, A. Flake, K. Nicolaides & E. Gratacos,  ‘Current controversies in 
prenatal diagnosis 4: Should fetal surgery be done in all cases of severe 
diaphragmatic hernia?’ Prenat.Diagn. 29(1) (2009) pp. 15-19.  Chapter 2    2.2 
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chance is better odds than no chance at all”. At the conference, we were 
asked whether the team could use the law to ask for court–ordered MFS 
in future similar cases. The woman was dismissed from hospital and 
returned to the referral center, where she continued her pregnancy to 
term. The baby died at birth.
52 
 
THE ‘DOCTRINE OF FETAL PATIENTHOOD”  
In another paper we said that the framework we currently have, “the 
doctrine of fetal patienthood”
53, is inadequate as a criterion for the 
solution of conflicts of duty in the context of MFS, because the 
foundational argument it puts forward for the moral/professional 
obligations of physicians – the concept of being a human patient - does 
not provide  a guide to action in cases where the moral and clinical 
interests of the fetus conflict with those of the woman who carries it (as 
                                                                                                                                 
[3] For pregnant women, MFS involves the risk of death ( unlikely but 
possible),  increased rates of cesarean sections, treatment in intensive care, 
prolonged hospitalization, and blood transfusion,  placental abruption, and 
spontaneous rupture of membranes leading to preterm birth: K. Golombeck, 
R.Ball, et al, ‘Maternal morbidity after maternal-fetal surgery.’ American 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology. 194(3) (2006), pp.834-839.  
52  We do not aim at analyzing the Law relevant to this case of any particular 
Legal System. As previously mentioned, our intention is to provide a set of 
moral and procedurally justified arguments for the solution of a conflict of 
duties that will almost invariably be in the background of any legal debate on 
maternal-fetal conflict. In the Netherlands, the country from where the case 
presented allegedly comes from, the issue of whether a pregnant women can be 
legally forced to submit to MFS, for the sake of the health interests of her fetus, 
has been discussed in a Monitoring Report from March 2009, written by the 
Center for Ethics and Health, and directed to the then State Secretary for Heath 
Welfare and Sport. (See: Care for the unborn child. Monitoring Report Ethics 
and Health, 2009/1. The Hague: Centre for Ethics and Health (2009); Health 
Council of the Netherlands: 2009/01E.  In question is, namely whether such 
cases would be justified by a broad interpretation of articles1:2 and eventually 
7:453 of the Dutch Civil Code (see chapter 2 and 5 of the report). For a 
discussion on the moral justification of legal compulsion regarding MFS in the 
U.S., see, e.g., K. Knopoff, ‘Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal 
Surgery?’ Cal. L. Rev 79 (1991) p.499. 
53 F. Chervenak & L. McCullough as above at n.3. Chapter 2    2.2 
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in the case we have just described). In Chervenak and McCullough’s 
account, the moral status of the fetus is the function of the existence of a 
reliable link between it and its becoming a child and eventually a 
person. In their view, there are two such links, both connected with the 
medico-legal concept of fetal viability (i.e., the probability the fetus has 
of surviving birth – viability exists at 24 gestational weeks in most 
European and North American countries, provided that neonatal 
intensive care units are available).  
The first link between a fetus and its becoming a child is conferred by a 
pregnant woman’s autonomy, whenever she presents her pre-viable 
fetus to care by a physician and there are clinical interventions that are 
reliably expected to benefit it. By doing so, she would confer the moral 
status of patient to her fetus.
54 The second link is the result of any 
physician’s professional commitment to his or her patients: once a 
human (person, agent, non–agent) presents for care, and there are 
interventions that are reliably expected to benefit it, a fiduciary 
relationship is created, from which the moral status of “patient” is 
derived.  
From Chervenak and McCullough’s point of view, the relationship that 
is established between a physician and his or her patients is the 
foundation of all physicians’ moral and professional obligations and the 
foundation of the moral status of the fetus.  That the patients are also 
persons, agents, or non-agents is irrelevant from the point of view of 
physicians’ obligations. In fact, according to Chervenak and 
                                                           
54 Being a patient is thus to have a moral status of sorts. An entity becomes a 
patient, and, for this reason, worthy of moral consideration as such, when it is 
presented to a physician for care and there exists interventions that are reliably 
expected, from an evidence-based clinical point of view, to benefit it. The 
moral status of women and fetuses differ in that average adult women have full, 
independent moral status, and fetuses have dependent moral status. Pregnant 
women have independent moral status because they generally possess the 
properties (e.g., humanity, reason, personhood, etc.) that, according to most 
ethical theories, give them a claim to have their legitimate interests protected 
and eventually promoted and a right to have one’s legitimate interests respected 
by others. Fetuses have dependent moral status because their social position in 
relation to others (physicians) is such, that it generates moral status and 
correlative moral ‘relation-generated’ obligations to protect that entity’s clinical 
interests. Chapter 2    2.2 
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McCullough, to a physician, all patients are patients in the same degree, 
independently of any other qualification. 
Against this background, a solution that is coherent with Chervenak and 
McCullough’s framework would look like this:   
 
Possibility 1 (pre-viable fetus) 
Until viability, simply by virtue of exercising her autonomy, the woman 
can withdraw moral status of “patient” from the fetus.  Until viability, a 
physician’s sole duty is towards the woman, and thus, he or she must 
respect the woman’s autonomous choice by not interfering with her 
decision to terminate the pregnancy, even when there are interventions 
that are reliably expected to benefit the fetus and the child it will 
eventually become.   
 
Possibility 2 (viable fetus) 
This would be applicable to the case study set out above. When the fetus 
is viable and there are interventions that are reliably expected to benefit 
it, physicians are confronted with a conflict of duty that involves two 
patients with equal dignity, with the same kind of claim to clinical 
benefit. Since, from the point of view of the physician, both woman and 
fetus are patients in the same degree, and since the physician cannot 
fulfill his or her moral and professional obligations towards both 
(different but inseparable patients), a choice must be made regarding 
whose clinical interests are superior. To do that, Chervenak and 
McCullough say that physicians must balance their beneficence-based 
obligations towards the fetal patient with their beneficence and 
autonomy-based obligations towards the pregnant patient. They do not, 
however, provide a criterion according to which obedience to one moral 
obligation can override and justifiably take precedence over another in a 
conflict.  
We can foresee two options:  
a) either the autonomy of the pregnant patient is respected, overriding 
the beneficence-based and role specific moral obligations of fetal 
surgeons towards the fetus, or Chapter 2    2.2 
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b) the beneficence, role specific, moral obligations of fetal surgeons 
towards the viable fetus override the respect for autonomy due to the 
pregnant patient. 
In view of the fact that there is no established hierarchical relationship 
between the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of 
beneficence as proposed by Chervenak and McCullough, a morally 
justified choice must be made in favor of one of those principles. If a 
choice is made in favor of respecting the autonomy of the pregnant 
woman, as we suspect would be the case, we cannot foresee a 
justificatory argument that ignores the superior moral status of that type 
of patient as a person or as an agent. After all, that status is conferred to 
‘normal’ average adult women by all comprehensive moral theories, not 
to mention the law.  If this is true, a patient which is also an agent and a 
rights bearer cannot be addressed by a physician in the same way as a 
fetal patient is, especially when, in order to comply with one’s moral 
obligation towards the fetus, one must intervene, physically, on another 
patient to whom we owe respect, not only as patient but also as a rights 
bearer outside the context of a hospital. The role related moral 
obligations of physicians-obstetricians are thus an unreliable criterion 
for the adjudication of conflicts of duty in the context of MFS.  
By determining which goods are more and less important for our ability 
to act in a morally relevant sense, we think the PGC (with the 
specifications made by Beyleveld and his co-authors) is a better 
reference tool for the solution of conflicts of duty in the context of MFS. 
We must now test it against our case study. 
 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE  
As we have said, the precautionary argument for the moral status of the 
fetus is an exercise of probability, based upon the real possibility that 
our knowledge about the fetus’s abilities is incorrect.  As Stephen Smith 
has put it, a fetus is a possible agent because there is a probability 
greater than 0% but less than 100% that the fetus fulfills the criteria for 
agency.
55 The same can be said about the moral status of a pregnant 
woman. However, the degree of the probability that she is indeed an 
                                                           
55 S. Smith, ‘Precautionary Reasoning in Determining Moral Worth, in Law and 
Bioethics’ in M. Freeman (ed), Current Legal Issues, Vol. 11 (Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  Chapter 2    2.2 
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agent is superior to that of the fetus, since she normally exhibits the 
necessary features of agency.  If this is correct, and because in the case 
we have presented, respect for the interests of both fetus (as non-
ostensible agent) and woman (ostensible agent) cannot be achieved, 
priority must be given to the rights of the woman, as the degree of the 
probability that she is an agent is superior to that of the fetus. This 
priority must be afforded to the woman despite the fact that (1) a viable 
fetus (more than 24 gestational weeks) is more likely an agent than a 
previable fetus and thus worthy of a stronger protection; and (2) that the 
law prohibits the abortion of fetuses post-viability. 
In relation to our case study, this means that we ought to: (1) respect the 
pregnant woman’s refusal to surrender herself to MFS that could be life 
saving for her fetus; and (2) respect her request for termination of 
pregnancy. In other words, by virtue of being an ostensible agent, 
women have a right to the necessary conditions of agency. According to 
the criterion of the degrees of necessity for action (see above), physical 
integrity is a basic feature of our agency, since harms to it might 
preclude us from successfully acting for the purposes we value.  In our 
case, the withdrawal of consent for surgery can be seen as an attempt on 
the part of the pregnant woman to secure a basic good of action (not 
having her physical integrity harmed). As a result, a physician’s failure 
to respect the woman’s right to choose not to have her physical integrity 
harmed would consist of a denial of her moral status as ostensible agent, 
something they cannot do, on pain of contradicting that they are also 
agents. 
In addition, although the latter consists of a failure to protect the fetus’s 
life, denial of the moral status of agent to an ostensible agent is more 
serious than overriding the moral status of non-ostensible agents. Failure 
to respect a woman’s rights is thus more likely to produce a harm that is 
forbidden by the PGC. Protecting the life of a fetus is commendable, but 
not doing so when it conflicts with the rights of the woman in whom it 
gestates produces a harm of a less magnitude, than the one that would 
arise were we to deny that an agent has a right to life and to physical 
integrity.   All this, of course, is from the point of view of a physician 
who cannot simultaneously protect the life of a fetus and the life and Chapter 2    2.2 
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physical integrity of a woman, and who in order to fulfill his 
professional obligations must decide whose interests are superior.
56 
 
These conclusions are justified by following steps: 
(1) There is a probability (> 0%  but < 100%) that the fetus is an agent; 
(2) If the fetus is an agent, the woman’s refusal to have life-saving MFS 
might  constitute a morally relevant harm, as it might constitute the 
negation of the most necessary feature of action – life. 
(3) However, agents (e.g., pregnant women and physicians) are not 
required to do any and everything to accommodate the possibility that 
an entity that does not behave as an agent (e.g. the fetus) is indeed an 
agent.  
(4) What agents must do is simply consider that it is possible that the 
fetus is an agent and act accordingly, in proportion to the degree that the 
fetus is able to express the behavior normally associated with agency.  
In other words, the precautionary principle does not require that we 
grant every possible agent the rights to the necessary features of agency 
and action. It requires only that we grant a certain moral status (but not 
rights) to those entities that might be agents but that do not behave as 
such.  Although the moral status of non-ostensible agents requires that 
we protect their interests when we can, they do not have a right to have 
those interest protected. The reason for that is that only ostensible agents 
are capable of exercising their rights, capable of imposing that others 
respect them, and capable of obeying the duties that are correlative to 
them.  
As a result, when duties towards an agent (woman) conflict with those 
we might have towards a non-ostensible agent (fetus), that conflict 
                                                           
56  From the point of view of the pregnant woman, if our reasoning is correct, 
she must also consider the possibility that her fetus has independent moral 
status, which requires her to produce a justification of a certain amount and 
sort, were she to refuse life saving MFS or to terminate her pregnancy. We did 
not set up to determine what kind of moral obligations women have towards 
embryos and fetuses during the course of pregnancy. However, it must be 
mentioned that if we accept that the fetus is an entity, which can have an 
independent moral status, anyone who engages in action with them must be 
accountable in some way for the eventual harms he/she causes. Chapter 2    2.2 
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might be solved by comparing, according to the specifics of the case, the 
amount of risk of moral harm our different options might entail for those 
involved. 
In our case study, a choice for the protection of the fetus’s interest in life 
would most certainly cause a morally relevant harm to an agent 
(woman): forcing the woman to have surgery for the sake of the 
protection of a fetus’s life involves a substantial harm to her physical 
integrity.  
For the reasons exposed, the fetus, although worthy of moral 
consideration, does not have a claim to have its right to life protected by 
others in the context of our case study. The woman was not granted an 
abortion, not because there are morally justified reasons against it (there 
are not), but because the law made by those who were democratically 
elected did not allow it.
57 Although this is a solution that might make 
some of us uneasy, it is a solution that is coherent with a series of claims 
anyone, even those who oppose the moral philosophy of Alan Gewirth 
will have a tough time denying.   
 
 
 
                                                           
57  Termination of pregnancy in the Netherlands is permitted until 24 
gestational weeks (see:  Termination of Pregnancy Act, article 5:2a. and 
Criminal Code, article 82a.) 
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CONCLUSION 
We adhere to the moral philosophy of Alan Gewirth and we find his 
arguments for the PGC convincing. Accordingly, we maintain that an 
agent ought to respect (and under certain circumstances protect and 
promote) the rights to the generic features of agency and action of all 
other agents, including him or herself. We are also convinced by 
Beyleveld and his co-authors’ concept of non-ostensible agency and by 
their interpretation and application of the precautionary principle to 
determining the moral status of the fetus. The latter, together with the 
PGC, provides a substantially and procedurally justified basis for the 
belief in existence of moral obligations towards the fetus, qua potential 
agent, and an action guiding criteria in case of conflicts of duty. 
For those involved in the practice of MFS, all of this entails the 
following: when a pregnant woman presents for MFS, physicians must 
at all times balance their moral obligations towards an ostensible agent 
and a non-ostensible agent. When the latter conflict, the PGC can guide 
physicians by telling them what goods and rights are more important, 
according to the criterion of needfulness for action, which establishes a 
hierarchy of goods that are more or less needed for agency and 
successful purposive action. Sometimes, conflicts of duty are so 
intricate, that direct reference to the PGC and its various specifications 
is not able to give a clear-cut solution to real-life cases such as those that 
may arise in the daily practice of MFS. This does not, however, mean 
that a solution that is coherent with the PGC cannot be found.   
Precautionary reasoning is the example of one of the strategies that we 
can agree to use to facilitate the application of the PGC in complex 
cases. 
In relation to the ethical framework proposed by Chervenak and 
McCullough for the dependent moral status of the fetus, our proposal 
has the following theoretical and practical advantages. Firstly, it justifies 
the ascription of independent/ intrinsic moral status to both the fetus and 
the woman in whom it gestates, rendering them (categorically) worthy 
of moral consideration in and outside the context of the relationship 
doctor-patient. Secondly, it provides better (coherent) guidance for the 
solution of the conflicts of duty that will inevitably arise in the context 
of MFS. When a conflict of duty arises, physicians cannot appeal 
exclusively to their role related moral obligations to solve it; they will 
have to determine, compare, and weigh, according to the specificity of 
the case, the amount of risk of moral harm their different options might Chapter 2    2.2 
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entail for those involved. A pregnant patient who is also a rights bearer 
cannot be addressed by a physician in the same way as a fetal patient is, 
especially when, in order to comply with one’s moral obligation towards 
the fetus, one must intervene, physically, on the pregnant patient to 
whom we owe respect as a person and rights bearer outside the context 
of hospital.  
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3.1 Randomized Controlled trials of Maternal-Fetal Surgery: 
A challenge to Clinical equipoise. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on maternal-fetal surgery (MFS) and on the concept 
of clinical equipoise that is a widely accepted requirement for 
conducting randomized controlled trials (RCT). 
There are at least three reasons why equipoise is unsuitable for MFS. 
First, the concept is based on a misconception about the nature of 
clinical research and the status of research subjects. Second, given that it 
is not clear who the research subject/s in MFS is/are, if clinical 
equipoise is to be used as a criterion to test the ethical appropriateness 
of RCT, its meaning should be unambiguous. Third, because of the 
multidisciplinary character of MFS, it is also not clear who should be in 
equipoise. As a result, we are lacking an adequate criterion for the 
ethical review of MFS protocols. On our account, which is based on 
Chervenak and McCullough’s seminal work in the field of obstetric 
ethics, equipoise is abandoned, and RCT involving MFS can be 
ethically initiated when a multidisciplinary ethics review board (ERB), 
based on an evidence based assessment of the risks involved, is 
convinced that the value of answering the research hypothesis for the 
sake of the health interests of future pregnant women carrying fetuses 
with certain congenital birth defects, justifies the actual risks present 
research participants might suffer within a set roof limit of 
low/manageable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Early in the 1980s, the International Fetal Medicine and Surgery Society 
(IFMSS) was created in the United States
58 in the sequence of the first 
reported success of maternal-fetal surgery (MFS), performed at the Fetal 
Treatment Center from the University of California, San Francisco on a 
woman carrying a fetus with a severe urinary tract obstruction. Rosa 
Skinner, seven months pregnant at the time, was put under anesthesia, a 
hysterotomy was performed, and the operable part of her fetus was 
exposed and worked upon by the surgeons. When they were done, the 
fetus was placed back in its mother’s uterus, where it was expected to 
stay until term. It did not, but it survived, and so did Rosa Skinner.  
Baby Michael, named after the surgeon who saved his life, was born on 
Mother’s Day 1981.
59 
As with many other surgical specialties, MFS evolved through trial and 
error and in many stages. The public and scientific community’s call for 
rigorousness in the presentation of surgical innovation has encouraged 
fetal surgeons to adhere to the rules of evidence based medicine, where 
randomized controlled trials (RCT), by eliminating the most important 
sources of bias, allegedly produce the highest and most reliable level of 
proof.  
In October 2008, in Europe, MFS for CDH went under clinical 
investigation in the TOTAL trial (Tracheal Occlusion To Accelerate 
Lung growth): a randomized trial of fetoscopic endoluminal tracheal 
occlusion (FETO) versus expectant management during pregnancy in 
fetuses with left sided and isolated congenital diaphragmatic hernia and 
moderate pulmonary hypoplasia.
60 During the preliminary discussions 
of that research protocol, and as suggested in the literature,
61 researchers 
                                                           
58  Harrison, M.R., Filly, R.A., Golbus, et al. 1982, "Fetal treatment 1982", The 
New England journal of medicine, vol. 307, no. 0028-4793; 0028-4793; 26, pp. 
1651-1652. 
59  “First fetal surgery survivor finally meets his doctor.” Available at, 
http://fetus.ucsfmedicalcenter.org/our_team/news.asp [Accessed 6 Jun 2012] 
60 Information about the TOTAL trial available at, http://www.eurocdh.org/ 
[Accessed 6 Jun 2012] 
61  Chervenak, F.A. & McCullough, L.B. 2002, “A comprehensive ethical 
framework for fetal research and its application to fetal surgery for spina 
bifida”.    Am J Obstet Gynecol,2002, vol. 187, No.1; Chervenak, F.A. & Chapter 3    3.1 
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of the FETO task force appealed to the ethical requirement of clinical 
equipoise in order to assess the appropriateness of their RCT proposal. 
Soon they verified that equipoise is a concept that admits several 
interpretations and that it is occasionally used without specification. For 
example, in the ethical review of the TOTAL trial, clinical equipoise, 
theoretical equipoise, patient and community equipoise have often been 
used indiscriminately.
62  
As members of the European Program on Soft Tissue Engineering for 
Children (EuroSTEC) 
63 where partners of the FETO task force are 
currently conducting the TOTAL trial, we have been confronted with 
the need to specify what the ethical requirement of clinical equipoise 
entails for those involved in the design and conduct of MFS RCT.  
 
THE ETHICAL REQUIREMENT OF CLINICAL EQUIPOISE 
Equipoise is based on the idea that physicians who are also researchers 
cannot waive their fiduciary role-related obligations to provide the best 
available treatment to their patients, a duty that is embedded in the 
Hippocratic Oath and any therapeutically driven practice.
64  
The principle was first introduced in 1974 by Charles Fried,
65 and has 
been adapted by others, namely B. Freedman, who has established the 
meaning by which equipoise is, today, more often understood, i.e., as 
clinical equipoise.
66  
                                                                                                                                 
McCullough, L.B. 2009, "Ethics of fetal surgery", Clinics in perinatology, vol. 
36, no. 1557-9840; 0095-5108; 2.  
62 Rodrigues, H.C., Deprest, J. & Berg, P.P. 2011, "When referring physicians 
and researchers disagree on equipoise: the TOTAL trial experience", Prenatal 
diagnosis, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 589-594.  
63 Information about the EU-FP6 project EuroSTEC (Contract: LSHB-CT-
2006-037409) available at, http://www.eurostec.eu/ [Accessed 6 Jun 2012] 
64 Miller, P.B. & Weijer, C. 2003, "Rehabilitating equipoise", Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics journal, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 93-118.  
65 Fried, C. 1974, Medical Experimentation: Personal Integrity  and Social 
Policy, Amsterdam: North Holland.  
66 Freedman, B. 1987, "Equipoise and the ethics of clinical research", The New 
England journal of medicine, vol. 317, no. 0028-4793; 3, pp. 141-145. Chapter 3    3.1 
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Because individual physicians who are also researchers can be biased by 
virtue of  their research activities in their judgment of what is in the best 
interest of their patients, Freedman suggested (against Fried) that in 
order to be able to enroll patients in RCTs without compromising the 
physician-patient relationship, the medical community, and not the 
attending physician-researchers, should be in an epistemic state of 
uncertainty between the merits of trial arms, i.e., in terms of the balance 
between benefits and harms that might derive from each intervention 
under investigation.  Clinical equipoise would be especially relevant in 
the ethical review of RCT protocols where ‘treatment’ is assigned to 
patient-research subjects based on chance, i.e., randomly, and not based 
on a physician’s clinical judgment about what is best for a particular 
patient.  
Accordingly, randomization can only occur and be ethical if the experts 
of the relevant medical community are genuinely uncertain about which 
of the arms of the trial is superior. That means both that no subject shall 
be randomized to an intervention known to be inferior to the accepted  
and available standard of care and that randomization shall be stopped 
and the clinical trial arrested as soon as clinical  equipoise is disturbed, 
i.e., as soon as the relevant medical community is no longer equally 
poised between arms of the trial.  The epistemic uncertainty required by 
defenders of clinical equipoise is both empirically and morally relevant.  
Empirically, it expresses the very reason why RCT are deemed 
necessary, that is, that there is a ‘current or imminent conflict in the 
clinical community over what treatment is preferred for patients in a 
defined population’.
67 Morally it purports to justify individual 
physicians’ referral of patients to RCT. That justification is based on the 
duty of personal care attending physicians owe to patients.
68 That duty 
requires physicians to treat patients according to their ‘best interests’, 
i.e., according to the current and available standard of care.
69  Under this 
                                                           
67 Ibid. 
68 Don Marquis, Leaving Therapy to Chance, The Hastings Center Report , Vol. 
13, No. 4 (Aug., 1983), pp. 40-47 
69  The concept of ‘patient’s best interests’ used here is a minimal one: 
physicians act in the best interest of their patients when, after having  informed 
them of the various therapeutic possibilities, and after having obtained their 
informed consent,  an intervention of proven safety and efficacy is 
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constraint, offering enrollment in a RCT to a patient would be consistent 
with the physician's duty of care to that patient if and only if, each of the 
various arms of the RCT is consistent with the standard of care and 
there are no interventions outside the trial that are known to be better 
than those inside the RCT.
70  
 
CLINICAL EQUIPOISE IN THE CONTEXT OF MFS  
Based on the concept of ‘the fetus as a patient’, Chervenak and 
McCullough have established a comprehensive ethical framework for 
MFS, which identifies criteria for the initiation and assessment of 
clinical trials and for the establishment of the standard of care in the 
field.
71 According to their framework, the only of its kind in the field, 
preliminary innovation should cease and RCT begin when there is 
‘evidence-based normative clinical equipoise’.  Evidence-based clinical 
equipoise would verify when:   
the initial case series indicates that the proposed fetal intervention is 
reliably expected either to be life saving or to prevent serious and 
irreversible disease, injury or handicap;  
among the possible alternative designs, the proposed intervention   
involves the least risk of morbidity and death to the fetus;  
the case series indicates that the mortality risk to the pregnant woman of 
the proposed fetal intervention is reliably expected to be low and that 
her risk of disease, injury, or handicap is reliably expected to be low or 
manageable, including in future pregnancies three cumulative criteria 
are met; and  
MFS specialists in general anticipate an equal (or almost equal) balance 
of risks weighted against the potential benefits of each intervention for 
the research participants in each trial arm.
 That is, when based on an 
evidence based assessment of preliminary data, they are uncertain about 
which intervention will most likely benefit research participants. 
72 
                                                           
70 Miller, F.G. & Brody, H. 2003, "A critique of clinical equipoise. Therapeutic 
misconception in the ethics of clinical trials", The Hastings Center report, vol. 
33, no. 0093-0334; 3, pp. 19-28.  Miller, P.B. & Weijer, op. cit. note 7, p.4.  
71 Chervenak, F.A. & McCullough, L.B. 2009, "Ethics of fetal surgery", Clinics 
in perinatology, vol. 36, no. 1557-9840; 0095-5108; 2. 
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DISCUSSION  
We can foresee at least three problems with Clinical Equipoise when 
used to evaluate MFS RCT protocols.  
 
I. Misconception about the goals of research. 
There is a fundamental reason why one should not rely on clinical 
equipoise  when evaluating MFS research protocols. The latter is 
grounded on the idea that researchers who are also physicians  are not 
excused from  pursuing what in their view is in the best interest of their 
patients, as they would normally do when acting as physicians - only. 
Equipoise, by requiring that research participants are not subjected to 
treatments that are below standard, would sort of guarantee that.  
In our view, however, equipoise is a concept that is flawed by 
definition, since it incorrectly assumes [1] that researchers, as 
physicians, are bound by a duty to provide the best available care to 
research subjects and that [2] research subjects have a right to 
interventions that are at least as beneficial as the accepted standard of 
care (which, as patients they are entitled to). 
Fundamentally, clinical research is not a therapeutic activity aimed at 
benefiting actual research participants, even when it is designed to 
investigate a potentially beneficial therapeutic option for the subgroup 
of patients, to which the actual research subjects belong. Instead, it aims 
at answering a scientific question described as an hypothesis in a 
research protocol, which in turn aims at producing ‘generalizable’ 
knowledge which may (or may not) benefit the actual research subjects 
and future patients. Although in principle there might be a positive 
indication about the therapeutic benefit of the experimental arm based 
on preliminary evidence, it is precisely that therapeutic benefit that must 
be proven in the course of the trial and, at the end, one may come to the 
conclusion that despite the initial indication of benefit, MFS is indeed an 
inferior option when compared to the standard of care, to neonatal care, 
or other kinds of prenatal intervention.  
In other words, RCT should not be viewed as personalized forms of care 
and one should insist on formal separation between patient care and 
clinical research. The separation is not always clear-cut and is especially 
difficult in the field of MFS, where most interventions remain 
investigational. However, since RCTs are a clear departure from Chapter 3    3.1 
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‘normal’ care, in order to protect the patients’ right not to be submitted 
to interventions of unproven efficacy and/or safety, that separation 
should be maintained and thoroughly explained by physicians and 
researchers. The “peace of mind” clinical equipoise is supposed to give, 
in that it purports to guarantee that physicians who are also researchers 
do not depart from their duty of care,  is based on a misconception about 
the nature of medical research in general and of MFS in particular and 
on a misconception about the status of research participants.
73  
Surely, physicians who are trained to always act in the best interests of 
patients may have difficulties in seeing research subjects as more than 
patients. The latter should not however cloud the fact that in research, 
subjects are exposed to risks for the benefit of others other than 
themselves, which makes them vulnerable to exploitation. A situation in 
which, as patients, they would not be exposed to. 
For those reasons, we believe equipoise should be abandoned in the 
ethical review of RCT protocols. In MFS, where the safety and/or 
efficacy of most interventions must be established
74, the reasons 
mentioned are even more pressing.  
Those who will not be convinced by this argument will have however to 
acknowledge and provide a solution to at least two other difficulties the 
concept of clinical equipoise poses in the assessment of MFS RCT 
protocols. 
 
II. Who’s my doctor? Who’s my patient?  
Clinical  Equipoise is thought as referring to individual subjects, or 
group of subjects whose members can be individualized, a concept that 
                                                           
73 Brody, H. & Miller, F.G. 2003, "The clinician-investigator: unavoidable but 
manageable tension", Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal, vol. 13, no. 1054-
6863; 4, pp. 329-346. Miller, F.G. & Brody, H. 2007, "Clinical equipoise and 
the incoherence of research ethics", The Journal of medicine and philosophy, 
vol. 32, no. 0360-5310; 2, pp. 151-165.  Miller, F.G. & Brody, H. 2003, "A 
critique of clinical equipoise. Therapeutic misconception in the ethics of 
clinical trials", The Hastings Center report, vol. 33, no. 0093-0334; 3, pp. 19-
28. 
74 Deprest, J.A., et al, op. cit. note 3, p. 2.   
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fits badly with the liminal and all-through-intertwined nature of 
pregnancy. By that we mean that the uncertainty present in judgments of 
clinical  equipoise refers to the merits of intervention options for a 
category of patients that are singular, i.e., not pregnant. That that 
category of patients is made of human beings that are distinguishable, 
separable and occupying a separate geographical space from their peers 
is not under dispute. With pregnant patients their being one person or 
one patient or two is, on the contrary, still in dispute.  Indeed, in the 
field of MFS there seems to be no straightforward answer to the 
question of who the patient/s and/or research/s subject is/are. And thus, 
it remains a problem to define in relation to whom judgments of 
equipoise must be made. Because all fetal surgery is in fact maternal-
fetal surgery, it seems reasonable to say that in addition to fetuses, 
pregnant women must be treated as research participants in MFS RCT 
and this claim is sustained mainly, albeit not exclusively, by the 
irrefutable fact that women must undergo surgery themselves, 
sometimes major surgery with significant associated morbidity, if their 
fetuses are to become part of research.
75  
By arguing that the fetus can be, or become a patient,
 Chervenak and 
McCullough, consider that there are at least two, albeit inseparable, 
patient-research subjects in MFS RCT: a woman and a fetus. 
76 
                                                           
75 Chervenak, F.A. & McCullough, L.B. 2003, "The fetus as a patient: an 
essential concept for the ethics of perinatal medicine", American Journal of 
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76 In their view, ‘[T]he fetus is a patient when reliable links exist between it and 
its  later achieving the moral status of a child, and then a person.’   They 
describe two such links, both based on the notion of fetal viability. Viability is 
a medical-legal concept, dependent on fetal biology and on the status of 
technological development of a given place and time. It consists on the 
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between the fetus and its later becoming a person is the possibility of existing 
(being) outside a pregnant woman’s body. The second is conferred by the 
pregnant woman’s decision to continue a previable pregnancy past viability and 
to term, i.e., by the exercise of her autonomy.  
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Although apparently reasonable, this view gives rise to several 
inconsistencies.
 77  
As Lyerly and Mahowald have pointed out: 
How can a particular researcher/clinician or group of 
researcher/clinicians be “equally poised” in their beliefs 
about the potential risks and benefits of treatment that carries 
no potential medical benefits but only risks for the woman? 
Even if equipoise were clearly established for the potential 
child, or if therapeutic benefit for the potential child were 
clearly demonstrated, medical equipoise for the woman 
herself would still be impossible.
78   
If pregnant women and fetuses are considered different (albeit 
inseparable) research participants, the risks women assume in the 
context of MFS, however low, negligible, or manageable, cannot be 
justified by the potential personal therapeutic benefit (strictly speaking) 
they may derive from their participation in the RCT.   In fact, when one 
of the trial arms is expectant management during pregnancy, as in the 
TOTAL trial
79, clinical equipoise in relation to the woman cannot be 
verified because the risks she assumes, if allocated to the surgical arm, 
are much higher than those she would endure were she to be randomized 
to the expectant management arm (where risks to her health, strictly 
speaking, are not greater than those a woman carrying a healthy fetus 
would endure).  
If this is correct, there remains the question of how, and according to 
which criterion, the ethical review of MFS RCT must be made in 
relation to the woman carrying the fetal patient. If equipoise cannot be 
verified in relation to her, the admissibility and appropriates of her 
                                                                                                                                 
it becomes a patient only when a pregnant woman grants it that status by [1] 
continuing her pregnancy and [2] presenting herself for treatment. Ibid. 
77 Lyerly, A.D. & Mahowald, M.B. 2001, "Maternal-fetal surgery: the fallacy 
of abstraction and the problem of equipoise", Health care analysis: HCA: 
journal of health philosophy and policy, vol. 9, no. 1065-3058; 2, pp. 151-165.  
78 Mahowald, M. 2005, "Sanctity of Life vs. Quality of Life in Maternal-Fetal 
Surgery: Personal and Public Priorities" in , pp. 103-118.  
79 See:  http://www.eurocdh.org/[Accessed 6 Jun 2012] Chapter 3    3.1 
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enrolment in a RCT and her status, as research participants must be 
evaluated according to other standards.  
A possible way out of this impasse, that is compatible with the generally 
accepted definition of MFS as a series of interventions aimed at 
addressing the clinical interests of the fetus and/or the child it will 
become
80, is to consider that the woman is not a patient in MFS.  
In this case, the woman is seen as an innocent bystander i.e., as a 
healthy volunteer of sorts; since what  distinguishes them from other 
volunteers is their unusual position in relation to another research 
subject that literally inhabits her body. 
In research with healthy volunteers, so called non-therapeutic research, 
judgments of acceptable risks and prospective benefits are done 
primarily with reference to the scientific or social value that the 
knowledge one aims at obtaining with the RCT may have for future 
generations of patients or for society at large.
81 Only when the latter 
outweigh the potential risks for the research participant is it acceptable 
to proceed with the study.  
Picturing pregnant women as healthy volunteers would require ethical 
review boards (ERB) to apply independent evaluative criteria when 
assessing the ethical and scientific appropriateness of MFS research 
protocols. On the one hand, they must establish clinical equipoise in 
relation to the fetus and, on the other hand, they must justify the risks 
the participation of the gestating woman entails in accordance with the 
scientific and societal value of the knowledge her inclusion might help 
obtaining for future generations of pregnant patients carrying fetuses 
with the targeted congenital birth defect.  
In sum, in clinical studies involving patients, the ethical requirement of 
clinical equipoise requires at a minimum that those participating are not 
                                                           
80 See: Casper, M.J. 1998,  The Making of the Unborn Patient. A Social 
Anatomy of Fetal Surgery, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, and London. And Chervenak, F.A. & McCullough, L.B. 2011, "An 
ethically justified framework for clinical investigation to benefit pregnant and 
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subjected to interventions that are likely to be inferior to the currently 
accepted and available standard of care. If pregnant women are not 
patients in a strict view of MFS, no relation to personal benefit can be 
established and that warrants the application of another criterion to 
evaluate the scientific and ethical appropriateness of MFS protocols. As 
a result, we could imagine a situation where evidence-based clinical 
equipoise exists in relation to the fetus and where a careful assessment 
of the social and scientific value of research does not justify the risks of 
healthy volunteer research. For example, an ERB might consider that 
MFS research for a rare congenital birth defect should not be conducted; 
not because there is no clinical equipoise in relation to the fetus, but 
because it is a kind of research whose potential to benefit either the 
actual pregnant woman or future generations of patients, is very limited, 
too harmful and perhaps too expensive, when compared to other 
intervention options or other more frequent and perhaps more 
devastating congenital birth defects.  And all that, independently of 
minimal risk or the willingness of pregnant women to enroll in the RCT. 
Furthermore, if we consider that there are two patients and research 
subjects in the field of MFS, we must also account for the fact that only 
one of them is in principle capable of understanding the necessary 
information based on which voluntary informed consent to research 
must be provided.  
 
III. A global concept of equipoise 
To overcome the mentioned obstacles, Lyerly and Mahowald have 
presented a so-called global concept of equipoise that, by avoiding the 
‘fallacy of abstraction’
82 in MFS, i.e., considering women and fetuses as 
different and/or separable entities, seems to be more in line with the 
liminal and intertwined nature of pregnancy.
83(Lyerly, Mahowald 2001)  
Firstly, instead of evaluating MFS by focusing either on the fetus 
exclusively or on both the woman and fetus as different or separable 
patients, they propose that there is only one patient and research subject, 
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the pregnant woman. ‘Operating on her to correct an anomaly in her 
fetus is simply that: operating on her.’ 
84 
Secondly, they establish that equipoise can only be verified when apart 
from an evaluation of the risks and benefits that MFS has for the fetus, 
maternal risks and benefits, including non-medical aspects of such 
interventions, such as psychosocial benefits, are included. On their 
view, only a global concept of equipoise that  
‘[...] incorporates the preferences and values of pregnant 
women in the design and conduct of clinical trials’ can 
overcome Chervenak and McCullough’s framework 
shortcomings.
85  
 ‘ […] On an account of the pregnant woman as the only 
research subject, the researchers only attain equipoise when 
they themselves
86 are genuinely uncertain regarding the total 
benefit/risk ratio of MFS as compared with the alternatives 
of pregnancy termination and post birth repair.’
87  
By exposing some of the inconsistencies that considering fetuses as 
different patients and research subjects may create when making 
judgments of equipoise and by pointing out that individual researchers’ 
and patients’ equipoise are relevant practical requirements in MFS RCT 
Lyerly and Mahowald, make an important statement about the 
ontological status of pregnancy and about the active role women and 
their families have in promoting MFS research; a role that is often 
neglected in the literature.
88   
We have, however, some reservations regarding the “global concept of 
equipoise”.  
Firstly, we wonder whether researchers can be expected to make 
judgments assessing all medical, non-medical psycho-social and 
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85 Ibid.  
86 My emphasis. 
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economic risks and benefits of MFS, as well as patient preferences and 
values.  
On our view, pregnant women, and eventually their families, are the 
ones better positioned to judge the consequences of participating in 
MFS. Researchers may have an opinion about the impact of MFS for the 
lives of the newborn and their caregivers, but one may doubt whether 
there is a place for these considerations in the elaboration and 
justification of MFS RCT protocols.  
Secondly, referring physicians and patient’s preferences are important 
practical considerations as they are an important element of therapy in 
daily clinical practice; they play a part during the informed consent 
procedure that legally precedes enrollment in a RCT, and physicians 
must take them into consideration when discussing treatment options 
with their patients. The point is however, that this is not the kind of 
relationship that springs between researchers, the medical community 
and prospective research subjects, making it questionable to decide 
whether there is a place for patient preferences in the ethical review of 
MFS protocols. They have a place politically and socially in the 
interdisciplinary conversations that should precede the embarking on a 
MFS RCT, or any MFS study design for that matter, regarding the 
societal value of such research for actual and future generations of 
patients, including non-gestating women. They have a role in evaluating 
whether MFS should be pursued, but they should not have a role in 
determining how it should be pursued. For that kind of judgment, the 
medical community and not the patients are more qualified.   
In other words, a research subject’s preferences become relevant on 
second moment, after the evaluation of the research protocol, at the time 
of deciding whether to participate in a clinical trial. 
Thirdly, Lyerly and Mahowald’s suggested global concept of equipoise 
entails the return to individual or theoretical equipoise.  By locating 
uncertainty about the expected benefits of MFS in the “researchers 
themselves”, Lyerly and Mahowald reinstate the concept of equipoise as 
defined by Fried in the 1970’s and named theoretical equipoise  by 
Freedman.
89 Theoretical equipoise would be obtained when the 
individual physician-researchers are uncertain about the merits of trial 
arms. As we have seen, those with the shared task of treating and doing 
research with the same population of patients are likely to be biased on 
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account of  their dual role, already expressing a preference for one of the 
trial arms. Such preferences disturb the sort of equilibrium presupposed 
by equipoise precluding the realization of RCT in circumstances where 
they might be needed in order to establish the safety and/or efficacy of 
MFS. 
In short, although we applaud Lyerly and Mahowald's view that 
pregnant women are the patients and the research subjects in MFS, for 
the three reasons mentioned, we reject their global concept of clinical 
equipoise. 
 
IV. Multidisciplinary nature of MFS 
 
‘Whether the patient is inside or outside the womb, its care is 
a continuum that requires the expertise of physicians trained 
in the care of mothers and babies.’
90  
 
Given the multidisciplinary character of MFS, one should ask which 
community of experts is relevant for the purposes of establishing 
clinical equipoise in relation to the fetus. 
“Mamma doctors” and “baby doctors” do not always have the same 
perspectives on risk, treatment, and outcome but they must work 
together and agree on which roles to take when treating pregnant 
women carrying fetuses with congenital birth defects.  Brown et al. have 
discussed, in the context of the U.S., some of the differences between 
obstetricians and pediatricians regarding the value and meaning of 
maternal-fetal interventions for fetal benefit.
91 The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Academy 
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91 Brown, S.D., Truog, R.D., Johnson, J.A. & Ecker, J.L. 2006, "Do differences 
in the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists positions on the ethics of maternal-fetal 
interventions reflect subtly divergent professional sensitivities to pregnant 
women and fetuses?", Pediatrics, vol. 117, no. 4, pp. 1382-1387.  Chapter 3    3.1 
95 
 
of Pediatrics (AAP) have different standpoints regarding the amount of 
risk women carrying fetuses with congenital birth defects should assume 
when confronted with the possibility of MFS for fetal benefit. In 
general, pediatric surgeons, the ones actually performing the operations, 
tend to be more “tolerant” of maternal risk and less “tolerant to maternal 
refusal of interventions that are recommended for fetal benefit.
92  
Despite these differences, researchers whiling to perform a MFS RCT 
usually rely on the pregnant women’s obstetricians’ good will to inform 
patients of ongoing trials. If the latter are not convinced about its merits, 
there will be no referrals, potentially delaying the production of the 
evidence aimed at by the RCT.
93 Should they be the ones in equipoise?  
What we have just described is yet another reason why clinical 
equipoise might not be adequate as criterion to judge the ethical 
appropriateness of MFS RCTs. If it is to be used by research ethics 
committees, one should at least know which community of experts is 
relevant. Given the different training and experience and the different 
weight and perspectives on risk, especially maternal risk, clinical 
equipoise, might be established for one community of experts and not 
for another. However, because both intervene in the care of pregnant 
women who participate in experimental MFS surgery, it is important to 
establish from whose perspective judgments of equipoise must be made 
for the evaluation of MFS research protocols.   
If we apply the normative clinical equipoise framework put forward by 
Chervenak and McCullough, that requires that the mortality risk to the 
pregnant woman of the proposed fetal intervention is reliably expected 
to be low and that her risk of disease, injury, or handicap is reliably 
expected to be low or manageable, then we must also know, according 
to which community of experts those judgments of risk are being 
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made.
94 The notion of risk is both a medical and normative concept 
where different training, experience and world view play a role. If 
clinical equipoise, by eliminating individual researcher’s bias, aims at 
safeguarding the rights and wellbeing of prospective research subjects, it 
should also avoid the introduction of a “professional bias”. Only by 
assuming the multidisciplinary character of MFS, can one avoid that. 
However, it is precisely because of the multidisciplinary character of 
MFS that equipoise in the expert community is difficult to ascertain.  
It seems thus that the impartial risk-benefit assessment that clinical 
equipoise is purported to give suffers from a similar limitation to the one 
we have previously described in relation to the identification of who the 
research subject/s in MFS is/are.  
For the reasons exposed, an adequate criterion to evaluate the ethical 
acceptability of MFS protocols is still missing.  
 
ALTERNATIVE 
1. who’s/are the research subject/s? 
Pregnancy and Fetal ontology and fetal moral status are among the most 
controversial topics in political, legal bioethical and philosophical 
literature. That the fetus is or can become a patient in its own right adds 
new fuel to an already difficult academic debate where consensus seems 
nearly impossible. That there is no consensus in the academia is not a 
problem per se since we doubt whether that is needed for the survival of 
bioethics as a discipline, and for its relevance and contribution to 
medicine. The problem is that such lack of consensus may cloud ERB’s 
evaluation of MFS RCT protocols, especially when the requirement of 
clinical equipoise is employed.  If we are, as a discipline, to contribute 
to the transparency and improvement of clinical research, then we must 
present working concepts that can be used by those who deal with MFS 
research in practice. As we have seen, joint claims of fetal patienthood 
and of the relevance of clinical equipoise have the negative practical 
implications we have explored in the previous sections.  
A solution to those practical difficulties comes from making a choice, 
albeit a difficult one. 
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Firstly, we propose, with Lyerly and Mahowald, that pregnant women 
are the patients and research subjects in MFS RCT.  This choice should 
not be seen as a claim about the ontological status of pregnant women or 
fetuses. What we propose is a ‘fiction’ of sorts, similar to the ones we 
often see in the Law with de jure statements or proper legal fictions
95 
that are put forward for pragmatic reasons. That fiction is justified 
precisely because of the challenging nature of the debate about the 
ontological status of pregnancy and the lack of consensus in our field 
about the moral status of embryos and (previable and viable) fetuses.  
This said, we see pregnant women as special subjects. They are different 
from pre-gestating women and from post partum women. They are, by 
definition, women with fetuses. In our account, we avoid tout court the 
debate on fetal patienthood. We do not deny that the fetus can be the 
addressee of medical care but we do not use the  construction of the 
‘fetal patient’ because when we say pregnant woman we are already 
considering the existence of a fetus that can be the addressee of medical 
care.   
MFS can be thus defined as a medical intervention or specialty that aims 
at treating pregnant women carrying fetuses with congenital birth 
defects for the benefit of the fetus and the child it will become. 
 
2. MFS research is not therapy 
Secondly, because we sustain the view that research and therapy should 
be seen as distinct activities with different aims and final goals, those 
involved in MFS research need to justify their work in a way that does 
not mislead pregnant women and their families into participating in 
RCT thinking they are looking for treatment. Because of this 
“therapeutic misconception”,
96 pregnant women might underestimate 
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risks and/or overestimate the benefits of participating in those 
experiments
97 potentially invalidating the informed consent that is 
legally and morally required for all research participants.
98  The very 
nature of clinical research and the context in which it is performed, 
contribute to the lack of precision in the separation of research and 
clinical practice.  But the concepts in use, namely that of equipoise, 
worsen this lack of specification by assuming that clinical trials are 
simultaneously scientific experiments aimed at producing knowledge 
that can help improving the care of future patients and forms of 
personalized treatment  
We claim that the protection of research participants is better served if 
the separation between research and therapy is acknowledged: precisely 
because MFS research does not aim at providing personal therapeutic 
benefits to concrete individual research participants (women and/or 
fetuses), the latter may be exposed to unacceptable harms for the sake of 
others (future patients).  
What an acceptable harm is and how much harm one is morally allowed 
to suffer for the sake of future patients is therefore one of the most 
important question bioethics needs to answer. In the context of MFS that 
question is whether pregnant women must morally accept the risks of 
experimental MFS for the sake of future pregnant patients carrying 
fetuses with similar congenital birth defects and if so, what threshold of 
risk is adequate and acceptable. Although the first question needs to be 
answered by bioethics in general, the latter must be answered by ERBs 
when asked to review a MFS RCT protocol.  
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For that, the cumulative criteria advanced by Chervenak and 
McCullough are paramount.
99 Accordingly, RCT of MFS can be 
initiated when ethics committees can validate  
[1] that in preliminary studies, the proposed intervention is reliably 
expected either to be life saving or to prevent serious and irreversible 
disease, injury, or disability for the fetus;  
[2] that among alternative designs, the intervention involves the least 
risk of morbidity and mortality to the fetus; 
 [3] and that preliminary studies indicate that the mortality risk to the 
woman is reliably expected to be low and that her risk of disease, injury 
or disability, including in future pregnancies is reliably expected to be 
low or manageable. 
In addition to the validation of those cumulative conditions, ERBs must 
assess the scientific validity and appropriateness of the hypothesis being 
evaluated.   
An uncertainty judgment similar to equipoise takes place in this phase, 
since the members of ERBs need to ascertain whether there is a 
disagreement, among those who take care of pregnant women carrying 
fetuses with congenital birth defects and the newborns these fetuses 
might become, about what the preferred course of treatment is.  This 
judgment is different from theoretical and clinical equipoise in at least 
three aspects. First, the members of the ethics committee themselves 
(and not the individual researchers or the community of experts) need to 
be uncertain about which trial arm is better in terms of  efficacy and in 
terms of the risks, balanced against potential benefits for future pregnant 
patients in the same circumstances. Second, this uncertainty judgment is 
an empirical judgment with no normative implications for referring 
physicians and MFS prospective research subjects. In other words, the 
acknowledgement of a conflict within the medical community about the 
best way of treating a certain group of patients does not alone justify the 
enrolment of pregnant women in MFS RCT. Furthermore, the 
confirmation of such uncertainty is no guarantee to prospective research 
subjects of receiving an intervention that is at least as good as the 
currently accepted standard of care.  
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Finally, this uncertainty judgment differs from equipoise since it does 
not rely on the idea that RCT should be done only when prospective 
therapeutic benefits for actual research participants can be derived from 
each trial arm. 
Those involved in the practice of MFS must inform ERBs of the risks 
inherent to that practice, namely, a quantification of the anticipated risk 
of mortality, serious and irreversible disease, injury and disability for 
the fetus, the newborn, the gestating and post gestating woman. They 
should also explain how these risks are considered to be low and/or 
manageable according to the natural history of the disease and the 
current medical state of the art. 
Armed with this information, ERBs must determine if the total amount 
of risk involved for research participants is justified by the importance 
that answering the research hypothesis has for future pregnant women 
carrying fetuses with similar congenital birth defects.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the most part, MFS is investigational. The standard of care for 
pregnant women carrying fetuses with congenital birth defects is still 
either termination of pregnancy within the legal limits or postnatal care 
for the newborn. When preliminary data and case series provide a 
reliable indication of safety and efficacy of MFS for correction of a 
certain birth defect, as it is presently the case with CDH
100, RCT can be 
used to establish the role of MFS for those affected with that disease. 
Because we view therapy and research as activities with distinct 
fundamental goals, where the former aims at providing patients with the 
best available treatment for their disease and the latter at gathering 
generalizable scientific knowledge for the benefit of future patients, we 
do not rely on any concept of equipoise to evaluate the appropriateness 
of RCT in MFS. We do not, because, contrary to those who defend 
equipoise, we do not assume that an anticipated therapeutic benefit to 
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actual research participants is a fundamental part of the ethical review of 
protocols. The harms research participants might suffer by consenting to 
research are not justified by the potential therapeutic benefit that they 
might personally derive from their participation in the RCT, but by the 
value that answering the research question has for future patients in the 
same circumstances. 
 In addition to this fundamental standpoint, we have chosen to view the 
pregnant woman as the prospective research subject in MFS. This 
choice does not purport to solve the philosophical debate about fetal 
ontology or the bioethical debate about the moral status of the fetus. It 
is, in fact, an alternative view within that debate that not only seems to 
be more in line with the apparent liminal nature of pregnancy, but also 
more helpful for ERB’s evaluation of MFS research protocols than that 
relying on the separation between the pregnant and fetal patient, which, 
as we have seen, might require a separate evaluative judgments of risk 
and benefit for the fetal patient and for the woman carrying it.  
In conclusion, in our account, RCT involving MFS can be ethically 
initiated when a multidisciplinary EC, based on an evidence based 
assessment of the risks involved in the terms above exposed, is 
convinced that the value of answering the research hypothesis for the 
sake of the health interests of future pregnant women carrying fetuses 
with certain congenital birth defects, justifies the actual risks present 
research participants might suffer within the already set roof limit of 
low/manageable.  
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3.2 When Referring Physicians and Researchers disagree on 
Equipoise: the TOTAL trial experience.  
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we reflect on whether RCTs are adequate for the clinical 
evaluation of maternal-fetal surgery for CDH, focusing on the role of 
patients’ preferences in the setting up of research protocols, on the 
requirement of equipoise and on the concept of therapeutic 
misconception.  
We describe the conception and setting up of the TOTAL trial and 
analyze the ethical dilemmas faced by the research team during that 
time.  
Depending on the view adopted regarding the scope of equipoise, there 
are two ways of dealing with patient's preferences concerning fetoscopic 
endoluminal tracheal occlusion and expectant management during 
pregnancy for CDH.  
The solution adopted for FETO is justified by the extended period of 
time it has been available to patients before the start of the RCT.  
Strong patient and referring physician preferences do not entail a right 
to have FETO, since it is a procedure of yet unproven efficacy and 
safety. In the future, in order to avoid the dilemmas posed by the 
therapeutic misconception and in name of the right of  future 
generations of patients to have access to treatment of proven safety and 
efficacy,  researchers must be able to plan RCT  in due time. 
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This work was financially supported by EU-FP6 project EuroSTEC (soft tissue 
engineering for congenital birth defects in children. Contract: LSHB-CT-2006-
037409).  Chapter 3  3.2 
106 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Until the 1990s, maternal-fetal surgery (MFS) was performed 
sporadically as experimental treatment for (women carrying) fetuses 
with life threatening or severely debilitating congenital birth defects. 
The advent of minimally invasive fetoscopic procedures in the last two 
decades has made MFS a clinical reality in a number of specialized 
centers around the world. Although a limited number of randomized 
controlled trials (RCT) has established the role of MFS for twin-to-twin 
transfusion syndrome and for congenital diaphragmatic hernia (CDH), 
(Deprest et al. 2010) for other indications, MFS remains investigational.  
CDH affects one in 2500 to 5000 births and it consists in a 
malformation of the diaphragm, which allows the abdominal organs to 
protrude into the chest, thereby hampering proper lung development. 
Newborns with CDH have smaller and less compliant lungs, lesser 
conducting and respiratory airways and lesser and abnormally 
developed blood vessels. This leads to respiratory insufficiency and 
pulmonary hypertension after birth, both life threatening.  Despite 
optimal postnatal care the overall mortality of this condition is as high 
as 30%.(Deprest et al. 2006;Deprest et al. 2009b)  
Prenatal repair of CDH has started in the 1980s and since then several 
clinical studies have been performed to assess the safety and efficacy of 
different types of MFS for correction of the diaphragm defect. Initial 
anatomical repair (closing the defect via open MFS, with a hysterotomy 
and fetal exposure), lead to less invasive tracheal occlusion (TO). 
During pregnancy, fetuses do not use lungs for oxygen intake. Instead, 
their airways produce fluid. When the windpipe is occluded, that fluid is 
entrapped within the lungs, raising the pressure and acting as a signal 
for lung growth. The latter may help reversing lethal hypoplasia, thereby 
increasing the chances of survival after birth. In a RCT conducted in 
San Francisco,  TO , as compared to expectant management during 
pregnancy- did not improve survival rates (Harrison et al. 1997). 
However, in this trial, the vast majority of fetuses had moderate lung 
hypoplasia, and the surgical techniques employed were quite different 
from what is possible today.  
Nowadays, the procedure is done percutaneously in a minimally 
invasive operation under local or loco-regional anesthesia with fetal 
pain relief and immobilization at around 26-28 gestational weeks Chapter 3  3.2 
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(Deprest, Jani, Van Schoubroeck, Cannie, Gallot, Dymarkowski, Fryns, 
Naulaers, Gratacos, & Nicolaides 2006),  requiring a 3.3 mm access to 
the uterus for insertion of an endoscope to deploy a balloon. The balloon 
is subsequently removed at 34 gestational weeks, to stimulate lung 
maturation (Deprest et al. 2010) allowing the woman to return from the 
fetal surgery center to the initial tertiary care center for labor.  (Deprest, 
Devlieger, Srisupundit, Beck, Sandaite, Rusconi, Claus, Naulaers, Van 
de Velde, Brady, Devriendt, Vermeesch, Toelen, Carlon, Debyser, De 
Catte, & Lewi 2010)  
The FETO consortium recently reported on the outcome of 210 
consecutive procedures performed in pregnant women carrying fetuses 
with severe hypoplasia. (Jani et al. 2009) Compared with the cases 
managed expectantly included in the antenatal CDH registry, FETO 
increased the survival rate of fetuses with severe left-sided CDH from 
24% to 49%, and in right-sided from 0% to 35% (p<0.001). In order to 
test the accuracy of these data, the so-called TOTAL trial (Tracheal 
Occlusion To Accelerate Lung growth trial) was designed. There, FETO 
will be compared to expectant management during pregnancy in fetuses 
with left sided and isolated congenital diaphragmatic hernia and severe 
pulmonary hypoplasia in a randomized controlled trial.
1  
RCT are considered the golden standard of evidence-based medicine for 
establishing the standard of care because, by eliminating the most 
important sources of bias, they allegedly provide the best possible 
evidence for or against the value of a certain intervention. However, 
when used to address clinical questions in MFS, RCT pose special 
problems. Despite the efforts to enforce honest informed consent 
procedures, referring physicians and pregnant women, often manifest a 
preference for the active or surgical management arm.(Chervenak & 
McCullough 2009; Mahowald 2005) Expressions of this preference 
might compromise the possibility of ethically conducting RCTs and that 
is what we will discuss based on the conception and setting up of the 
TOTAL trial and on the ethical dilemmas faced during this process.  
 
THE TOTAL TRIAL 
The TOTAL trial tests the hypothesis of whether prenatal intervention 
increases survival and/or morbidity in fetuses with isolated CDH, as 
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compared to expectant management during pregnancy, both followed by 
standardized neonatal care. The trial is divided into two arms, according 
to the severity of the disease. In the severe cases, i.e., those with an 
observed/expected lung-to-head-ratio (O/E LHR) < 25%, investigators 
hypothesize that prenatal intervention increases survival rates by 50%. 
In the moderate cases, i.e. cases with an O/E LHR 26-35% or an O/E 
LHR 36-45% together with liver herniation, prenatal intervention would 
lead to a significant increase in survival without bronchopulmonary 
dysplasia (BPD). The TOTAL trial is an unblended multicenter trial, 
where all prenatal interventions are done at expert fetal surgery centers 
familiar with fetoscopy and FETO and that are prepared to manage 
fetuses with obstructed airways and preterm babies with CDH at 
anytime. Postnatal management is also standardized by a consensus 
protocol. (Deprest et al. 2009a).   
During the review of the protocol, the FETO task force encountered an 
“unexpected resistance” to randomization. The reasons for that can be 
summarized under the following three captions. First, it has been 
claimed that because some pregnant women and/or referring physicians 
tend to consider expectant management during pregnancy  as “doing 
nothing”, they tend to establish a strong preference for prenatal 
intervention, therefore refusing randomization that may deprive them of  
it. Second, because FETO has been clinically available since 2003, and 
consistently reporting an apparent improvement in survival, as 
compared to historical controls, which were used to define the natural 
history and selection criteria of the study, it was suggested that 
restricting the availability of FETO to the RCT might be perceived 
negatively as the elimination of a significant choice.   
In other words, supposedly, there has been a pre-RCT period that has 
lasted longer than scientifically desirable, allowing both prospective 
patient-research subjects and referring physicians to establish a 
preference for FETO. Restricting the access to fetal intervention to the 
RCT participating hospitals might drive patients to less or non- 
experienced centers, receiving thereafter less than optimal care. 
Third, there have been fears that when faced with such low predicted 
survival rates (without prenatal intervention) and the unavailability of 
FETO outside the RCT, pregnant women would rather opt for 
terminating the pregnancy. 
Essentially this goes back to the validity of the prediction model 
proposed for severe CDH. Lung and liver measurements define a group Chapter 3  3.2 
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that has a predicted survival rate of 20 % or less in the expectant 
management arm and that might be perceived as nearly unacceptable by 
pregnant women who, hoping to increase the chances of survival of their 
babies, could only obtain FETO by participating in the RCT with a ½ 
chance of actually getting it. 
In view of these points, an Ethics Committee (EC) ruled that prospective 
patients cannot be denied the possibility of opting for FETO. In other 
words, it was claimed that they should not be locked in a system where 
there is no longer access to prenatal surgery, an option that had been 
available until the formal start of the RCT.  
Provided that  
(1)  standardized tertiary neonatal care during expectant management 
during pregnancy is available but does not contribute to increase the 
survival of the worst-off group of patients   
(2) that prospective patients are sufficiently informed about the lack of 
scientific evidence in favor of MFS over expectant management and 
standard neonatal care  
(3) and about the inherent risks of the fetal intervention, pregnant 
women should be able to have access to FETO if that is their 
intervention of choice.  
Primary physicians should also be able to refer pregnant women to 
FETO if they think that is in their patients’ best interest.  
Because patient and referring physician’s equipoise could not allegedly 
be established, a reformulation of the protocol that contemplated the 
alleged strong “patient preferences for FETO” has been requested by the 
ethics committee (EC) in charge. It is important to notice that there has 
been no real objection to randomization per se, but to randomization-
only, i.e., to a RCT without a “backdoor” through which prospective 
research subjects could get their preferred intervention. Supposedly, in 
this trial, randomization-only would unduly neglect prospective patient-
subject and referring physician’s preferences, whose equipoise has been 
disturbed.   
 
EQUIPOISE 
It is important to clarify what is meant here by ‘the requirement of 
equipoise’, not only because it can have different meanings when Chapter 3  3.2 
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applied to clinical research but also because it is often used in a non-
specified manner.  
The concept was first introduced in the early 1970s by Charles Fried and 
has been enriched and developed by others who have followed, such as 
B. Freedman, who in 1987 established the meaning by which the notion 
of equipoise is more often understood, i.e.,  as clinical equipoise 
(Freedman 1987;Fried 1974) 
The principle is based upon the idea that physicians who are also 
researchers have special (fiduciary) obligations to provide the best 
available treatment to their patients.(Kukla 2007) According to this 
view, randomization can only be ethical if the relevant medical 
community is genuinely uncertain about which of the arms of the 
proposed trial is superior. This means both that no subject shall be 
randomized to a treatment known to be inferior and that the clinical trial 
will be aborted once there is no longer equipoise, i.e., as soon as there is 
evidence that one treatment is indeed better than another. (Brody & 
Miller 2003)   
In MFS, clinical equipoise has also been used as a criterion for the 
moral acceptability of RCT.  Based on the concept of “the fetus as a 
patient”, Chervenak and McCullough have established “a 
comprehensive ethical framework for fetal research”, which identifies 
the conditions for the initiation and assessment of clinical trials in the 
field.  On their account, “preliminary innovation should cease and RCT 
begin when there is clinical equipoise, that is, when based on an 
evidence based evaluation of the outcomes of previous case series, there 
is a ‘remaining disagreement in the expert clinical community, (...) 
about the merits of the intervention to be tested” (Chervenak & 
McCullough 2009;Chervenak & McCullough 2007)  
Equipoise might nonetheless be understood in another sense, one that is 
more in line with the arguments presented before, as patient equipoise 
or, to a wider extent, as community (of patient and referring 
physician’s) equipoise.  
According to Chervenak and McCullough, provided that there is valid 
informed consent, it is irrelevant whether individual researchers, 
individual referring physicians or individual subjects are themselves 
equally poised about the merits of the trial arms for guaranteeing that 
randomization does not preclude the duty of care of physician-
researchers.  Chapter 3  3.2 
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The arguments raised against “closing the backdoor” refer instead to 
patient and community equipoise. According to this view, referring 
physicians and patients who are prospective research subjects should 
also be themselves in equipoise for randomization to be ethical. 
Independently of whether or not clinical equipoise is verified, when 
prospective research subjects and/or referring physicians are not, 
personally, in equipoise, recruitment and consent to randomization are 
difficult to achieve and some would say, even unethical (Veatch 2002). 
 
Equipoise in the TOTAL trial. 
At this point, the TOTAL trial investigators, who are part of a research 
consortium exploring the potential of tissue engineering for MFS
2 asked 
for the consortium’s ethicists advice on the matter at stake.  
Following the advice of the senior ethicist, the protocol was adjusted.  In 
3her expert opinion, those research subjects who, for whatever reason, 
refuse to be randomized should be able to receive FETO by enrolling in 
an observational study. Those with no preference might be enrolled in 
the RCT.  Accordingly, fetal and perinatal medicine specialists should 
judge whether they are indifferent in relation to the merits of the arms of 
the trial and decide how to advise patients, regarding their participation 
in the RCT. If they are personally in equipoise, they should refer 
patients for the RCT (and nothing else). If not, they can refer patients 
for FETO directly. Pregnant women are also given the opportunity to 
evaluate whether participation in the RCT is in their best interest, opting 
for FETO if that is their preferred mode of treatment. 
There is a precedent in Europe where a similar solution has been 
considered. In the Eurofoetus trial,  prospective research subjects could 
opt into the trial, but could also be treated in accordance with their 
preference or with their referring physicians’ advice (Senat et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, despite the precedent, it is worth mentioning that the EU 
has no regulatory framework for MFS making it very difficult to prevent 
access to experimental treatment next to the RCT.  
In contrast, in the U.S., a general professional agreement has been 
established since the MOMS trial, according to which, where a 
procedure has not been formally validated, MFS should not be 
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performed outside a RCT trial in specialized maternal-fetal medicine 
centers (Chescheir 2009).  In the MOMS’ trial, there is no “back door” 
through which patient-research subjects can have access to MFS outside 
the RCT, at least in the USA. This was possible because of an 
agreement between fetal surgery centers and the funding authority, the 
National Institutes of Health.  Notwithstanding the different nature of 
the studies
4, the FETO consortium was initially inclined to manage the 
TOTAL trial in analogy with MOMS, blocking the access to MFS 
outside the recruiting CDH trial. 
However, given the insistence on the importance of patient equipoise, 
the FETO task force has contemplated a different solution. One that 
allows them to run the much needed RCT and at the same time respect 
prospective patient and physician’s strong preferences for FETO.  
 
 DISCUSSION 
The relevance of  patient and community equipoise is  not consensual  
(Veatch 2002;Veatch 2007) and that means that a different solution than 
that ultimately adopted by the FETO consortium could be envisaged. 
The arguments presented above against randomization-only  can be seen 
as different  faces of two known problems facing RCT involving 
surgery: (1) the problem of “dissemination first, evidence later” (Ashton 
et al. 2009) and (2) the problem of the therapeutic misconception (TM) 
that seems to assail physicians and research subjects alike in the field of 
MFS. (Mahowald 2005)  
Ideally, the evaluation of new procedures should be performed before 
they become part of daily clinical practice.  However, the history of 
clinical research involving surgery is rich in examples of procedures that 
have been widely used before its safety and efficacy have been formally 
established in an evidence-based fashion.   Some procedures  never 
make it to that stage, though they are widely practiced (Ashton, Wray, 
Jarman, Kolman, Wenner, & Brody 2009) and others actually continue 
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to be used on patients despite the evidence gathered against them. An 
example of that is Ecmo for CDH.(Morini, Goldman, & Pierro 2006)  
For that reason, RCT have to be timely set up. Establishing the 
appropriate timing is an issue which deserves further thought. However 
at this point, it seems fair to say that when RCTs are undertaken after a 
long time use of a certain technique, belief systems and preferences are 
allowed to develop among physicians and patients, making RCTs 
difficult to organize,  making them  prone to lack of recruitment, “drop-
offs” or “cross-overs”  (Ashton, Wray, Jarman, Kolman, Wenner, & 
Brody 2009).  
The phenomenon of ‘dissemination first’ was a reason for the reluctance 
to accept randomization- only. The argument can however result in a 
slippery slope for at least two reasons. First, that FETO has been 
improperly performed in a large number of patients remains to be 
proven. We actually think this is not so, as this experience gathered the 
evidence that justified the initiation of the TOTAL trial in the first place. 
In fact, if there were no reasons to believe in the potential of FETO in 
the case series, it would be unacceptable to start a RCT either according 
to the IFMSS guidelines 
5 (Harrison et al. 1982) or the ethical standards 
put forward by Chervenack and McCullough for  the initiation and 
assessment of Clinical Trials (Chervenak & McCullough 2007;Harrison 
et al. 1982)) . Second, even if we could produce such proof, it would not 
necessarily follow that randomization-only, without accommodating 
patient preferences, is unethical. The fact that we can describe and 
understand a phenomenon, in this case, the strong patient and referring 
physician preferences for FETO, does not entail that we must accord it 
normative force. More specifically, the mere existence of a preference 
for FETO does not entail a right to have FETO.   
                                                           
5 Criteria for maternal-fetal surgery: 1. Accurate diagnosis and staging possible, 
with exclusion of associated anomalies; 2. Natural history of the disease is 
documented, and prognosis established; 3. Currently no effective postnatal 
therapy; 4. In-uterus surgery proven feasible in animal models, reversing 
deleterious effects of the condition; 5. Interventions performed in specialized 
multidisciplinary fetal treatment centers within strict protocols and approval of 
the local ethics committee with informed consent of the mother or parents. 
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Allowing patient-research subjects to have off-trial access to FETO with 
the argument that not doing so might violate patient’s right to have their 
preferred course of treatment and the referring physician’s duty to 
promote  that patient’s best interests can be seen as a misconception 
about the therapeutic goals of clinical research. This misconception is 
usually named the “therapeutic misconception” (TM). The concept has 
been put forward by Paul S. Appelbaum in the 1980’s and can be 
understood in two ways.  As a prospective research subject’s failure to 
recognize how her personal care may be compromised by research 
procedures or as an unreasonable appraisal of the nature of the research 
enterprise (Appelbaum et al. 1987;Appelbaum & Lidz 2008).  
Surely, depending on the circumstances, one can distinguish between 
stronger and weaker forms of therapeutic misconception like when one 
thinks that by entering a RCT one will receive the best treatment 
available vs. when one enters a RCT with ‘rational therapeutic 
optimism, consisting in weighing low probable benefit (Glannon 2006).  
One could say that both types of TM seem to be present in the 
arguments presented above.  
Undoubtedly, the very nature of clinical research and the context in 
which it is performed, contribute to the lack of precision in the 
separation of research and clinical practice.  But the concepts in use, 
namely that of equipoise, worsen this lack of specification by assuming 
that clinical trials are simultaneously scientific experiments aimed at 
producing knowledge that can help improve the care of future patients 
and forms of personalized treatment (Miller & Brody 2003). When 
research is conducted with patients with prospective therapeutic benefit, 
the frontiers of what is treatment and what is research are often difficult 
to draw.  
On our perspective though, clinical research should not be viewed as a 
form of medical treatment or as personalized care and RCTs should not 
be seen as forms of providing personal therapeutic benefits to individual 
patients. On the contrary, RCTs aim at ascertaining the superiority, in 
terms of efficacy and safety for future patients, of an experimental arm 
against another arm, usually the standard of care. Often initial studies 
hint towards the potential therapeutic benefit of the experimental 
procedure and later that is not confirmed by a RCT. It is precisely this 
benefit that must be proven by the trial. The hypothesis may be rejected 
as well. Or, in other words, the perceived therapeutic benefit might 
ultimately not be proven. Allowing patients to have access to FETO Chapter 3  3.2 
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next to the RCT can be seen in the light of the notion of TM. In fact, one 
could say that the door is left open for prospective research subjects 
who, because of a mistake about the nature of FETO, refuse to be 
randomized.  Sanctioning the performance of a surgical procedure of 
unproven efficacy and/or safety based on a mistake is unacceptable for it 
may undermine the validity of the informed consent (or dissent) 
research subjects are (morally and legally) required to give. Because of 
the TM, they might underestimate risks and/or overestimate the benefits 
of participating in those experiments (Melo-Martin & Ho 2008). 
Researchers have thus a moral obligation to explain what is outside 
normal care. 
Ideally, FETO should not be offered to prospective research subjects 
outside the TOTAL trial. We have given credit to the reasons put 
forward against the “closed back door policy.” However, in view of the 
TM about the merits of MFS for CDH, we think it is important to 
mention some of the consequences of adopting patient and community 
equipoise as relevant ethical requirements.  
  When patient or community equipoise cannot be established, 
independently of the existence of clinical equipoise, consent to 
randomization might not be achieved and RCT become difficult to 
realize. That does not mean that randomization is unethical and that it 
should not be pursued. On the contrary, emphasis should be put on the 
necessity of producing the strongest evidence possible and RCT 
theoretically produce such evidence.  
Patient preferences should not always determine how RCT should be 
conducted and, in the case of the TOTAL trial, a solution that did not 
contemplate them was also possible, following the MOMs trial example. 
That does not  also  mean that they have no weight or that they should 
be disregarded. On the contrary, patient preferences and primary 
physician’s opinions are an important element of therapy in clinical 
practice and physicians must, take them into consideration when 
discussing treatment options with their patients. 
The point is precisely that according to a preeminent view of  research 
ethics, (Brody & Miller 2003;Miller & Brody 2003;Veatch 2007) this is 
not the kind of relationship that exists  between the FETO task force and 
the research subjects in the TOTAL trial.  Answering the research 
hypothesis “Does FETO improve survival rates in the worst off group of 
fetuses with CDH and predicted survival rate of 15% or less when 
compared to expectant management during pregnancy and standard Chapter 3  3.2 
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neonatal care” is the aim of the TOTAL trial; and that question is 
independent of the relationship prospective research subjects may have 
with their referring physicians where patient preferences are indeed 
relevant.  
In the absence of a body of regulation at European level enforcing RCT, 
researchers have to rely on the good will of their colleagues not to 
perform FETO outside trial. Non- participating institutions and their 
surgeons are indeed under no official legal obligation to refer patients to 
ongoing RCTs.  It is our view, however, that for the sake of the safety of 
future patients and of the gathering of quality scientific proof, 
physicians should abstain from performing experiments outside ongoing 
trials.  At a minimum, if the trial has passed all relevant scientific and 
ethical scrutiny and clinical equipoise is verified, physicians have a 
moral obligation to refer patients to RCT and by extension, the TOTAL 
trial.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Our answer to the question of whether it is ethical to offer FETO outside 
the TOTAL trial to research subjects who refuse to be randomized 
depends therefore on to whom the question is asked. 
Researchers in the TOTAL trial cannot ethically offer FETO outside the 
RCT because that would perpetuate the TM about the goals of clinical 
research where the good of finding the standard of care for severe cases 
of CDH should trump the interests of individual patient’s in having 
procedure of unproven safety and efficacy. 
When the question is posed to the referring physician, it is another story. 
Taking into consideration the lack of regulation preventing surgeons to 
perform experimental interventions outside ongoing RCT, we propose 
the following framework: 
When referring physicians and patients are personally in equipoise, trial 
participation should be offered. Those referring physicians who are not 
in  equipoise might choose to offer their patients both expectant 
management and standard neonatal care or, participation in the 
observational trial. 
We repeat, strong patient and referring physician preferences for FETO 
do not entail a right to have FETO, since it is a procedure of yet 
unproven efficacy and safety. Only in the context of a therapeutic Chapter 3  3.2 
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relationship, do patients have the right to obtain the best care available 
for their disease. If in this context, the referring physician thinks it is the 
best for their patient that she gets FETO, then he or she might refer her 
to the observational trial.  
A carefully thought informed consent procedure should be in place in 
this case, emphasizing the experimental nature of the procedure 
offered.(Chervenak & McCullough 2009) 
“Clinician gate-keeping”, the process whereby physicians or other 
healthcare providers prevent eligible potential research subjects from 
having access to clinical trials should be discouraged and referring 
physicians should be careful not to direct their patients’ choices when 
sending them to the observational trial, allowing for their own biases to 
influence the choice of potential research subjects (Sharkey et al. 2010).  
Although we do not want to promote a “tyranny of the RCT”(Cooper 
2010), we agree that they are necessary to provide the evidence needed 
in the field of MFS,  therefore European maternal-fetal surgeons should 
urge the EU to regulate on this subject. 
The solution adopted for FETO is a less than ideal option that is 
justified by the extended period of time it has been available to patients 
before the start of the RCT. During this time preferences and beliefs 
have been formed from the part of patients and referring obstetricians, 
thus making a “close back door policy” difficult to enforce. In the 
future, in order to avoid the dilemmas posed by the therapeutic 
misconception and in name of the right of  future generations of patients 
to have access to treatment of proven safety and efficacy,  researchers 
should be able to plan RCT for MFS in due time. Preliminary data is 
necessary to justify the initiation of a RCT and researchers should not be 
excused from gathering them in order to safely conduct clinical trials. 
The perhaps ungrateful task of knowing when to stop experimenting is 
the key if RCT are to have a place in MFS research. 
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3.3 Equipoise: differences between patients, physicians, and 
researchers * 
 
ABSTRACT 
When randomized controlled trials (RCT) are conducted with patients 
with prospective therapeutic benefit, the line between treatment and 
research is often difficult to draw. However, in order to protect 
prospective research subjects’ well-being and rights not to be subjected 
to harmful and pointless research, the distinction between what is 
normal care and research must be thoroughly explained. Strong patient 
preferences for the experimental arm in a RCT do not entail a right to 
have access to it since by definition it represents an option of unproven 
safety and/or efficacy. Only in the context of therapy, patients have a 
right to obtain the best available care and a right to discuss their 
treatment preferences with their physicians. A careful informed consent 
procedure that clarifies the differences between research and therapy, 
and that emphasizes the experimental nature of trial arms, should be in 
place prior to randomization. 
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Clinical research with human subjects, because potentially harmful, is 
typically subjected to ethics committees’ (EC) oversight and approval. 
In this process, both the scientific and methodological merits of the 
research hypothesis are evaluated in order to promote the informed and 
voluntary consent of prospective research participants. Scientific and 
ethical review cannot thus be separated in the task of evaluating the 
appropriateness of clinical studies, which, at the expense of the enrolled 
subjects, aim at acquiring generalizable knowledge that may benefit 
future generations of patients. In randomized controlled trials (RCT) 
conducted with therapeutic intent, where one intervention or non-
intervention is compared in terms of efficacy and/or safety against 
another, EC’s scrutiny is often made with reference to the ethical 
requirement of equipoise.  
 
EQUIPOISE: A QUICK OVERVIEW.   
Etymologically, equipoise comes from the Latin word equi and the old 
French word pois, literally meaning “equal weight”. As an ethical 
principle, it aims at protecting the value of the principle of “primum non 
nuocere”
 1  that is in the heart of the Hippocratic Oath and all 
therapeutically driven medical practice. In short, the principle requires 
that when one aims at comparing alternative therapeutic options in a 
RCT, one should be genuinely uncertain about which alternative is 
superior in terms of the balance of risks weighed against the anticipated 
therapeutic benefits of each trial arm for the participating patient-
research subjects. This view about the ethics of clinical research is 
known as the ‘similarity position’ in that it claims that  “clinical 
investigators ought to be bound by the same fundamental principles that 
govern therapeutic medicine, more specifically, by a duty to provide the 
optimal therapeutic benefit to each patient or subject” (1). The latter 
means both that no patient/research subject shall be randomized  to 
interventions known to be inferior to the currently accepted standard of 
care and that the trial shall be stopped as soon as equipoise is disturbed, 
i.e., as soon as an evidence-based preference has been established in 
favor of one of the trial arms.  
 
 
                                                           
1 “First do no harm.” Chapter 3    3.3 
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Who should be uncertain about the merits of trial arms? 
There is no straightforward answer to that question. When equipoise 
was first put forward as an ethical requirement for conducting clinical 
trials (2), uncertainty was located in individual physician-researchers ( 
theoretical equipoise). However, because individual physicians who are 
also researchers can be biased by virtue of  their research activities in 
their judgment of what is in the best interest of their patients, Freedman 
suggested that in order to be able to enroll patients in clinical research 
without compromising the fiduciary based physician-patient 
relationship, the relevant community of medical experts, and not the 
attending physician-researcher, should be in an epistemic state of 
uncertainty between the merits of trial arms. It is in this sense that 
equipoise is, today, more often used, i.e., as clinical equipoise (3). 
Equipoise might nevertheless be understood in another sense, as patient 
equipoise or, to a wider extent, as community (of patient and referring 
physician’s)  equipoise(4;5). According to this view, in order to be 
ethical, referring physicians and/or patients who are prospective 
research subjects should also be themselves in equipoise for 
randomization. Independently of whether or not clinical equipoise is 
verified, when prospective research subjects and/or referring physicians 
are not, personally, in equipoise, recruitment and consent to 
randomization are difficult to achieve and some would say, immoral(6). 
The latter is particularly important when the patient’s preferred course 
of treatment is experimental and only available in the context of a RCT.  
Why is randomization in these cases unethical? And why shouldn’t 
those patients have access to their preferred therapeutic option within 
the RCT? 
To answer those questions adequately, we must take into consideration a 
much debated but fundamental aspect about the aims of clinical research 
in general and more specifically, of RCT, and the way in which these 
differ from the goals of therapy in daily clinical practice.  
 
RESEARCH VS. THERAPY: RESEARCH IS NOT THERAPY.  
We sustain the view that research and therapy should be seen as distinct 
activities with different aims. RCTs that compare therapeutic options for 
a given medical condition aim at ascertaining in a statistically relevant 
way the superiority, in terms of efficacy and safety, of an intervention, Chapter 3    3.3 
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often an experimental arm, against another arm, usually the standard of 
care. Although sometimes previous formal studies or informal practice 
give a positive indication about the therapeutic benefit of the 
experimental arm, it is precisely this therapeutic benefit that must be 
proven by the trial. At the end, this benefit might even be shown to be 
false. In other words, RCTs aim at answering a scientific question 
described as a hypothesis in a research protocol, which in turn aims at 
producing generalizable scientific knowledge which may or may not 
benefit future generations of patients diagnosed with the condition at 
stake.   
In daily practice, a physician’s goal is to provide the best available care 
to actual patients(7). In contrast with clinical research, rather than taking 
into consideration the health interests of future generations of patients, 
physicians, have a moral and legal obligation to provide the best 
available care to actual patients. In this context, and not in the former, 
the actual best interests of patients are paramount.  
As they do not aim at providing personal therapeutic benefits to 
individual research participants, RCT should not be seen as 
extraordinary forms of medical treatment, not even when the patient’s 
preferred course of action is available only within a RCT.  
This seemingly straightforward distinction is not so clear in practice, 
and what’s worse, it is often blurred during the ethical review of clinical 
studies(8). Certainly, the very nature of interventional clinical research 
and the context in which it is performed, contribute to the lack of 
precision in the separation of research and clinical practice. For 
example, ideally, the evaluation of novel therapies, surgical or not, 
should be performed before they become part of daily clinical practice. 
If RCT are deemed necessary by the relevant expert community but are 
conducted after a long time use of a certain intervention or therapeutic 
option, belief systems and preferences are allowed to develop among 
physicians and patients making it difficult to rationalize the performance 
of RCT. For this reason, establishing the appropriate timing for a RCT is 
an ethically relevant aspect. Surely, RCT are justified when a certain 
level of evidence gathered in preliminary studies warrants 
randomization. However, where prospective research subjects and 
referring physicians have a deep-rooted preference for one of the arms 
of the trial, conducting the RCT in a statistically significant way may be 
unrealistic, even when deemed important. The concepts in use, namely 
that of equipoise, may worsen this situation. By assuming that clinical Chapter 3    3.3 
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trials are simultaneously scientific experiments and forms of 
personalized treatment (8;9), equipoise in any of its meanings, demands 
EC’s to take into consideration patients’ preferences  when assessing the 
scientific and ethical appropriateness of RCT protocols. The latter is 
misleading and contradicts the very goal of clinical research.  
 
THE ROLE OF PATIENT PREFERENCES IN RCT.  
When patient equipoise cannot be established, because prospective 
research subjects have a strong preference for the experimental arm of 
the trial, consent to randomization might not be achieved. That does not, 
however, mean that randomization is unethical or illegal or that 
prospective research subjects now have a right to their preferred course 
of treatment. Such right exists in the context of normal care. But even 
there, this right comes with certain limits since patient’s preferences can 
be flawed, formed based on the wrong information or simply 
unrealistic
2. In any case, in general, it is safe to say that patient 
preferences are an important element of therapy in daily clinical practice 
and physicians must take them into consideration when discussing 
treatment options with their patients. The point is precisely that this is 
not the kind of relationship that bears between clinical researchers and 
research subjects in a RCT comparing an experimental therapy against 
the currently accepted standard of care. In such a context, the main goal 
is to provide a valid and statistical relevant answer to a scientific 
question in order to improve the care of future patients, namely by 
proving the safety and/ or superiority of the experimental arm.   
In addition, patients have a right to therapy that is proven to be safe and 
3efficient. Experimental therapy within a RCT is neither. For this reason, 
unless the trial design allows it, for example by contemplating a patient 
preference arm, prospective research subjects do not have a right to be 
placed in the experimental arm of a RCT, even when the latter is only 
available there. Suggesting the contrary is to incur in a “therapeutic 
misconception”(TM) of sorts, similar to the one research subjects 
sustain when they think that by participating in a RCT they will have 
access to the best available treatment for their disease (10). 
                                                           
2 When for example a patient requests an intervention that is not available in a 
certain hospital or that is contraindicated. 
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The TM can be defined as [a] a research subject’s failure to recognize 
that her personal care may be compromised by research procedures or 
[b] as an unreasonable optimism about the therapeutic benefits of 
participating in research.(11) 
Independently of how prospective research subjects’ preferences were 
formed, taking them into consideration during EC’s scrutiny and at the 
moment of randomization might both reinforce the described 
misconception and create obstacles to the voluntary informed consent, 
research subjects are morally and legally required to produce. Despite 
the fact that informed consent is one of the most debated topics in 
bioethics and medical law literature, it is fair to say that in order to give 
it, one must at least understand relevant facts about the nature of RCT. 
Because of the TM, i.e., a mistake about the nature of an experimental 
arm in a RCT, prospective research subjects might underestimate and/ 
or overestimate the benefits of their inclusion in a RCT, failing to 
comply with one of the most important aspects of informed consent.  
 
CONCLUSION.  
Strong patient preferences for an experimental arm in a RCT which 
design does not contemplate a patient preference arm do not entail a 
right to have access to it since, by definition, it represents an option of 
unproven safety and/or efficacy. Only in the context therapy, do patients 
have a right to obtain the best care available for their disease and a right 
to discuss their treatment preferences with their attending physicians. 
A careful informed consent procedure that makes the differences in 
scope between research and therapy clear and that emphasizes the 
experimental nature of trial arms should be in place prior to 
randomization. When positive preliminary pre–trial data is part of the 
information that must be conveyed to research participants, it should be 
disclosed in a way that does not mislead them to think that one arm of 
the trial is superior to another. And finally, patient equipoise is a 
relevant phenomenon in the sense that when missing, randomization 
will most likely fail and researchers will have to solve recruitment and 
power issues. However, the mere existence of a preference does not 
grant it normative force and the good of finding the safest and most 
efficient treatment for patients should trump the interest of individual 
prospective research subjects in having procedures of unproven safety 
and efficacy.  Chapter 3    3.3 
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Counseling of Maternal-Fetal Surgery Spina Bifida 
Prospective Patients. A Dutch- Belgian Case Study on the 
traveling patient.  
 
ABSTRACT 
Myelomeningocele, aka, spina bifida can be diagnosed during 
pregnancy, in the second trimester by routine ultrasound and it is the 
most common congenital birth defect involving the central and 
peripheral nervous system. Worldwide, spina bifida affects 1/2000 live 
births (1). In most cases, it entails lifelong disability with dependence on 
medical and social supportive care. (2-6) The Management Of 
Myelomeningocele Study (MOMS), a randomized controlled trial 
(RCT) comparing prenatal closure of the defect with standard postnatal 
care, shows  that for a small and carefully selected number of subjects, 
prenatal surgery reduces the need for shunting and improves the 
composite score for mental development and motor function at 30 
months when compared with postnatal surgical repair. Prenatal surgery 
is however associated with high maternal morbidity, including an 
increased risk of uterine dehiscence at delivery, and with a high rate of 
preterm birth. (5) 
For a group of selected patients, maternal-fetal surgery (MFS) might be 
seen as a management alternative for Dutch pregnant women, together 
with legal abortion, expectant management and postnatal care.  
In this paper, we discuss the conditions put forward by the PROSPER 
consortium (Prospective Spina bifida registry of outcome after 
intrauterine Surgery)(7), upon which Dutch pregnant women with a 
diagnosis of spina bifida might be (ethically) referred for consideration 
of MFS at the KU Leuven’s Fetal Treatment Center in Belgium that 
currently offers the procedure as innovative treatment. 
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BACKGROUND 
In the beginning of 2011, the results of the MOMS trial (Management 
Of Myelomeningocele Study), the first RCT comparing prenatal and 
neonatal closure of myelomeningocele, were published. These results, 
released in the New England Journal of Medicine, showed a statistically 
significant advantage of MFS for a selected number of patients, over 
postnatal coverage of the defect, until then, the standard of care for 
myelomeningocele. (5)In the sequence of the release of the MOMS trial 
results, the Fetal Treatment Center of the University Hospital of the 
Catholic University of Leuven (UZ KULeuven) in Belgium has begun 
training its staff to offer MFS for spina bifida (as described in the 
MOMS trial protocol) to patients. In the Netherlands, there is no single 
center sufficiently qualified to perform that kind of intervention. Given 
Belgium’s geographical and linguistic proximity and the long-lasting 
history of referral of patients to Leuven, namely for fetoscopic tracheal 
occlusion for Congenital Diaphragmatic Hernia, several Dutch 
physicians, together with the Fetal Treatment Center in Leuven, have 
promoted a series of meetings and discussions with representatives of 
the multidisciplinary teams involved in the diagnose and care of 
children with myelomeningocele in the Netherlands. The latter aimed at 
determining whether and under which conditions, pregnant women with 
a spina bifida diagnosis should be offered referral to Leuven for prenatal 
surgery.  
The much awaited results of MOMS trial have had great media 
coverage, including in the Netherlands
109. The way the news were 
reported generated the fear that patients would misinterpret the 
significance of the results of the trial and think that finally, here we have 
the cure for spina bifida! Those fears became real when, in the weeks 
following the news of the end of the MOMS trial, some Dutch 
physicians started reporting patient’s phone calls asking whether, where, 
and when they could have MFS.
110 
                                                           
109 See for example:  http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/5250/VK-Banen-
Zorg/article/detail/1872988/2011/04/10/De-moederschoot-als-
operatiekamer.dhtml; http://www.mednet.nl/nieuws/id4883-meerwaarde-
foetale-chirurgie-bij-spina-bifida-aangetoond.html; http://www.news-
medical.net/news/20110209/3419/Dutch.aspx 
110 Personal communication during visit to the “Spina Bifida poli” at the 
University Medical Center Groningen, the Netherlands (April 2011) Chapter 4  
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In order to make the process of referral of patients to Leuven as 
transparent as possible and the counseling of prospective patients 
consistent, it became clear that a consensus position paper should be 
written by those who, in the Netherlands take care of spina bifida 
patients and of pregnant women carrying fetuses with a spina bifida 
diagnosis. In order to do that, the PROSPER consortium was created. 
(8)
111 
In that document, experts from various medical disciplines put forward 
the terms in which referrals to MFS at KU Leuven should be made, and 
the terms in which the counseling of those who fulfill the relevant 
criteria of eligibility must be conducted (see annex 1). The latter is 
expected to guide Dutch physicians, mainly in university hospitals, 
whose patients belong to the group that might benefit from MFS.  A 
brochure containing information about the procedure, referral, and 
postoperative care, has also been produced, in order to provide 
prospective MFS candidates with the necessary information for the 
morally and legally due voluntary and informed consent.  
In addition, provided that informed consent is obtained, a follow-up 
study of  Dutch patients who have received MFS for spina bifida will be 
performed – the PROSPER study (Prospective Spina bifida registry of 
outcome after intrauterine Surgery).  Among other aspects, that study 
aims at documenting the long-term effects of MFS for Spina Bifida as 
compared to postnatal coverage of the defect, the current standard of 
care in the Netherlands.(8) 
During the preparation of the above-mentioned documents and study, a 
series of ethical concerns regarding the admissibility of referral of 
patients to MFS at KU Leuven were raised. In this paper, we describe 
the source of those concerns, the way they were dealt with by the work 
group, as well as the foundation of the choices made. 
 
THE ROLE OF ETHICS  
The very possibility of operating pregnant women for the clinical 
benefit of the fetus is surrounded by controversy and it constitutes, 
without any further qualifications, a challenging object of study from 
                                                           
111  See Annex 3 PROSPER consortium’s position paper: ‘Counseling voor 
foetale therapie bij spina bifida in de Nederlandse praktijk.’ Submitted. Chapter 4  
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the point of view of ethical theory and of bioethics. Just to give an 
example, on a theoretical level, the recently introduced and immediately 
widespread use of the concept of the ‘fetus as a patient’ (9-12), by 
establishing that the pregnant woman and the fetus are, from the point of 
view of any physician, patients in the same degree, forces us to review 
at least two fundamental questions any ethical theory should be able to 
answer: the distributive question, which aims at determining whose 
interests are worth of moral consideration; and the substantive question, 
which aims at identifying which interests are worth protecting (13). On 
the level of applied ethics, given that MFS for congenital birth defects 
as surgical discipline is alive and well, it presses us to put forward 
criteria for right action and for the resolution of conflicts of duty that 
might arise in that practice. On this level, our first task was thus to 
identify the key ethical issues posed by the referral of pregnant women 
to MFS at KU Leuven in Belgium.   
 
THE STATUS OF OPEN MFS FOR MYELOMENINGOCELE 
 During the setting up of the PROSPER consortium’s position paper, the 
most disputed subject was that of the definition of the status of MFS for 
myelomeningocele: experiment, innovative treatment, or standard of 
care? 
The distinction between these categories is made based on the level of 
scientific evidence we have in favor of a certain intervention and based 
on the level of confidence we have in relation to that evidence. Who 
determines the level of evidence required for each category is not very 
clear though, making that distinction one of the most debated topics 
among researchers and Ethics Committees (EC). (14-18) For the most 
part, the relevant community of experts determines that status based on 
an evidence-based consideration of clinical benefit. 
In any case, knowing under which category a certain intervention should 
fall is relevant in terms of the degree of protection of the (moral and 
legal) rights of patients and/or research subjects, both from the point of 
view of Ethics and from the point of view of the Law.  
In clinical research the fundamental ethical concern is that research 
subjects might be object of exploitation, as they are exposed to risks and 
harms of interventions of unproven safety and/or efficacy, for the 
benefit of others (i.e., future generations of patients with a similar 
diagnosis) without any guarantee of actual personal clinical benefit. In Chapter 4  
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normal clinical practice, clinical benefit is an almost-given. A 
physician’s goal is to act in the best interest of actual patients, and, the 
fundamental ethical concern is thus the respect for the patients’ right to 
receive treatments of proven safety and efficacy.  
For those reasons, clinical research, contrary to normal clinical practice, 
is typically subject to ECs oversight and approval. In this process, 
regulated by both national and international Law, the scientific and 
methodological merits of the research hypothesis are evaluated in order 
to avoid exploitation and to promote the informed and voluntary consent 
of prospective research participants. 
In addition to establishing the conditions under which the research 
subject’s informed consent might be obtained, EC will also make sure 
that all experimental interventions are performed in accordance with a 
previously approved protocol and will control the progress of the 
research made. No such external control exists in the context of normal 
therapeutic practice, as it is assumed that the interventions performed in 
patients are already tested for safety and efficacy. 
In relation to MFS for myelomeningocele, the fact that there has been 
only one RCT establishing its superiority for a small number of patients 
was a cause of concern.  
Not a single member of the PROSPER consortium was prepared to 
accept open MFS for Myelomeningocele as the standard of care for 
eligible Dutch patients. In addition to the fact that there are no Dutch 
centers ready to offer the procedure, there was a  generalized belief that 
there is simply not enough evidence of  overall benefit to consider it 
standard of care, not to mention the high level of maternal and fetal risks 
associated with the open procedure (when weighed against the eventual 
fetal benefit). The discussion shifted thus between considering open 
MFS for myelomeningocele as an experiment or as innovative 
treatment.  A consensus was reached in relation to the qualification 
‘innovative treatment’. 
 
THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE QUALIFICATION ‘INNOVATIVE TREATMENT’ 
In relation to Open MFS for myelomeningocele, we have one 
multicenter randomized controlled trial pointing out the advantage of 
fetal intervention over postnatal care for a selected number of patients 
with very specific characteristics. In general, one single trial would not Chapter 4  
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be enough to convince the scientific community of the value of an 
intervention. Surely, if it were a pharmaceutical product, one trial would 
be just not enough. However, the case with Spina Bifida and the MOMS 
trial is special.  
This was a large multicenter surgical trial, it took too long to obtain the 
necessary evidence (February 2003 – December 2010), it was too 
expensive, and the centers involved maintained the exclusive of the 
intervention for the duration of the trial, as all other centers eventually 
qualified to perform the operation abstained from offering the procedure 
outside the RCT. (4,5,19) For those reasons, the consortium agreed that 
it is impracticable to repeat the trial or even try to reproduce its results 
in the European context.  If this is indeed true, that we cannot get 
evidence that is better than the one we currently have, then for practical 
reasons, and under some conditions, the consortium was prepared to 
accept the qualification ‘innovative treatment’.  
Those conditions are 
112: 
1.  It must be explained to prospective patients what innovative treatment 
means in the context of MFS for myelomeningocele. 
It means that there is evidence that prenatal surgery is beneficial to a 
very limited number of carefully selected patients. That evidence is 
based on one single RCT and on a series of other scientific evidence 
collected outside the context of a RCT, but still according to well-
established scientific methods. 
2.  The distinction between innovative treatment and standard of care must 
be also explained, so that patients know that they have a choice between 
a well-established intervention (postnatal care) and an intervention for 
which we have good evidence of benefit, but not enough to call it 
standard of care.  
3.  MFS for myelomeningocele should only be offered to those patients 
who fulfill the eligibility criteria put forward by KU Leuven
113. 
4.  A thorough informed consent procedure must be in place at KU Leuven, 
emphasizing the nature and amount of the maternal and fetal risks 
associated with both MFS and expectant management during pregnancy. 
                                                           
112 See also Table 1 at the end of this chapter. 
113 See Table 2 at the end of this chapter. Chapter 4  
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5.  MFS for myelomeningocele should be offered but not recommended to 
eligible patients and it should not be presented as an alternative
114 to 
legal termination of pregnancy. There are three reasons for that. Firstly, 
there is a lack of knowledge about the long-term effects of the 
intervention, for both woman and surviving children. Secondly, MFS 
might improve the outcome of spina bifida in terms of morbidity, but it 
does NOT constitute a cure for the defect. Thirdly, women are under no 
legal obligation to carry a fetus with spina bifida to term, provided that 
the legal limit for termination of pregnancy is not overdue.
115 
6.  An EC does not have to approve the performance of MFS for 
myelomeningocele, since it has already been tested for safety and 
efficacy. (It would have to approve an experimental intervention). 
However, because such interventions carry major risks for both woman 
and fetus, some sort of external control should be established. That will 
be achieved by the creation of a registry and two prospective studies 
(the PROSPER study in the Netherlands and another at KU Leuven) 
where all the relevant information regarding each single patient is 
recorded and where the long term effects of MFS will be studied and 
compared with the data from patients who have received standard of 
                                                           
114 The words ‘as an alternative’ should be interpreted in the following fashion: 
all options available to pregnant women that are eligible for MFS should be 
disclosed by those in charge of their counseling. This means that, together with 
TOP, MFS and expectant management during pregnancy + postnatal closure of 
the defect, should be presented and described to patients as the management 
options available to them and among which they will be able to choose. When 
we say that MFS should not be presented as alternative to TOP, we mean that 
MFS should not be presented as a better option than TOP and/or expectant 
management and eventually post natal repair of the defect.  The decision about 
what the best option for an actual patient is, is a judgment that must be left to 
patients themselves, Because for some women the availability of Open MFS 
may tip the balance from termination to continuing the pregnancy, a carefully 
thought counseling must emphasize that all three management options are 
valid.. 
115 Whether there is a moral obligation to carry a fetus with spina bifida to term 
is a different issue. See following sections. Chapter 4  
 
138 
 
care. In this way, data concerning complications and side effects can be 
accumulated.
116 
TRUST, THERAPEUTIC MISCONCEPTION AND INFORMED CONSENT.  
When a diagnosis of spina bifida is suspected during routine ultrasound 
in the second trimester, Dutch pregnant women are typically referred to 
a tertiary medical center, where the diagnosis and individual prognosis 
will be established by a multidisciplinary team of experts.  In order to 
make the referral of patients to the Fetal Treatment Center in Leuven 
viable, those teams must be familiar with the MOMS trial and its results, 
as the center will only handle patients who fulfill eligibility conditions 
similar to the MOMS trial inclusion criteria. (Annex 2)  
Awareness about that criteria and about the (maternal and fetal) risks 
and eventual benefits of the intervention performed at KU Leuven will 
not only improve the quality and accuracy of the information that should 
be given to prospective MFS patients prior to the legally due informed 
consent, but also avoid the issue of the ‘therapeutic misconception’(TM) 
                                                           
116 In the Netherlands, clinical research involving human subjects is regulated 
by the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Law 
(Wet medischwetenschappelijkonderzoek met mensen van 26 februari 1998) 
and/or the Embryo Act (Embryowet van 20 juni 2002) and it must be 
submitted, if under the scope of the previous acts to an accredited Medical 
Research Ethics Committee (MREC) or, in certain circumstances, to the 
Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (CCMO) for 
oversight and approval. For an English language summary of the Dutch Law 
requirements and proceedings, see:   
http://www.ccmo-online.nl/main.asp?pid=10&sid=11.  
For Belgian Law regulating clinical research with human subjects, see: “Loi 
relative aux expérimentations sur la personne humaine” of 7 May 2004 and the 
‘Arrêté royal déterminant des mesures d'exécution de la loi du 7 mai 2004 
relative aux expérimentations sur la personne humaine en ce qui concerne les 
essais cliniques de médicaments à usage humain’of 30 June 2004 at   
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2
004050732&table_name=loi; 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2
004063030&table_name=loi 
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which, more often than not, affect pregnant women considering MFS for 
congenital birth defects (15,20). The TM consists of a mistake about the 
nature and goals of medical interventions, where patients, and 
sometimes medical staff, either fail to distinguish between the aims of 
participation in clinical research and of receiving regular treatment, or 
wrongly assume that a certain procedure is either their only treatment 
option, or even, more beneficial than it actually is. (18,21, 22) 
The TM varies in degrees, as there are different levels of 
misunderstanding the scope of a given medical intervention. It is 
potentially invalidating of the informed consent of research subjects 
and/or patients when it precludes patients or research subjects from 
understanding the most relevant facts about the nature, risks, and 
eventual benefits of the intervention at hand and about the consequences 
of receiving it. In other words, although informed consent is one of the 
most debated topics in bioethics and in the medical law literature, it is 
fair to say that in order to give it, in a meaningful way, one must at least 
understand relevant facts about an intervention’s nature, risks, and 
goals. If one is seriously mistaken about any of those issues, one is 
likely to consent or dissent based on the wrong information. 
The information problem is especially important when, as in MFS for 
myelomeningocele, there are promising positive results about its 
efficacy and safety. How much must be said about those results and 
about the status of MFS for spina bifida, in a way that does not mislead 
trial participants to think that one is being offered a procedure that is the 
standard of care, is a problem those counseling eligible Dutch pregnant 
women have to tackle. The criteria put forward by the PROSPER 
consortium, if used in the counseling of eligible women will hopefully 
help those in charge of conveying the information about the procedure 
offered at KU Leuven avoid  more serious forms of the misconception.  
Another reason why accurate information about the terms of the referral 
of Dutch patients to KU Leuven must be conveyed is related with the 
ethical and legal concept of ‘trust’. 
As pointed out by De Melo-Martín and co-authors, trust is essential and 
unavoidable in any medical relationship, be it in the context of normal 
care or in the context of research. Although there might be disagreement 
about the meaning and ethical relevance of the concept of ‘trust’ it will 
be difficult to deny that both patients and research subjects, in virtue of 
their position of vulnerability, trust that physicians and the institutions 
where they work, will protect them from preventable and unnecessary Chapter 4  
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harms. Moreover, patients will accept the potential harms of 
interventions because they trust, not only their physician’s competence 
to determine what is in their best clinical interests, but also because they 
believe that their physicians share a common goal with them, that is, 
promoting their health interests within the limits of what is available. 
{{25 Melo-Martin,I. 2008}} 
Since trust is at the base of any patient-physician encounter, the 
PROSPER consortium agreed upon an uniform informed consent 
procedure, that should take place both at the referral center in the 
Netherlands and at KU Leuven. Discrepancies in the type and amount of 
information given to eligible MFS patients could frustrate the goal of 
maintaining the trustworthiness of both institutions, and it would consist 
of a violation of one of the most fundamental values governing the 
patient-physician relationship. 
Consistency and accuracy of the information given, particularly in 
relation to the status of the intervention to be offered at KU Leuven ( 
innovative treatment), will also contribute to the avoidance of the TM, 
one of the circumstances that might challenge the informed consent of 
prospective patients.  
In addition, the fact that patients must travel across borders, health care 
systems, and legal jurisdictions, makes the issue of consistency even 
more pressing, as the law will in fact enforce trust-related expectations 
and punish violations of trust, especially when the latter constitute a 
violation of the (human) legal right to be informed about goals, nature, 
risks and potential benefits of medical interventions.
117   
 
MFS FOR MYELOMENINGOCELE AND ABORTION.  
In the Netherlands, termination of pregnancy (TOP), in the presence of 
congenital birth defects, as well as for other reasons at the discretion of 
                                                           
117 The Sghengen agreement allows EU citizens to move freely across internal 
EU member’s borders. see: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_moveme
nt_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l14514_en.htm  
Despite the Shengen agreement, the health care and legal systems of the 
individual member states diverge across borders. Chapter 4  
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the pregnant woman, is legally permitted until 24 weeks gestation
118. 
The issue of abortion was also under dispute during the meetings that 
lead to the PROSPER position paper. In question was not the 
controversial issue of the morality of abortion, but the question of 
whether MFS for myelomeningocele should be offered to eligible MFS 
patients as an alternative to TOP. 
The consortium agreed that it should not.  Again, the latter was not 
based on a moral judgment about the permissibility of abortion, but 
based on the fact that women are under no legal obligation to carry a 
fetus (until 24 gestational weeks) with a spina bifida diagnosis to term. 
Independently of what one might think about the morality of abortion, 
and despite the evidence in favor of MFS for certain patients, the 
democratically produced law of the Netherlands has regulated the issue 
of abortion. For that reason, the PROSPER consortium agreed that it is 
not the place of physicians to overrule a procedurally justified legal rule 
and to interfere with the choices of adult competent women for TOP. 
Counseling of prospective MFS patients must thus be non-directive and 
must introduce TOP as one of the options available to eligible MFS 
pregnant patients.  
When pregnant women declare that they want to proceed with the 
pregnancy to term, MFS should be offered to patients who are reliably 
expected to benefit from it, together with expectant management and 
post natal surgical repair of the defect.  
The solution taken by the PROSPER consortium in relation to TOP, 
though invulnerable to critique from a point of view of the law and 
procedural ethics, has made some commentators uncomfortable. 
The most preeminent reason for discomfort belongs to the substantive 
moral realm and will be briefly disclosed. Myelomeningocele is not, for 
the most part, a life-threatening birth defect and despite severe life-long 
disability and dependence, a number of spina bifida patients live 
through childhood into adulthood. Pregnant women who do not choose 
to terminate their pregnancies and who will opt for MFS will be, 
                                                           
118 Termination of pregnancy in the Netherlands is regulated by the 
Termination of pregnancy act (‘Wet afbreken van zwangerschap’) from 1 May 
1981.  See: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003396/geldigheidsdatum_26-04-
2012 
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together with the physicians that follow them,  confronted with the 
following dilemma: given the elevated risk of premature preterm rupture 
of membranes leading to premature birth, those fetuses that are born too 
early because of MFS, will face (if not death) potential additional 
disability because of prematurity and not necessarily because of the 
birth defect that made them suitable MFS candidates in the first place. 
In this case, the degree of harms one wanted to avoid will be increased 
by the means used to reduce them.  
How then, does this fact affect the moral obligations of physicians and 
pregnant women in relation to the fetuses they operate or let be operated 
on? Or, in other words: should the latter be seen as a good a reason not 
to perform MFS for myelomeningocele?  
The answer to this question presupposes the answer to the controversial 
issue of the moral status of the fetus. That is, it requires us to know 
whether the fetus is the kind of entity towards which one owes moral 
obligations, including a duty to avoid the greatest harm of all, death.
119  
                                                           
119 That death is the greatest (moral) harm of all is something that can be 
debated. In the Bioethics literature,  it has been claimed  that a life with 
disabilities might be worse than no life at all,  
See e.g.,  
Buchanan, A., D. Brock, N. Daniels and D. Wikler, 2000. From Chance to 
Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press ;  
Peters, P., 2004. How Safe Is Safe Enough? Obligations to the Children of 
Reproductive Technology. New York: Oxford University Press. 
–––, 2009. “Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of 
Reproductive Liberty,” in Roberts and Wasserman (eds.), pp. 317–331.and  
Derek Parfit, 1987. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
–––, 1982. “Future Generations: Further Problems,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 11: 113–72. 
 Although this is not the place to go through the line of argument proposed by 
these authors, it is important to say, that for their views to be sound, they must 
provide a justificatory argument for the existence and foundation of  moral 
obligations of actual people/ agents towards future entities. Chapter 4  
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If we assume that fetuses are worth of (even if only minimal) moral 
consideration, we will then have to determine, on which terms they are  
worth of it, and how they will relate with others who, like normal 
pregnant women, you and me, are, in an uncontroversial fashion, worth 
of it.  Without an answer to these theoretical questions, any attempt of 
an answer from the point of view of applied ethics is meaningless. 
For now it is important to know however that although the fetus is 
apparently not one of us, that is, an entity that is able to act for purposes 
it values and that is able to make that visible through a serious of 
behaviors (agent), there remains a probability (> 0% and <100%) that 
the fetus is able to do those things, but just not able to exteriorize it. 
Although the latter provides a reason to believe that we owe something 
morally relevant to the fetus (because there is a real possibility that our 
knowledge about the fetus’s abilities is incorrect) we should not 
conclude that the fetus should, for precautionary reasons be treated as 
‘one of  us’.  Whether or not the prematurity risks for the fetus are 
acceptable and a reason not to perform MFS will be thus the function of 
a pregnant woman’s exercise of her own agency.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have described a series of ethical concerns regarding 
the admissibility of referral of Dutch patients to MFS at KU Leuven that 
were raised during the setting up of the PROSPER consortium. We have 
explained the source of those concerns and the foundations of the 
solutions reached by the consortium in its position paper. 
The conditions upon which Dutch pregnant women can be (ethically) 
referred to KU Leuven for MFS for myelomeningocele can be read in 
Annex 1. From the point of view of applied ethics, it is important that 
patients are informed about the nature, goals and potential adverse 
consequences of MFS for myelomeningocele, and about the status of 
such intervention. As innovative treatment, MFS can be seen as a 
treatment for which a certain level of evidence of safety and benefit 
exists, but not on the level required to consider it the standard of care.  
As a result, and given the major risks involved for pregnant women, 
MFS for myelomeningocele can be offered to eligible patients but not 
yet recommended. Chapter 4  
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The informed consent procedure at both sites, i.e., at the referral center 
and at KU Leuven, must be as uniform as possible in order to avoid the 
TM and to promote patients’ trust in the referral process. 
Finally, MFS for myelomeningocele should not be presented as an 
alternative to TOP, but as an alternative management option, together 
with TOP and expectant management during pregnancy and postnatal 
closure of the defect.  
 
Table 1.  
  Criteria for referral of Dutch patients to MFS at KU Leuven 
1  The diagnosis of myelomeningocele must be confirmed at a tertiary center 
– academic hospital. 
2  Only those who fulfill the eligibility criteria for the procedure should be 
informed about the option of MFS for myelomeningocele at KU Leuven. 
3  The counseling of prospective MFS candidates and the information about 
pre-operative care, MFS, and post-operative care must be disclosed also at 
a Dutch academic hospital, preferably by a multidisciplinary team, 
comprised of at least a perinatologist, a pediatric neurologist/ 
neurosurgeon and a social worker. 
4 
 
Those who inform and counsel patients must be aware of the results of the 
MOMS trial and of the proceedings of MFS at KU Leuven. The risks and 
eventual benefits of the procedure must be thoroughly explained in order 
to avoid false expectations. Pregnant women and their families should be 
reminded that MFS for myelomeningocele does not constitute a cure for 
their fetuses’ disease and that further surgery might be necessary in the 
postnatal period. 
5  The possibility of referral to KU Leuven for MFS should be offered to 
those who fulfill the eligibility criteria, but there should be no strong 
directive counseling, in the form of recommendation. 
6  MFS for myelomeningocele in KU Leuven should be classified as 
innovative treatment. The different between innovative treatment and 
standard of care must be mentioned during counseling, in order to avoid 
the therapeutic misconception. 
7  Termination of pregnancy within the legal limit of 24 weeks gestation, 
expectant management, and standard postnatal closure of the defect should 
be presented as valid options. Chapter 4  
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8  Psycho-social support must be readily available for patients who wish to 
use it. 
9  Counseling and information should be made in two sessions with a short 
time interval between them, in order to give prospective candidates, and 
their families, time to consider the different options for that pregnancy. 
10  Those who fulfill the eligibility requirements and are whiling to travel 
must be referred to KU Leuven no later than 22 gestational weeks + 0 
days. 
11  Patients who are referred to KU Leuven, must be aware of the fact that the 
individual diagnosis and prognosis will be rechecked, making them 
vulnerable to ineligibility. These patients should return to the referral 
center and, those who will not opt for TOP (within the legal limits) will 
receive postnatal standard of care. 
12  Informed consent will be obtained at KU Leuven, following disclosure of 
relevant information about the procedure. 
13  Patients considered eligible at the Fetal Treatment Center in Leuven will 
be operated before 26 gestational weeks + 0 days and no latter. 
14  After surgery, pregnant women will be sent to the referral center where 
they will continue their prenatal checks until the onset of labor and 
delivery. 
15  The delivery will take place at the referral center through planned cesarean 
section. 
16  Parents of children who have considered or received MFS for 
myelomeningocele in KU Leuven will be encouraged to participate in the 
PROSPER study, a prospective trial aimed at documenting the long term 
effects of MFS when compared to postnatal closure of the defects, the 
standard of care in Dutch hospitals. 
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Table 2.  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for MFS for Spina Bifida ( adapted from 
MOMS protocol) 
Inclusion criteria  
x  Singleton pregnancy 
x  Maternal age ≥18 
x  Myelomeningocele at level 
T1 through S1with hindbrain 
herniation, confirmed by 
ultrasound and/or MRI 
x  Normal karyotype 
x  Ability to comply with travel 
requirements 
x  Surgery must take place 
before 26+0 gestational 
weeks 
Exclusion criteria  
x  Multifetal pregnancy 
x  Fetal anomaly not 
related to 
myelomeningocele 
x  Documented history of 
incompetent cervix or 
current or planned 
cerclage 
x  Short cervix (< 20mm 
measured by vaginal 
ultrasound) 
x  Placenta previa or 
placental abruption 
x  Obesity, defined as body 
mass index  ≥ 35 
x  Kyphosis in the fetus of 
30 degrees or more 
x  History of pre-term 
delivery 
x  Maternal-fetal Rh 
isoimmunization, Kell 
sensitization or history 
of neonatal alloimune 
thrombocytopenia 
x  Maternal HIV or 
Hepatitis-B status 
positive and known 
Hepatitis-C positive 
x  Uterine abnormality and 
other maternal medical 
condition which is a 
contraindication to 
surgery or general 
anesthesia 
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SUMMARY 
Maternal-Fetal surgery (MFS) consists of a series of surgical techniques 
and prenatal interventions, which aim at correcting or improving the 
outcome of life-threatening or severely debilitating congenital birth 
defects, such as congenital diaphragmatic hernia and 
myelomeningocele.  
Today, most of MFS remains investigational, as its safety and efficacy 
are still to be proven. For some indications and for a small number of 
patients, MFS has however become the standard of care. 
In either case, although the fetus is the surgery’s immediate or potential 
beneficiary, in order to operate on it, surgeons must inevitably pass 
through the woman’s abdomen, uterus, and membranes, causing harms 
to her health that she would not endure were she to continue her 
pregnancy to term without MFS, were she to terminate that pregnancy, 
or were she to be pregnant with a ‘healthy’ fetus. This undeniable and 
apparently innocuous fact, is however the source of many “headaches” 
for pregnant women, physicians, moral philosophers, ethicists and 
lawyers. The different chapters of this thesis deal with some of the 
causes of those “headaches” and constitute an attempt to give answers to 
the following questions: 
 
I.  What do those involved in European Programme on Soft Tissue 
Engineering (EuroSTEC) think is ethically problematic in their work? 
(Chapter 1) 
II.  Who is the patient/research subject in MFS? (Chapter 2) 
III.  What is owed, morally, to those involved in MFS (women and fetuses)? 
(Chapter 2) 
IV.  What is the foundation of the moral obligations of those in charge of the 
care of pregnant women (women with one or more fetuses)? (Chapter 2) 
V.  How should conflicts of obligation be dealt with in the context of MFS? 
(Chapter 2) 
 
VI.  How should the ethical review of MFS research protocols (namely, 
randomized controlled trials (RCT)) proceed, on which basis, and Chapter 5    Summary 
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according to which criteria should they be ethically sanctioned? 
(Chapter 3) 
VII.  How much weight should be given to patient/research subject’s 
preferences in the design and conduct of MFS RCT? (Chapter 4) 
VIII.  Under which conditions can Dutch patients be referred for MFS for 
myelomeningocele?  And how should the counseling of prospective 
candidates proceed? (Chapter 5) 
 
The answer to the previous questions can be summarized as follows: 
 
i.  In our Delphi study, participants have identified a series of ethical 
issues, which, in their opinion, will arise within the research conducted 
by the partners of the European Project of Soft tissue Engineering for 
Children (a total of 27). Some of the issues were rather non-specific, 
others more specifically related to the EuroSTEC project, either because 
they pertained to tissue engineering research or to research with fetuses 
or neonates (or a combination of both).  
We have noticed that some of the topics of concern mentioned were 
more in the realm of morally relevant concepts or facts than ‘true’ 
ethical issues. Our participants were not ethicists and may have had 
some trouble identifying ethical issues in their practice and phrasing 
them in the questionnaire. (I) 
ii.  Pregnant women and fetuses have independent/intrinsic moral status and 
are thus (categorically) worth of moral consideration in and outside the 
context of the relationship doctor-patient. If both are to be considered 
fetal surgeon’s patients, they cannot be treated as patients in the same 
degree, but to the degree that they approach being agents. (II, III,IV) 
iii.  When a conflict of duty arises, physicians cannot appeal exclusively to 
their role related moral obligations to solve it; they will have to 
determine, compare, and weigh, according to the specificity of the case, 
the amount of risk of moral harm their different options might entail for 
those involved. 
This said, a pregnant woman, which is also a rights bearer, cannot be 
addressed by a physician in the same way a fetal patient is, especially 
when, in order to comply with one’s moral obligation towards the fetus, 
one must intervene, physically, on another patient to whom we owe Chapter 5    Summary 
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respect, not only as our patient but also as person and rights bearer 
outside the context of a hospital. (V) 
iv.  We view therapy and research as activities with distinct fundamental 
goals, and therefore, we do not rely on any concept of equipoise to 
evaluate the ethical appropriateness of any clinical trial. In our account, 
clinical trials involving MFS can be ethically initiated when a 
multidisciplinary ethics committee, based on an evidence based 
assessment of the risks involved, is convinced that the value of 
answering the research hypothesis for the sake of the health interests of 
future pregnant women carrying fetuses with certain congenital birth 
defects, justifies the actual risks present research participants might 
suffer within a set roof limit of low/manageable. (VI) 
v.  Strong patient preferences for an experimental intervention in a RCT 
which design does not contemplate a patient preference arm do not 
entail a right to have access to it, since, by definition, it represents a 
option of unproven safety and/or efficacy. Only in the context therapy, 
patients have a right to obtain the best care available for their disease 
and a right to discuss their treatment preferences with their attending 
physicians. (VII) 
vi.  Dutch patients can be referred to MFS for myelomeningocele when the 
following conditions are fulfilled:  MFS for myelomeningocele should 
be qualified as innovative treatment; it should be offered but not 
recommended to eligible patients and; it should not be presented as an 
alternative to legal termination of pregnancy. (VIII) 
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DISCUSSION 
 
1.  THE ROLE OF AN ‘ETHICIST’ IN THE EVALUATION OF INNOVATION IN 
MEDICINE 
 
In chapter one of this thesis, a modified Delphi study was used in order 
to identify which were, according to the members of EuroSTEC, the 
most pressing moral issues involved in their research activities.  
One may wonder why we were interested in obtaining this information.  
At that time, two senior ethicists and two PhD students were members 
of the EuroSTEC consortium: after having studied the consortium’s 
research goals, the planned distribution of work, and some of the 
proposed research protocols,  
“Shouldn’t they know, by virtue of their training and ‘expertise’ which 
issues might require an answer from the point of view of ethics?  
The immediate answer to this question was yes! By virtue of their 
training, the ethicists involved in the EuroSTEC consortium should have 
been able to identify those issues.  
Does this mean that our study was worthless? 
The goal of the Delphi study was modest and subtle (at least for the 
purposes of my own research): we wanted to investigate the degree to 
which, the representatives of the various disciplines involved in the 
EuroSTEC consortium were aware of the ethically problematic issues 
involved in their practices. The study showed that the professionals 
were, for the most part, aware of the moral dimension of their jobs. 
They were able to recognize morally complex cases, to identify certain 
principles and values in (potential or actual) conflict, and to locate those 
subjects in the broader cultural and political context of the European 
Union. The latter allowed us to proceed with our own work with a high 
level of acceptance from their part.  
Despite this fact, on occasion, we heard the familiar “ethics is fine and 
all that, you might be right, but what about ‘real life?’”. Why should I 
accept that, if what you say is just your opinion? 
 
The answer to these concerns depends on whether (or not) we believe 
that ethics has something relevant and/or authoritative to say in the Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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evaluation of innovation in medicine (and in any other field for that 
matter).  Some authors do challenge the possibility of ‘ethical expertise’, 
and doubt whether the moral judgments of philosophers have a different 
standing than those passed by the rest of us humans in the context of 
public and private institutional settings, such as the hospital or the work 
place of other professionals (e.g., in laboratories and in courts of law).  
It has been claimed that an ethicist is not an expert as, e.g., a surgeon is, 
because, contrary to the recommendations of ethicists’, the surgeon’s 
recommendations rest on agreed upon sets of facts and criteria. 
According to this view, the claims made by ethics cannot be proved 
because ethics is not on a par with medicine or the physical sciences, 
where ‘objective’ knowledge is possible.
120 In other words, there is no 
such thing as expert knowledge about right and wrong, no reliability in 
the methods used by ethics, and more importantly, no agreement upon a 
common morality that justifies its universal validity. 
There is simply not enough space to pursue this topic here (an object of 
study for someone else’s PhD dissertation perhaps). However, I cannot 
abstain from saying the following: I agree with Daniel Wikler when he 
says that ‘philosophers rarely claim to have the exclusive domain over 
ethical issues’
121.
 They should not. That being said, I do believe there is 
a (authoritative) role for ethics in the evaluation of new medical 
interventions. That role will be influenced by the context in which the 
ethicist is asked to intervene. For example, her role, and the value of her 
judgments in circumstances already regulated by the law will be 
different from those she will produce in the absence of such regulation, 
and in the presence of several degrees of uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of the application of new medical interventions. When 
asked to evaluate certain aspects of medical innovation the ethicist 
should, in general, describe the solution different moral theories might 
                                                           
120 For an overview of the debate concerning the possibility and nature of 
ethical expertise, see: 
Yoder, S.C. “The nature of ethical expertise”, Hastings Center Report, 
November 1, 1998. 
Crosthwaite, J. “Moral expertise: a problem in the professional ethics of 
professional ethicists” Bioethics. 1995 Oct;9(5):361-79. 
121 Wikler, D. “Ethicists, Critics, and Expertise,” Hastings Center Report 12, 
number 3, 1982. Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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give to a given moral problem, and the foundations and method upon 
which those solutions were construed. In the end, she should be able to 
provide a solution to the moral problem at hand that is coherent with 
both the substantive and procedural claims of the moral theory she 
adheres to. That judgment will be made together with a claim of 
coherence and validity for without it, an ethicist’s recommendations, are 
indeed, no more than a personal opinion, the justification of which is not 
necessarily due. As in the so-called “true sciences”, when our ethical 
theories do not provide us with a substantive answer to an actual moral 
problem, the authority of an ethicist’s recommendation will be 
grounded, as a minimum, on the validity of the method employed. The 
stronger the justification in favor of that method, the stronger the 
validity claim of our moral judgments and recommendations will be. 
If we are not prepared to attribute that sort of authority to ethics, then 
we should conclude that there is no particular place for it outside the 
academia, in the discussion of morally relevant topics that affect our 
lives and the way we interact with others. However, since I believe my 
grandmother is right when she claims that opinions (as taste) can, and 
therefore ought to, be discussed and justified, I also believe that ethics 
should get out of the office. 
The previous observations introduce the next topic for discussion. 
 
2.  THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY AND WHY WE SHOULD (OR 
SHOULD NOT) ACCEPT THAT THE FETUS IS WORTH OF MORAL 
CONSIDERATION.  
In this thesis we present what we think is a substantially and 
procedurally justified argument for the existence of physicians’ moral 
obligations towards the women and fetuses they care for in the context 
of MFS. The latter is based on Alan Gewirth’s ethical theory and on 
Deryck Beyleveld’s work on precautionary reasoning, within the realm 
of the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) – ‘Act in accord with the 
generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself’.  
Shortly, we claim that, under precautionary reasoning, all agents must 
confer to fetuses (and all beings that could be agents) the moral status 
that is proportional to the degree of the probability that they have the 
necessary abilities for action, providing that doing so does not hurt or 
preclude another agent’s rights to the necessary abilities for action. We 
also say that when a conflict of duty arises where one cannot Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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simultaneously respect/promote the rights of an ostensible (pregnant 
woman) and of an apparent non-ostensible agent (fetus), the rights of the 
ostensible agent take priority, since failing to respect an ostensible 
agent’s rights is more likely to produce a harm that is forbidden by the 
PGC.  
Must those who do not accept the PGC as the supreme principle of 
morality, accept the conclusions derived from its applications? 
Including the conclusions presented in chapter two, about the moral 
status of the fetus? 
NO. Those who are not convinced about the merits of the PGC and of 
Gewirth’s philosophy in general, may well deny the conclusions derived 
from its direct and indirect applications, and challenge (in ways that are 
definitely easier to justify) our view on the moral status of the fetus.  
However, in order to deny the PGG, they must at a minimum (and that 
is a lot!), offer some arguments against the method according to which 
Gewirth arrived at the PGC formula – the dialectically necessary 
method. 
122 
                                                           
122 Although we cannot discuss all the details of Gewirth’s argument for the 
PGC, it is important to go through the basic premises of that argument, in order 
to reveal how the method ‘works’:  
The method is dialectical because it starts from the internal point of view of any 
agent, i.e., any entity that acts or is able to act for a purpose she finds good (in 
the sense that purpose X is her reason for acting).  It is dialectically necessary 
because it begins not from any type of statement, but from a statement or 
judgment that, on pain of contradiction, is necessarily attributable to every 
agent. In other words, the method is dialectically necessary in that its 
conclusions derive from the assumptions and claims all rational agents (must) 
make when acting, or planning to act for a certain purpose. In addition, those 
statements are such that were agents to deny them, that negation would signify 
a concomitant logical negation of his/her own status as an agent. This formal 
requirement of generic consistency or non-contradiction guarantees a sequence 
of claims that are deduced logical and necessarily from what is (too) 
necessarily involved in human action:  
‘By way of brief summary: an agent is a person who initiates or controls his 
behavior through his unforced, informed choice with a view to achieving 
various purposes; since he wants to fulfill his purposes he regards his freedom 
and well-being, the necessary conditions of his successful pursuit of purposes, Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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To refute our case for the moral status of the fetus, opponents will have 
[1] to deconstruct the precautionary reasoning employed in our 
argument, [2] prove that the lack of knowledge about the nature and 
abilities of human fetuses is an irrelevant consideration in the 
determination of their moral status. Since we fully endorse the PGC, 
independently of what has been written against it, we are only 
concerned with possible arguments against our view on the moral status 
of the fetus.  After having discussed the topic with several obstetricians, 
we can already predict what some will say: were they to support our 
proposal, pregnant woman’s rights would always ‘win’ against fetal 
interests, a position that some of them will not be prepared to accept, in 
view of the duties of care they ‘feel’ they have towards the fetus.  
Most of the time the latter will be true, unless we can prove (and the 
courts of law have mechanisms for that) that the pregnant woman is not 
(or has ceased to be) an apparent agent, a circumstance in which, the 
moral interests of the fetus will prevail. 
As physicians and other medical personnel cannot act as substitutes for 
a pregnant woman who is an apparent agent, in all other cases, they 
must abstain from interfering with the exercise of her rights, even when 
that leads to results we find amiss. Surely, we can disapprove of a 
pregnant woman’s choice to, for example, abort a nearly viable fetus, 
with what we believe is no stringent reason; we can even mourn the 
death of that fetus; and then refer the woman to another doctor.  
However, despite that, we are still convinced that the degree of moral 
harm, our not accepting the pregnant woman’s right to control what 
                                                                                                                                 
as necessary goods; hence he holds that he has rights to freedom and well-
being; to avoid self-contradiction, he must hold that he has these generic rights 
insofar as he is a prospective purposive agent; hence he must admit that all 
prospective purposive agents have the generic rights; hence he must 
acknowledge that he ought at least to refrain from interfering with his 
recipients’ freedom and well-being, so that he ought to act in accord with their 
generic rights as well as his own.”  Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, 1978. 
P.171 
 
 
 Chapter 5     General Discussion 
160 
 
happens to her body and her life plan , is higher than the degree of moral 
harm we will allow the fetus to incur. And that, because the woman is 
(and the fetus is not), an apparent agent, towards whom, we owe, in 
general a higher degree of respect, in and outside the hospital. 
Other kinds of criticism to our argument for the moral status of the fetus 
are expected and welcomed. 
 
3.  THE WOMAN, THE PREGNANT WOMAN, THE GRAVID UTERUS, THE UTERINE 
ENVIRONMENT, THE FETUS’S NATURAL HABITAT, THE MOTHER, THE MOM, 
THE INNOCENT BYSTANDER; THE FETUS, THE UNBORN CHILD, THE FUTURE 
CHILD, THE KID, THE BABY; “THE FATHER OF MAN”. 
OR WHY LANGUAGE MATTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF MFS. 
Stanley Hauerwas once said, “You can only act in a world you see (…) 
and you learn to see by learning to say.”  Since in any human 
interaction, language, in any of its kinds – words, phrases, signs, 
symbols, (art?) – is the most important tool we have to be able to 
communicate with others, and since morality is made by and for those 
who are able to ‘speak’, and justify their actions through words in form 
of arguments, we could not conclude this discussion chapter without a 
reference to the ‘uses of language’ in the context of MFS. Because the 
investigation of the origin, nature, rules, and meaning of language and 
human communication is object of a vast array of disciplines, nothing I 
will say here will do justice to those who make of it their “way of 
living”. Despite that fact, I want to briefly discuss the ethical 
implications of the use of certain concepts and descriptions in the 
context of MFS, in particular in the scientific literature and (the expert 
meetings I have had the privilege of attending. 
Since it is through language that we express our normative views, the 
way we speak articulates the way we think of others and ourselves, the 
way we judge other people’s actions, and the way we define our 
expectations in relation to the behavior of others. In addition, what we 
say affects the way the recipients of our speech (our listeners), interpret 
the meaning of the actions and expectations we direct at them.  As 
Helen Benedict put it, ‘words are the tools we use to communicate our 
perceptions of each other’
123. When out of negligence, indifference, 
                                                           
123 Helen Benedict, “Virgin or Vamp: how the press covers sex crimes.” New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1992. P.20-21 Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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ignorance, or insensitivity, women who undergo MFS are referred to as 
“the best heart-lung machine”, “gravid uteri”, “the fetus’s natural 
environment”, 
124 they suffer a moral harm of a degree worth noticing. 
In contrast with the fetus that, at least in written language, is usually 
appropriately referred to by its name, women are named after part of 
their reproductive organs, and/or defined through stereotypical notions 
of motherhood and sacrifice, leaving aside their most distinctive 
characteristic, i.e., their being whole human beings capable of agency. 
This neglect is even more appalling when empirical claims such as: 
“During pregnancy, a woman’s capacity to choose is severely affected 
or inexistent”
125, are added to the mix, with no empirical proof offered 
to substantiate them. 
126   
Because it is through women’s consent that fetal surgery becomes a 
reality, their exclusion from a discourse that must inevitably include 
them can be seen as a negation of women’s agency and active role in the 
practice of MFS.   
Women, who voluntarily and knowledgeably opt for MFS, do it, 
primarily, for their own sake and eventually, for the sake of their 
offspring; we should at least dignify them with the use of a proper name. 
They are women or pregnant women, not “uteri” or “environments”.  
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
I am convinced that Alan Gewirth’s Human rights theory, together with 
the specifications that others have made of it, is right and provides us 
with the guidance we need for solving the ever more intricate moral 
issues of medical innovation. I think Gewirth’s work should be taught in 
                                                           
124 See for a detailed discussion on the uses of language in the context of MFS: 
Casper MJ. The Making of the Unborn Patient. A Social Anatomy of Fetal 
Surgery. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London, 
1998. 
125 I have read this sentence on a manuscript sent to me for peer review. 
126 Inaccuracy in the description of fetuses is also present in the context of MFS 
discourse, although curiously, almost exclusively in spoken language. Here, 
contrary to what happens with women, defining characteristics are added (and 
not removed) from fetuses, as they are frequently referred to as “kids”, 
“children”, “unborn children”, a status with a certain moral and legal 
connotation that they do not yet possess. Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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every philosophy department and in every applied ethics class. It must 
be taught to high school students! His theory will appear clear, simple, 
(and beautiful) to anyone who has time to read it (and re-read it). 
Unfortunately, since the vast majority of us is, and must be, concerned 
with mere survival, feeding our children and making ends meet, time is 
something most of us do not have to read philosophy. 
Those who have had that privilege, as I did, and who have  participated 
in the evaluation of innovation in medicine should, however, claim more 
time to do their jobs. By this, I mean that more often than not, the work 
ethicists present to health care professionals seems shallow and not very 
meticulous.  For it to be and/or look less superficial, ethicists should be 
asked (and given the opportunity) to explain the concepts, methods and 
conclusions they arrive at to the addressees of their moral judgments; a 
chance, I regret never having had.  
It is difficult to point the finger and blame someone for that, but the 
drawbacks of exhibiting your work in a ten minutes oral presentation or 
in a short ‘publishable’ article are obvious: you will not be able to 
justify your claims and do justice to the ethical theories you have 
studied: The conclusions you have arrived at will be  presented in a 
format that is no more than an outline. 
Perhaps, medical conferences and consortiums are just not the place to 
'do ethics’. That might also be true, but because morality is such a 
fundamental part of being human, and because the practice and 
development of medicine touches us in such a significant way, the 
discussion about the moral consequences of innovation ought to take 
place more often, and in a public arena.  
Lack of time and rigor might also explain why the dialogue between 
ethicists (and lawyers) and health care professionals is so difficult and 
often surrounded by mutual distrust. Apart from issues related to the 
lack of knowledge specific to each field, I believe that that dialogue is 
often clouded by misplaced expectations. Since, in general, not much is 
expected from ethics, why should health care professionals be willing to 
discuss their practices with us? A solution to this issue must entail an 
effort from ethics to explain what can be expected from it as a 
discipline, and an effort from medicine to recognize that the moral 
implications of its work are relevant not only within the small, contained 
hospital space but also beyond its walls.  
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I want to finish with a quote from Monica Casper
127, who by bridging 
together ethics and politics, says it all: 
‘Indeed the fetal patient is as much a product of women’s own 
imaginations as it is of medical work and technological innovation. If 
we want to insist on complexity, diversity, and ambivalence, then we 
also need to be prepared for the consequences, such as struggling to 
understand the perspectives of a woman who drinks her fetus to death, a 
woman who kills her defective baby, or an entire voting block of pro-
life women. We need to insist on access to safe, affordable abortions 
while also emphasizing with women who experience pregnancy loss. 
We need to simultaneously demand access to affordable, effective, easy-
to-use contraception while also working to ensure adequate prenatal care 
for all women. We need to question practices that may be harmful to 
women’s health while also recognizing and validating women’s 
decisions to participate in such practices. In short, we need to be supple 
and flexible with our theories and representations - despite an 
unyielding and dangerous political context.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
127  Monica Casper, “Feminist Encounters with Fetal Surgery” in: Lynn M. 
Morgan and Meredith W. Michaels, Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions, PENN, 
University of Pensilvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999. P. 111 Chapter 5     General Discussion 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Het complex van chirurgische handelingen en andere prenatale 
interventies die reeds voor de geboorte van de foetus worden uitgevoerd 
wordt ook wel Materno-Foetale chirurgie genoemd (MFS). Doel van 
deze handelingen is om levensbedreigende of met een ernstige handicap 
gepaard gaande afwijkingen reeds in een vroeg stadium te behandelen, 
om zodoende de uitkomst te verbeteren. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn 
ernstige vormen van spina bifida aperta (myelomeningocele) en 
congenitale hernia diafragmatica.  
Op dit moment worden de meeste behandelingen nog als experimenteel 
gezien, omdat de veiligheid en effectiviteit nog niet bewezen zijn. Er 
zijn echter enkele indicaties bij kleine groepen patiënten waarbij MFS 
reeds een gevestigde behandeling is. 
Hoewel het doel van behandeling het verbeteren van de gezondheid van 
de foetus is, gaat chirurgie onvermijdelijk gepaard met risico`s en 
eventuele gezondheidsschade voor de vrouw. Risico`s waar ze nooit aan 
had worden blootgesteld als de zwangerschap uitgedragen zou worden 
zonder dat er MFS zou worden toegepast, als de zwangerschap 
voortijdig beëindigd zou worden of wanneer ze zwanger zou zijn van 
een gezonde foetus. Dit feit vormt een belangrijk onderdeel van 
discussie onder zwangere vrouwen, artsen, filosofen, ethici en juristen.     
In de verschillende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift wordt ingegaan op 
de verschillende facetten van deze discussie en wordt een poging gedaan 
om een antwoord te geven op de volgende vragen: 
I.  Wat vinden diegenen die betrokken zijn bij het ‘European Programm on 
Soft Enigineering (EuroSTEC) dat het ethische probleem is bij het werk 
dat zij uitvoeren? (Hoofdstuk 1) 
II.  Wie is de patiënt/het onderzoeksobject bij MFS? (Hoofdstuk 2)  
III.  Wat is men moreel verschuldigd aan degenen die betrokken zijn bij 
MFS (vrouwen en foetussen)? (Hoofdstuk 2)  
IV.  Wat is de grondslag van de morele verplichtingen die de behandelaars 
hebben voor de zorg van zwangere vrouwen? (Hoofdstuk 2)  
V.  Hoe moet er worden omgegaan met belangenverstrengeling in het kader 
van MFS? (Hoofdstuk 2)  
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VI.  Hoe moet de ethische evaluatie van MFS onderzoeksprotocollen (vooral 
gerandomiseerde gecontroleerde studies (RCT)) verlopen en op basis 
van welke criteria moeten deze ethisch worden beoordeeld? (Hoofdstuk 
3)  
VII.  Hoe zwaar moeten de voorkeuren van de patiënt/ het onderzoeksobject 
wegen in het ontwerp en uitvoer van MFS RCT’s (Hoofdstuk 4)  
VIII.  Onder welke voorwaarden kunnen Nederlandse vrouwen die zwanger 
zijn van een foetus met een myelomeningocele worden verwezen voor 
MFS? En hoe moeten deze potentiële kandidaten worden gecounseld? 
(Hoofdstuk 5) 
Het antwoord op de voorgaande vragen kan als volgt worden 
samengevat:  
I. In onze Delphi-studie hebben deelnemers een aantal ethische 
vraagstukken geformuleerd welke, naar hun mening, zullen ontstaan 
binnen het onderzoek uitgevoerd door de partners van het ‘European 
Program on Soft Enigineering (EuroSTEC) (27 in totaal). Sommige 
vraagstukken waren niet-specifiek, anderen waren wel specifiek 
gerelateerd aan het EuroSTEC-project omdat ze betrekking hadden op 
tissue engineering onderzoek of op onderzoek met foetussen of 
pasgeborenen (of een combinatie van beide). Opmerkelijk was het feit 
dat enkele van de geformuleerde vraagstukken meer over morele 
aspecten gingen dan dat het daadwerkelijk ethische kwesties waren. Dit 
kan waarschijnlijk worden verklaard door het feit dat onze deelnemers 
geen ethici waren en dat daardoor enige moeite bestond met het 
identificeren van ethische vraagstukken in hun praktijk. (I)  
II. Zwangere vrouwen en foetussen hebben een 
onafhankelijke/intrinsieke morele status en moeten derhalve onderwerp 
zijn van morele overwegingen, zowel binnen als buiten de context van 
de arts-patiënt relatie. Als beide beschouwd worden als de patiënt van 
de foetaal chirurg, kunnen zij niet behandeld worden als patiënten van 
gelijke waarde, maar in de mate dat zij dat zij ‘agents’ kunnen worden 
beschouwd . (II, III, IV)  
III. Wanneer er een conflict van plichten ontstaat, kunnen artsen zich 
niet enkel beroepen op hun beroeps gerelateerde morele verplichtingen; 
zij zullen moeten wegen, afhankelijk van de specifieke casus die 
voorligt, of en in welke mate de verschillende opties morele risico`s met    
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zich meebrengen voor degenen die betrokken zijn. Dit in overweging 
nemende kan gezegd worden dat een zwangere vrouw, die ook 
daadwerkelijk rechten heeft, anders benaderd moet worden dan een 
foetale patiënt. Dit is met name het geval als het gaat om het voldoen 
van de morele verplichtingen jegens de foetus, wanneer daarvoor fysiek 
geïntervenieerd moet worden bij de andere patiënt (in casus de 
zwangere), welke ook gezien moet worden als persoon met rechten 
buiten de context van het ziekenhuis. (V) 
  
IV. Therapie en onderzoek worden gezien als activiteiten met 
fundamenteel andere doelstellingen, wat met zich meebrengt dat we niet 
kunnen terugvallen op welk concept van equipoise dan ook om de 
ethische juistheid van een klinische trial te beoordelen. Naar onze 
mening kunnen klinische trials aangaande MFS ethisch gezien enkel 
geïnitieerd worden wanneer een multidisciplinair ethisch comité een 
evidence based weging doet van de specifieke risico`s, en naar 
aanleiding daarvan overtuigd is dat de waarde van het beantwoorden 
van de onderzoeksvraag voor de zwangere vrouwen met foetussen met 
congenitale geboortedefecten de eventuele risico`s wat dat met zich 
meebrengt voor de onderzoeksdeelnemers rechtvaardigt. (VI) 
V. Bij een RCT met een experimentele interventie zonder dat er in het 
design van de RCT een patiënten-preferentie-arm is opgenomen, hoeft 
geen rekening gehouden te worden met de eventuele voorkeur van de 
patiënt voor de interventie-arm, omdat er per definitie sprake is van een 
therapie met onbewezen effectiviteit en/of veiligheid.  Alleen in de 
context van (bewezen) therapie hebben patiënten recht op de beste zorg  
voor hun ziekte en moeten zij de mogelijkheid hebben om de 
verschillende opties met hun arts te bespreken. (VII)   
 
VI. Nederlandse patiënten kunnen worden verwezen naar MFS voor 
myelomeningocele wanneer aan de volgende voorwaarden is voldaan: 
MFS voor myelomeningocele moet worden gekwalificeerd als 
innovatieve behandeling; het moet worden aangeboden, maar niet 
aanbevolen; het moet niet worden gepresenteerd als een alternatief voor 
abortus. (VIII) 
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USE OF DATA FROM PREDICTIVE TESTS FOLLOWING FETOSCOPIC 
ENDOLUMINAL TRACHEAL OCCLUSION FOR CONGENITAL 
DIAPHRAGMATIC HERNIA. 
 
Rodrigues, H. C., Deprest, J., Cruz-Martinez, R., & van den Berg, P. P.  
 
2011, Fetal Diagn.Ther., vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 261-262. 
  
We have read with interest the recent papers by our partners in the 
European Program on Soft Tissue Engineering for Children 
(EuroSTEC- www.eurostec.eu) on the prognostic value of pulmonary 
Doppler in predicting survival and morbidity of fetoscopic endoluminal 
tracheal occlusion (FETO) in fetuses with severe isolated left CDH and 
liver herniation. The value of pulmonary circulation assessment for the 
prediction of outcome of fetal therapy has been investigated either by 
using Doppler to evaluate blood vessel resistance and/or actual blood 
flow, or as response to maternal hyperoxygenation (1-3). 
On a theoretical basis, the investigation of pulmonary circulation 
provides independent information that can be combined with that 
already obtained by measuring the size of the airway compartment 
and/or the position of the liver. Recent studies also by the FETO 
consortium confirm that the data obtained with each parameter is not the 
same. Therefore, adding a combined use of all the different available 
predictors might improve the prediction of outcome.  
These studies are part of ongoing efforts to develop reliable outcome 
prediction models, both at the time of diagnosis and after prenatal 
therapy. As suggested, (4) we would like to caution the fetal medicine 
community prior to using this information.  First, as shown by the same 
group, many of these measurements are not easily reproducible (5). 
Second, as suggested by the same authors, it would be prudent to wait 
for external validation of these observations by other, independent 
researchers (2;6). Third, most of the data were collected on a small 
subset of patients with isolated left sided CDH and severe pulmonary 
hypoplasia who underwent prenatal therapy. Clinical experience with 
FETO has however revealed significant individual variability in the 
response to FETO, both in lung size as well as vascularization. (1-3;7) 
Fourth, at fetal surgery centers, the population of patients with less Annex 1 (chapter 3.2) 
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severe hypoplasia, and those who despite severe hypoplasia, are 
expectantly managed during pregnancy, are under-represented. It would 
be more comforting to know whether the pulmonary vascular 
assessment test can perform well also in the latter group of patients. In 
our opinion, until there is generalizable agreement upon the value, 
accuracy and validity of intrapulmonary Doppler, one should refrain 
from disclosing the prognostic information acquired by this particular 
investigational method to prospective research participants. The reason 
against disclosure is that, from an ethical viewpoint, patients have a 
right to all the information that is necessary to produce voluntary 
informed consent (8). Informed consent should be provided only based 
on reliable, properly validated information. Because the present 
prediction model has not been validated in a wider research context, it 
does not provide (yet), when applied to individual patient-research 
subjects, reliable evidence of correct outcome prediction. In retrospect, 
patients might otherwise come to the conclusion that they have been 
wrongly included in a study, because of a wrong prediction of outcome 
based on an invalidated model. In addition, those with a poor Doppler 
prognosis after FETO might be mislead in their decision either to 
continue that pregnancy or to terminate it, a legal right that most 
countries in Europe recognize to parents in these circumstances. Such  
situations put researchers at risk of liability and, more importantly, they 
may harm patients who having been given the correct facts, would either 
have not consented to participating in  the study or would have   
withdrew from it.  
Centers managing fetuses with CDH, either expectantly or with FETO 
would do well to test the proposed model in order to obtain proof of the 
validity and efficacy of pulmonary assessment in predicting survival and 
morbidity irrespective of prenatal intervention. The TOTAL trial 
(Tracheal Occlusion To Accelerate Lung growth) (www.totaltrial.eu) 
and the European based observational study of FETO (9) presents as a 
great opportunity to do exactly that. Only when there is consensus and 
wide professional confidence in the results of the proposed combination 
of anatomical information (either O/E-LHR or volume) and functional it 
should be used to counsel patients towards their decision for considering 
FETO, another prenatal intervention, or expectant management during 
pregnancy. For the time being, it seems logic to rely on lung size 
measurement, and perhaps position of the liver, as the best validated 
predictors and informed consent should be provided based on its results. 
(10;11) Annex 1 (chapter 3.2) 
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EQUIPOISE: VERSCHILLEN TUSSEN PATIËNTEN, ARTSEN, EN 
ONDERZOEKERS 
 
Abstract 
Wanneer gerandomiseerde, gecontroleerde studies (RCT) met een 
potentieel therapeutisch voordeel voor de proefpersonen worden 
uitgevoerd, is de grens tussen behandeling en onderzoek vaak moeilijk 
aan te geven. Om toekomstige proefpersonen, en hun recht om niet 
onderworpen te worden aan schadelijk en nutteloos onderzoek, te 
beschermen, dient het onderscheid tussen normale zorg en 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek duidelijk aangegeven te worden, Een sterke 
patiëntvoorkeur voor de experimentele arm van een RCT betekent niet 
dat de persoon in kwestie er recht op heeft, aangezien het per definitie 
een interventie is van onbewezen veiligheid en/of effectiviteit. Slechts in 
the context van therapie hebben patiënten het recht om de best 
beschikbare zorg te ontvangen, en het recht om hun behandelvoorkeur te 
bespreken met hun arts. Voor randomisatie dient een zorgvuldige 
informed consent-procedure plaats te vinden die de verschillen tussen 
onderzoek en behandeling duidelijk maakt en de experimentele aard van 
de studiearm benadrukt.  
 
 
Rodrigues, HCML, Oerlemans AJ, van den Berg PP.  
 
Ned Tijdschr Geneeskd. 2011; 155(49):A3846. Dutch. ) 
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PERSPECTIEF – EQUIPOISE: VERSCHILLEN TUSSEN PATIËNTEN, ARTSEN, EN 
ONDERZOEKERS 
 
Equipoise: voor wie? 
Gezien de mogelijkheid van schade bij de deelnemers, wordt onderzoek 
met menselijke proefpersonen normaliter door een ethische commissie 
(EC) getoetst In dit proces worden zowel de wetenschappelijke als de 
methodologische merites van het onderzoek geëvalueerd en wordt 
beoordeeld of het verkrijgen van geïnformeerde en vrijwillige 
toestemming (oftewel, informed consent) van de toekomstige 
proefpersonen gewaarborgd is. De wetenschappelijke en ethische 
evaluatie kunnen niet van elkaar gescheiden worden bij het beoordelen 
van de toelaatbaarheid van klinische studies, die – ten koste van de 
geïncludeerde proefpersonen – gericht zijn op het vergaren van kennis 
waarvan volgende generaties patiënten wellicht profiteren. In een 
gerandomiseerd, gecontroleerd onderzoek (randomised controlled trial 
of RCT) met therapeutische intentie, waarin een interventie of non-
interventie wat betreft effectiviteit en/of veiligheid wordt vergeleken 
met een ander, oordeelt een EC vaak op basis van de ethische noodzaak 
van equipoise.  
 
Wat is equipoise?  
Equipoise komt van het Latijnse equi en het Franse pois en betekent 
letterlijk ‘gelijk gewicht’.  
Dit ethische principe tracht het credo “primum non nocere” (“first do no 
harm”) te beschermen, de kern van de eed van Hippocrates en daarmee 
tevens het uitgangspunt van behandeling in de medische praktijk. 
Equipoise betekent dat, wanneer men verschillende therapeutische 
opties wil vergelijken in een RCT, men oprecht onzeker dient te zijn 
welke optie de voorkeur verdient bij afwegen van risico’s en het 
therapeutisch nut van iedere studiearm. Dit perspectief op de ethiek van 
klinisch onderzoek wordt ook wel de ‘gelijkheidspositie’ genoemd, 
aangezien het ervan uitgaat dat klinische onderzoekers zich aan dezelfde 
fundamentele principes dienen te houden als de therapeutische 
geneeskunde, oftewel, aan de verplichting om iedere patiënt of 
proefpersoon van optimale zorg te voorzien.
1;2  
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Wie dient in equipoise te zijn? 
Toen equipoise werd geïntroduceerd als ethische voorwaarde voor het 
uitvoeren van klinische studies (2), was de gedachte dat dit diende te 
gelden voor individuele arts-onderzoekers (theoretische equipoise). 
Artsen die naast hun klinische praktijk onderzoek doen kunnen echter 
worden beïnvloed door onderzoeksresultaten die bijvoorbeeld hun 
mening over de beste behandeling kunnen veranderen. Daarom stelde 
Freedman voor om de relevante gemeenschap van medische experts als 
referentie te nemen, in plaats van de individuele arts-onderzoeker.  Deze 
benadering wordt ook wel klinische equipoise genoemd.
3 
Equipoise kan ook anders begrepen worden, namelijk als patiënt-
equipoise of, in breder opzicht, als gemeenschappelijke (van patiënt en 
verwijzende arts) equipoise .
4;5 Volgens deze zienswijze is randomisatie 
alleen ethisch acceptabel wanneer de verwijzende arts en/of de 
prospectieve proefpersoon in equipoise zijn
6 Dit is zeker relevant 
wanneer de behandeling die de patiënt prefereert enkel wordt 
aangeboden binnen een RCT. 
Waarom is randomisatie in deze gevallen onethisch? Waarom kunnen 
patiënten de behandeling van hun voorkeur niet gewoon binnen de 
context van de RCT krijgen?  
 
Spanningsveld 
De spanning tussen onderzoeker-, arts- en patiënt-equipoise is goed te 
zien bij maternaal-foetale chirurgie voor myelomeningocele en 
congenitale hernia diafragmatica. De Management of 
Myelomeningocele Study (MOMS) was een multicenter-RCT die 
prenatale chirurgie en een afwachtend beleid tijdens de zwangerschap 
vergeleek. Bij aanvang van de studie kwamen alle betrokken 
instellingen overeen te stoppen met alle experimenten buiten de studie 
om.
7 Ondanks de voorkeur van sommige professionals en toekomstige 
patiënten voor maternaal-foetale chirurgie werd de beslissing om 
toegang tot prenatale interventies buiten de studie te beperken verdedigd 
door het belang van het vinden van wetenschappelijk bewijs voor 
maternal-foetale chirurgie voor spina bifida binnen een gecontroleerde 
onderzoeksomgeving. De gezondheidsbelangen van toekomstige 
patiënten vormden de morele rechtvaardiging voor deze 
methodologische keuze.  Annex 2 (chapter 3.3) 
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In Europa, waar Europese en nationale wetten met elkaar wedijveren in 
het reguleren van klinisch onderzoek, is zo’n overeenkomst nauwelijks 
mogelijk. Het is zelfs zo dat in discussies voorafgaand aan de 
goedkeuring van de TOTAL-trial (Tracheal Occlusion to Accelerate 
Lung Growth,
8;9 een RCT die de overlevingskansen van maternaal-
foetale chirurgie voor linkszijdige congenitale hernia diafragmatica en 
een afwachtend beleid tijdens de zwangerschap vergelijkt) vragen rond 
de rol van patiëntvoorkeur en patiënt-equipoise aan de orde van de dag 
waren. 
Hoewel klinische equipoise was geverifieerd, werd randomisatie ter 
discussie gesteld door de ethische commissie. Het hoofdargument tegen 
randomisatie was dat de te evalueren interventie eerder beschikbaar was 
geweest voor patiënten. Toen waren voorkeuren voor de experimentele 
behandeling ontstaan, waardoor patiënt-equipoise niet kon worden 
vastgesteld. De conclusie was dat patiëntvoorkeuren gehonoreerd 
moesten worden en randomisatie niet aan de orde kon zijn.
10 
 
DE ROL VAN PATIËNTVOORKEUR IN ONDERZOEK 
Als patiënt-equipoise niet meer haalbaar is, omdat toekomstige 
onderzoeksdeelnemers een sterke voorkeur hebben voor de 
experimentele arm van de studie, kan ook geen toestemming voor 
randomisatie worden verkregen. Dit betekent echter niet dat 
randomisatie onethisch of zelfs illegaal is, noch dat de patiënt recht 
heeft op een door hem of haar gekozen behandeling binnen het 
onderzoek. Die rechten heeft de patiënt wel binnen de context van 
standaardzorg. Maar ook hier zijn deze rechten begrensd, omdat de 
patiënt kan zijn beïnvloed door verkeerde informatie of onrealistische 
verwachtingen (bijvoorbeeld wanneer een patiënt om een interventie 
vraagt die niet beschikbaar is in een bepaald ziekenhuis, of 
gecontraïndiceerd is).  
In het algemeen geldt dat de voorkeur van de patiënt een belangrijk 
element van behandeling in de dagelijkse praktijk is, en dat artsen deze 
dienen te betrekken bij het bespreken van behandelmogelijkheden met 
hun patiënten. Binnen een RCT waarin een experimentele therapie met 
de huidige standaardzorg wordt vergeleken, is de relatie tussen klinisch 
onderzoeker en onderzoeksubject echter anders van aard. In deze 
context is het hoofddoel het geven van een valide en statistisch relevant 
antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag, zodat de zorg voor toekomstige Annex 2 (chapter 3.3) 
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patiënten kan worden verbeterd. Bovendien hebben patiënten recht op 
een behandeling, die evidence-based is, wat wil zeggen; bewezen 
effectief en veilig. Een experimentele behandeling in het kader van 
onderzoek is dit niet. Om deze reden hebben toekomstige proefpersonen 
niet het recht om in de experimentele arm van een RCT geplaatst te 
worden, zelfs niet wanneer deze behandeling enkel in deze context 
beschikbaar is (tenzij het onderzoeksontwerp daar expliciet rekening 
mee houdt in de vorm van een patiëntvoorkeursarm). De indruk wekken 
dat het tegendeel het geval is roept een therapeutische misconceptie op, 
vergelijkbaar met de misvatting wanneer onderzoeksdeelnemers denken 
dat ze de best beschikbare behandeling voor hun ziekte krijgen, door 
deelname aan een RCT.
11 De therapeutische misconceptie kan worden 
gedefinieerd als [a] het onvermogen van een proefpersoon om in te zien 
dat het onderzoek zijn of haar persoonlijke zorg ten negatieve kan 
beïnvloeden of [b] een irrationeel optimisme over het therapeutisch 
voordeel van deelnemen aan onderzoek.
12 Ongeacht hoe bepaalde 
voorkeuren ontstaan; het meenemen van deze preferenties tijdens de 
toetsing door de EC en tijdens de randomisatie kan zowel de misvatting 
in stand houden als de vrijwillige informed consent (die proefpersonen 
moreel en juridisch gezien verplicht zijn te geven) bemoeilijken. 
Geïnformeerde toestemming kan alleen gegeven worden als degene die 
toestemming geeft op zijn minst relevante feiten over de aard van de 
RCT begrijpt. Door de therapeutische misconceptie, oftewel een 
misvatting over de aard van de experimentele arm in een RCT, zouden 
toekomstige proefpersonen de voordelen van deelname kunnen over- of 
onderschatten, en is er in feite dus geen sprake meer van informed 
consent. 
 
CONCLUSIE 
Een sterke voorkeur van de patiënt voor de experimentele arm in een 
RCT betekent niet dat deze dient te worden gehonoreerd, omdat per 
definitie deze behandeling nog niet bewezen veilig en/of effectief is. 
Slechts in het kader van een geneeskundige behandeling hebben 
patiënten het recht de best beschikbare zorg te ontvangen, en kunnen zij 
met een dokter overleggen over hun voorkeur. Het is essentieel dat 
randomisatie voorafgegaan wordt door een zorgvuldige informed 
consent-procedure die het verschil tussen therapie en onderzoek 
duidelijk maakt en de experimentele aard van studie-armen benadrukt. 
Indien positieve resultaten uit voorafgaand onderzoek deel uitmaken van Annex 2 (chapter 3.3) 
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de proefpersooninformatie, dient dit overgebracht te worden op een 
manier die hen niet doet denken dat de ene arm van een studie superieur 
is aan de andere. En tenslotte is patiënt-equipoise belangrijk, want 
wanneer deze afwezig is, zal randomisatie waarschijnlijk falen en zullen 
onderzoekers problemen met voldoende inclusie en power van het 
onderzoek krijgen. Echter, het feit dat een voorkeur bestaat geeft het 
geen normatieve kracht, en het vinden van de veiligste en meest 
effectieve behandeling voor patiënten dient altijd te prevaleren boven 
het belang van individuele toekomstige proefpersonen om interventies 
met onbewezen veiligheid en effectiviteit te krijgen. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Spina bifida is de meest voorkomende aangeboren afwijking van het 
centraal zenuwstelsel en veroorzaakt centrale en perifere neurologische 
afwijkingen. In de ernstiger gevallen kan dit leiden tot levenslange 
invaliditeit met afhankelijkheid van medische en sociale hulpverlening. 
In een gerandomiseerd onderzoek werd aangetoond dat het sluiten van 
het defect in de foetale periode een betere uitkomst biedt dan postnatale 
chirurgie. Prenatale therapie geeft echter ook een verhoogd risico op 
prematuriteit en obstetrische complicaties. Hoewel foetale therapie 
vooralsnog niet moet worden gezien als standaard zorg moet de 
zwangere vrouw waar bij de foetus een spina bifida is vastgesteld 
hierover wel worden geïnformeerd en de mogelijkheid hebben, te 
worden verwezen voor foetale therapie. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Spina bifida is the most common congenital birth defect involving the 
central and peripheral nervous system and results in abnormal central 
and peripheral innervation. In the most severe cases, it entails lifelong 
disability with dependence on medical and social supportive care. 
A randomized controlled study demonstrated that prenatal closure of the 
defect improved neurological outcome as compared with postnatal 
surgical repair. However, prenatal surgery was associated with an 
increased risk of preterm birth and obstetric complications. Although 
fetal therapy must not yet be seen as standard care, the pregnant woman 
is entitled to full information and must have the possibility to be referred 
for fetal therapy in case of a prenatal diagnosed spina bifida. 
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INLEIDING 
Foetale therapie kan de prognose voor kinderen die geboren worden met 
een  spina bifida verbeteren maar gaat ook gepaard met risico's voor 
moeder en kind. Dit artikel heeft tot doel een gebalanceerde 
samenvatting en beoordeling te geven van de nu bekende 
wetenschappelijke kennis over foetale therapie bij spina bifida, ter 
ondersteuning van de zorgverleners die betrokken zijn bij de zorg voor 
vrouwen die zwanger zijn van een kind met spina bifida. Bij het tot 
stand komen van dit artikel is gebruik gemaakt van de kennis en 
expertise van deskundigen uit de diverse disciplines die zich bezig 
houden met de pre-, en postnatale zorg voor kinderen met een spina 
bifida. Voor de wetenschappelijke onderbouwing is gebruik gemaakt 
van literatuur verkregen met gerichte zoekacties uit PubMed. 
 
Spina bifida 
Spina bifida is een sluitingsdefect van de wervelkolom en het 
ruggenmerg en is de meest voorkomende aangeboren afwijking van het 
centraal zenuwstelsel. De wereldwijde incidentie bedraagt 1 op 2000 
levendgeborenen.
1 S pina bifida aperta leidt tot motore en sensibele 
uitvalsverschijnselen van de onderste extremiteiten, darm en blaas 
functiestoornissen, seksuele problematiek, scoliose en vergroeiingen van 
de onderste extremiteiten.
2-3 De ernst van de gevolgen is onder andere 
afhankelijk van het niveau van de laesie. Een spina bifida gaat veelal 
gepaard met hydrocefalus en neerwaartse herniatie van de kleine 
hersenen en hersenstam (Chiari type II malformatie). Hoewel veel 
kinderen niet verstandelijk gehandicapt zijn kan het IQ wel verlaagd zijn 
ten gevolge van deze afwijkingen.
4 Spina bifida kan aanleiding geven 
tot levenslange afhankelijkheid van medische en sociale zorg.
5 Ondanks 
de huidige intensieve medische zorg overlijdt 15-30% van de kinderen 
binnen de eerste 5 levensjaren.
6-7  
 
Spina bifida wordt in toenemende mate in prenatale 
screeningsprogramma's vastgesteld in het eerste en/of tweede trimester.
8 
Bij vermoeden op spina bifida wordt de patiënt doorverwezen naar een 
derdelijnscentrum. Na het zorgvuldig vaststellen van het niveau van het 
defect en het uitsluiten van bijkomende afwijkingen, wordt uitgebreide 
multidisciplinaire counseling over spina bifida en de te verwachten 
prognose aangeboden. Hoewel er een zekere inschatting van de Annex 3 (chapter 4) 
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gevolgen kan worden gemaakt op basis van het niveau van het defect 
kan er een groot verschil bestaan tussen het anatomische defect en het 
neurologische uitvalsniveau.
9 Tot voor kort bleven de prenatale opties 
beperkt tot het laten beëindigen van de zwangerschap of een expectatief 
beleid tot aan de geboorte. In Noord Nederland werd in de periode 
2007-2009, 45% van alle zwangerschappen met spina bifida beëindigd. 
In andere regio's ligt dat getal hoger. (Bron: "Eurocat Update: Actuele 
cijfers aangeboren aandoeningen in Noord Nederland 1981-2009"). 
 
De standaard behandeling van spina bifida is het onmiddellijk 
postnataal chirurgisch sluiten van het defect. Opstijgende infectie of 
bijkomende secundaire schade aan het centraal zenuwstelsel wordt 
hiermee voorkomen maar verbetert de neurologische afwijkingen niet. 
In de meeste gevallen moet primair of secundair een 
ventriculoperitoneale drain worden geplaatst omwille van hydrocefalus. 
Bij 40% wordt de drain binnen 6 maanden gereviseerd in verband met 
complicaties. Zowel hydrocefalus, als het plaatsen van of complicaties 
met de drain zijn negatieve predictoren.
10 
 
FOETALE THERAPIE 
Spina bifida is een aandoening die progressief is tijdens het prenatale 
leven. Naast de embryologische stoornis is het zich ontwikkelende 
ruggenmerg gedurende de zwangerschap blootgesteld aan de chemische 
en mechanische invloeden van de intra-uteriene omgeving, wat 
bijkomende schade veroorzaakt.
11 Het tijdens de zwangerschap sluiten 
van het defect zou deze secundaire schade en ook verdere liquorlekkage 
kunnen voorkomen.
12-14 
 
De eerste klinische poging tot prenatale behandeling van spina bifida 
via een laparotomie en hysterotomie vond plaats in 1997.
15 De resultaten 
lieten een daling zien van het aantal drainafhankelijke hydrocefalieën en 
het verdwijnen van de herniatie van kleine hersenen en hersenstam.
15-16 
In 2003 werd door de National Institutes of Health een gerandomiseerd 
onderzoek opgestart, beter bekend onder het acroniem "MOMS trial" 
(Management Of Myelomeningocele Study). In drie centra werd de 
prenatale behandeling vergeleken met de postnatale behandeling voor 
een welomschreven groep (tabel 1).
17 De eerste primaire Annex 3 (chapter 4) 
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uitkomstvariabele was overleving zonder de noodzaak tot het plaatsen 
van een ventriculoperitoneale drain op de leeftijd van 12 maanden. De 
tweede uitkomstvariabele op de leeftijd van 30 maanden was een 
samengestelde motorische en mentale ontwikkelingsscore met correctie 
voor het niveau van het defect. Secundaire uitkomstmaten waren 
maternale, foetale en neonatale uitkomsten. In december 2010 werd de 
studie voortijdig beëindigd vanwege een significant verbeterde uitkomst 
na foetale chirurgie. Op dat moment (183 inclusies) waren de resultaten 
bekend van 158, respectievelijk 134 kinderen van 12, respectievelijk 30 
maanden oud (tabel 2).
17 In de prenataal behandelde groep werd bij 40% 
een drain geplaatst, in vergelijking met 82% in de postnataal 
geopereerde groep (12 maanden).
17 Verder was er een duidelijke 
verbetering te zien in de motorische ontwikkeling bij de prenataal 
geopereerde groep (30 maanden). Zoals bij andere foetale interventies 
blijven het vroegtijdig breken van de vliezen, oligohydramnion en 
amnion-chorion separatie een probleem wat het risico op vroeggeboorte 
(zwangerschapsduur bij geboorte respectievelijk 34,1±3,1 en 37,3±1,1 
weken) met de daaraan verbonden complicaties doet toenemen. Bij 10% 
van de moeders werd er een gedeeltelijke of complete dehiscentie van 
het uteriene litteken ten tijde van de sectio caesarea gevonden.
17 
 
Men moet er zich bij dit type foetale chirurgie goed van bewust zijn dat 
men een aantal risico's introduceert die er niet zouden zijn bij een 
afwachtend beleid tijdens de zwangerschap. Zo kan iatrogene 
vroeggeboorte tot neonatale sterfte leiden. Gevolgen van algehele 
anesthesie en tocolyse, chorioamnionitis en littekendehiscentie zijn 
maternale risico's in dezelfde zwangerschap. Verder zijn er nog, niet 
goed gekwantificeerde risico's van uterusruptuur en de noodzaak tot een 
primaire sectio caesarea in volgende zwangerschappen. 
 
De vraag is nu hoe de resultaten naar de Europese context vertaald 
moeten worden. Tijdens de studieperiode bouwden de drie deelnemende 
centra een enorme expertise met open foetale chirurgie en deze 
aandoening op. Vanwege het noodzakelijke leerproces lijkt het logisch 
om deze nieuwe behandelvorm aan te bieden in een beperkt aantal 
centra die al ervaring hebben met andere vormen van foetale chirurgie, 
en idealiter door ervaren teams worden bijgestaan. Voordelen hiervan 
zijn dat concentratie van patiënten het leerproces verkort en de kans op 
goede resultaten verhoogt.
18 Verder dienen deze centra zich ook strikt te Annex 3 (chapter 4) 
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houden aan de operatietechniek en de selectiecriteria die in de MOMS 
trial werden gebruikt.
19 Aangezien er vooralsnog alleen korte termijn 
resultaten bekend zijn, dienen centra zich te engageren tot een 
langdurige follow-up van deze patiëntengroep. Mogelijk treedt er alsnog 
op latere leeftijd drainafhankelijkheid op of verklevingen binnen het 
wervelkanaal. Ook over de blaas-, en darmfunctie na foetale chirurgie is 
nog onvoldoende bekend.
20 Hetzelfde geldt voor de mogelijk negatieve 
gevolgen van vroeggeboorte die pas op de langere termijn zichtbaar 
worden. Experimenteel onderzoek naar minimaal invasieve foetale 
therapie bij spina bifida dient te worden voortgezet. Hoewel het niet is 
aangetoond dat dit het risico op vroeggeboorte doet afnemen, zou het 
althans de obstetrische complicaties moeten voorkomen en een vroegere 
behandeling in de zwangerschap mogelijk moeten maken wat de 
uitkomst theoretisch nog zou moeten verbeteren.
21 Tissue engineering 
kan hierbij mogelijk een rol spelen, met name bij grote defecten die niet 
primair gesloten kunnen worden.
13 Recente resultaten tonen aan dat 
foetale endoscopische sluiting mogelijk is, waarbij een vergelijkbare 
neurologische winst als bij de MOMS trial behaald wordt maar helaas 
ook ten koste van ernstige complicaties.
22 
 
Foetale therapie in Leuven 
Leuven, wat bekend staat als een groot interventiecentrum als het gaat 
om foetale therapie met een uitgebreide expertise op dit gebied, 
behandelt patiënten op dezelfde manier als bij de MOMS trial waarbij 
de artsen van het Children's Hospital of Philadelphia deel uitmaken van 
het behandelteam. Inclusiecriteria voor deelname zijn vergelijkbaar met 
de gehanteerde criteria in de MOMS trial (tabel 1) en de foetus zal ook 
worden benaderd via een hysterotomie. Ook de Nederlandse patiënt 
komt hier voor behandeling in aanmerking.  
Uitgangspunten voor verwijzing naar Leuven 
y Voor een goede voorlichting is het van belang dat counselors goed op 
de hoogte zijn van de uitkomsten van de MOMS trial en de voor- en 
nadelen van foetale therapie kunnen bespreken om te voorkomen dat er 
onjuiste verwachtingen worden gewekt.  
 
y Verwijzing naar Leuven zal moeten plaatsvinden vanuit de 
academische centra, wat impliceert dat iedere zwangere vrouw, bij wie Annex 3 (chapter 4) 
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bij de foetus een spina bifida is vastgesteld, wordt verwezen naar een 
academisch centrum. Dit verwijspatroon sluit aan op de huidige 
praktijk: in vrijwel alle gevallen vind postnatale behandeling van spina 
bifida plaats in een academisch centrum. 
 
y Binnen de centra blijft het huidige standaardbeleid bestaan. Goede 
counseling, inclusief over foetale therapie, dient in Nederland plaats te 
vinden. Dit gebeurt op basis van de individuele bevindingen en de 
functionele prognose voor het kind door een multidisciplinair team. 
Maatschappelijk werk of een psycholoog kan worden aangeboden voor 
sociale en emotionele begeleiding. De mogelijkheid van foetale therapie 
moet in ieder geval worden besproken met patiënten die voldoen aan de 
inclusiecriteria zonder dat dit een aanbeveling voor foetale therapie 
impliceert. In de counseling is het belangrijk te vermelden dat foetale 
therapie geen genezing betekent maar dat hoogstens door een foetale 
ingreep verdere neurologische uitval tijdens de zwangerschap kan 
worden voorkomen. De voor- en nadelen van foetale therapie moeten 
worden besproken, inclusief het noemen van de risico's. Geadviseerd 
wordt om na deze huidige zwangerschap, minimaal 18-24 maanden niet 
zwanger te worden en alle volgende bevallingen moeten plaatsvinden 
door middel van een primaire sectio caesarea.
23 Het is belangrijk in de 
counseling aan te geven dat ondanks de beschreven uitkomsten en het 
aanbieden van foetale chirurgie als behandeling in Leuven, foetale 
therapie in Nederland (nog) geen standaard zorg is. Het verdient 
aanbeveling om, mits de zwangerschapstermijn dit toelaat, counseling te 
spreiden over twee consulten met een korte tussenpoos om de zwangere 
vrouw en haar partner de tijd te geven een goede afweging te kunnen 
maken. Tijdens de counseling dient besproken te worden dat het 
beëindigen van de zwangerschap voor de 24
e week of een expectatief 
beleid tot aan de geboorte tot de mogelijkheden behoort. 
 
y Als patiënt voldoet aan de inclusiecriteria (tabel 1) en in aanmerking 
wil komen voor foetale therapie kan zij, na overleg met Leuven, worden 
verwezen. Vanwege logistieke redenen moet verwijzing voor de 22
e 
week plaatsvinden. Indien zij na verwijzing alsnog afziet van foetale 
therapie wordt zij terug verwezen naar verwijzer en wordt het huidige 
standaardbeleid gevolgd. Als gekozen wordt voor foetale therapie, dan 
zal de operatie in Leuven worden uitgevoerd, waarna de verdere 
prenatale controles plaatsvinden in het centrum van verwijzing. Annex 3 (chapter 4) 
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y De bevalling zal moeten plaatsvinden in een academisch centrum. Na 
prenatale behandeling is een primaire sectio caesarea geïndiceerd 
vanwege het risico op littekendehiscentie of een uterusruptuur. Als geen 
prenatale behandeling heeft plaatsgevonden lijkt het gerechtvaardigd om 
bij hoofdligging en geen groot defect een vaginale partus na te streven.
24 
 
y Foetale behandeling van spina bifida mag worden beschouwd als een 
experimentele interventie, waarvoor nog zeer beperkte bewijslast 
bestaat. Om deze reden wordt geadviseerd om kinderen die deze 
behandeling hebben ondergaan te laten deelnemen aan een prospectief 
beschrijvend onderzoek met een gedegen follow-up programma. Binnen 
Nederland zal daarom een follow-up programma worden opgezet om 
alle kinderen met een spina bifida voor lange tijd te kunnen vervolgen. 
Hierbij zullen de resultaten van de kinderen met prenatale behandeling 
worden vergeleken met die na postnatale behandeling. Bij de counseling 
in de zwangerschap moet al gevraagd worden of ouders aan deze 
follow-up willen deelnemen en dit moet bij voorkeur worden vastgelegd 
in een informed consent formulier. 
 
CONCLUSIE 
Foetale chirurgie verbetert in een selecte groep patiënten met spina 
bifida de motorische ontwikkeling en voorkomt het ontstaan van 
hydrocefalie. Dit gaat echter ten koste van een verhoogde kans op 
vroeggeboorte en complicaties in de huidige en/of eventueel volgende 
zwangerschappen.  
Met de mogelijkheid van foetale behandeling van spina bifida voor de 
Nederlandse patiënt in Leuven is het belangrijk dat er in Nederland 
consensus wordt bereikt over het aanbieden van foetale therapie evenals 
lange termijn opvolging bij spina bifida. Deze verandering in beleid 
moet breed worden gedragen door de diverse disciplines. Daartoe werd 
een landelijke multidisciplinaire werkgroep opgericht. Naast het 
samenstellen van voorlichtingsmateriaal voor zorgverleners en patiënten 
zal een follow-up programma worden opgezet om alle kinderen met een 
spina bifida prospectief te kunnen vervolgen. Vooralsnog moet foetale 
therapie bij spina bifida niet worden gezien als standaard therapie. 
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Tabel 1. Inclusie- en exclusiecriteria voor foetale therapie bij spina 
bifida. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusiecriteria  Exclusiecriteria 
eenling zwangerschap  niet geïsoleerd 
normaal karyogram  verkorte cervix of eerdere 
vroeggeboorte 
bovenste niveau van de laesie tussen 
T1 en S1 
BMI ≥ 35 
aanwijzingen herniatie van kleine 
hersenen en hersenstam (echo of 
MRI) 
contra-indicaties voor chirurgie 
inclusief een eerdere 
hysterotomie 
ventriculomegalie  placenta praevia of abruptio 
placentae 
chirurgie moet kunnen plaatsvinden 
voor 26+0 weken 
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Tabel 2. Belangrijkste uitkomsten uit de MOMS trial.
33  
 
Maternale uitkomst  Prenatale 
chirurgie 
n=78 
Postnatale 
chirurgie 
n=80 
Amnion-chorion separatie - n   20  0 
Oligohydramnion - n  16  3 
Abruptio placentae - n  5  0 
Chorioamnionitis - n  2  0 
Spontaan breken vliezen - n  36  6 
Bloedtransfusie bij bevalling - n  7  1 
Status hysterotomie litteken bij partus - 
n/totaal n 
   
- intact  49/76   
- erg dun  19/76   
- gedeeltelijke dehiscentie  7/76   
- complete dehiscentie  1/76   
Foetale en neonatale uitkomst     
Perinatale sterfte - n  2  2 
Zwangerschapsduur bij de geboorte - n  34,1±3,1  37,3±1,1 
Respiratory distress syndrome - n/totaal n  16/77  5/80 
Uitkomst kind bij 12 maanden     
Plaatsing drain - n  31  66 
Herniatie van kleine hersenen en 
hersenstam - n/totaal n 
45/70  66/69 
Chirurgie voor tethered cord - n/totaal n  6/77  1/80 
Uitkomst kind bij 30 maanden  n=64  n=70 
Bayley Mental Development Index -    Annex 3 (chapter 4) 
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n/totaal n* 
≥ 50  60/62  59/67 
≥ 85  46/62  45/67 
Bayley Psychomotor Development Index - 
n/totaal n* 
   
≥ 50  29/62  23/67 
≥ 85  10/62  4/67 
Zelfstandig lopen bij onderzoek - n/totaal n  26/62  14/67 
* Een hogere score betekent beter functioneren. 
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